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
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## ZENO OF ELEA'S ATTACKS ON PLURALITY.

In recent decades students of mathematics, philosophy, and the classics have again and again raised their voices <sup>1</sup> to vindicate the serious importance of Zeno's paradoxes of motion (*Vorsokr.*<sup>2</sup> 29 A 25-28 = Lee,<sup>3</sup> nos. 19-36), not even excluding the Stadium. No longer can the problem implied in the paradoxes be disposed of by simply pointing out that time and space are equally divisible. The question which is at the bottom of all four of them is far more profound. It concerns the fundamental structure of continua, and the cognate problem of the nature of the infinite and its relationship to the finite; <sup>4</sup> or, to quote Brochard:

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Bertrand Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics* (Cambridge, University Press, 1903), I, § 327-36; V. Brochard, *Études de philosophie ancienne et de philosophie moderne* (Paris, Alcan, 1912), pp. 3-22; A. Koyré, "Bemerkungen zu den Zenonischen Paradoxen," *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, V (1922), pp. 603-28; H. Lanz, "Disintegration of Integrals," *The Personalist*, X (1929), pp. 248-55; H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1935), pp. 154-61. (I have listed only writings which I have used. I am not equipped to follow up the mathematical aspect of the problems involved.)

<sup>2</sup> Hermann Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 5. Auflage herausgegeben von W. Kranz (Berlin, Weidmann, 1934-37). The chapter on Zeno is no. 29 in the fifth edition, no. 19 in the preceding editions. The fragments of Zeno will be quoted from *Vorsokr.* in the form "frag. B 4."

<sup>3</sup> H. D. P. Lee, *Zeno of Elea*, Text, Translation and Notes (Cambridge, University Press, 1936). The evidence is presented more extensively than in *Vorsokr.* and the commentary is very useful. Texts from Lee will be quoted in the form "Lee, no. 17."

<sup>4</sup> Cf. G. Calogero, *Studi sull' Eleatismo* (Rome, Tipografia del Senato, 1932), pp. 87-157. Calogero discusses all fragments and other evidence

"La question est de savoir comment . . . cette série de divisions, par définition inépuisable, peut être épuisée . . ." (p. 9). Furthermore, it has been shown that Aristotle, when criticizing the paradoxes, was not concerned conscientiously to adjust his objections to that which the historical Zeno had tried to prove, or rather disprove.<sup>5</sup> For Aristotle, Zeno's deductions were nothing but single items in the immense wealth of given material of which he could take advantage to clarify his own views. If it is thus established that Zeno's syllogisms must not necessarily be condemned as a futile play of dialectics<sup>6</sup> and that Aristotle's censure fails to do Zeno justice, a road seems to be open to a full rehabilitation and, perhaps, glorification. But one doubt remains. How adequately did the real Zeno actually deal with the problems he had in hand? And how sincere was he about them? These questions cannot, for obvious reasons, be conclusively answered for the four paradoxes of motion which have come down to us only in the form which Aristotle or his commentators<sup>7</sup> gave them. We have to look rather to the three or

with great acumen and tries accurately to determine Zeno's historical position. He especially stresses, and sometimes overemphasizes to the exclusion of other aspects, the antinomy of finite and infinite.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Calogero, p. 92, and especially Cherniss, p. 43, note 165.

<sup>6</sup> Zeno was called by Aristotle "inventor of dialectics" (*Vorsokr.* A 10). To explain what Aristotle meant it is sufficient to quote three authorities: 1) According to Simplicius (*Phys.*, p. 139, 5; cf. note 7 *infra*), every one of Zeno's arguments purported to prove *ὅτι τῶ πολλὰ εἶναι λέγοντι συμβαίνει τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν*.

2) According to Aristotle himself (*Rhet.* 1, 1355 a 33), dialectics and rhetoric are the only arts the business of which it is to forge contradictions (i.e. to derive contradictory conclusions from identical premises).

3) According to Plato (*Phaedrus* 261 d-e), finally, the technique of contrary contentions (*ἡ ἀντιλογική*) has a legitimate place in rhetoric, but "the Eleatic Palamedes" (= Zeno) was likewise proficient in the art of making *φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι τὰ αὐτὰ ὅμοια καὶ οὐκ ὅμοια, καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ μένοντά τε αὐτὰ καὶ φερόμενα*.

<sup>7</sup> The commentators will be quoted by page and line from the Berlin Academy edition: *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca edita consilio et auctoritate Academiae Literarum Regiae Borussicae* (Berlin, Reimer). Philoponus, in *Phys.*, first part, is in volume XVI, ed. Vitelli, 1887; Simplicius, in *Phys.*, first part, is in volume IX, ed. Diels, 1882; Simplicius, in *De Caelo*, is in volume VII, ed. Heiberg, 1894; and Themistius, in *Phys.*, is in volume V, part 2, ed. Schenkl, 1900.

four<sup>8</sup> fragments preserved in their original wording (*Vorsokr.* B 1-4). Since they likewise deal with aspects of the identical problem, the problem of the continuum, they are likely to yield inferences of a more general nature. And it might prove worth while to determine, as accurately as can be done, precisely what Zeno said in his own words, and how he said it.

Turning now to the scanty remnants of Zeno's original book and putting the question as we did, we are met at once by a fragment which of itself illuminates the whole situation. The fragment reads:

Εἰ πολλὰ ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη τοσαῦτα εἶναι ὅσα ἐστί, καὶ οὔτε πλείονα αὐτῶν οὔτε ἐλάττωνα. Εἰ δὲ τοσαῦτά ἐστιν ὅσα ἐστί, πεπερασμένα ἂν εἴη. Εἰ πολλὰ ἔστιν, ἄπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἐστίν. Ἀεὶ γὰρ ἕτερα μεταξὺ τῶν ὄντων ἐστί, καὶ πάλιν ἐκείνων ἕτερα μεταξὺ· καὶ οὕτως ἄπειρα τὰ ὄντα ἐστί (*Vorsokr.* B 3 = Lee, no. 11).

"If there are many things, they must necessarily be as many as they are, neither more nor less. And if they are as many as they are, they will be limited. If there are many things, the things that are are unlimited. For there are always other things between the things that are, and again other things between those, and thus the things that are are unlimited."

One glance at the text is sufficient to make us realize that for "limited" and "unlimited" (*scil.* in number) we could almost substitute "exhausted" and "inexhaustible," and at once the fragment reads like a translation back into Zeno's Greek of what we quoted above from Brochard. Brochard himself does not seem to have been aware of the coincidence. Like most writers, he had his eyes fixed on the four paradoxes of motion as reported by Aristotle and others, and gave the rest of the material hardly more than a transient thought.<sup>9</sup> By keen intuition and conjectural inference, the French scholar developed from the four paradoxes an idea which now appears to be manifestly in evidence in one of Zeno's authentic fragments. When he formulated his novel explanation, Brochard of course made it primarily apply to the four paradoxes. In our quotation, however, we indulged

<sup>8</sup> Calogero's attempt (pp. 93-4) to add a fifth fragment (= Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 562, 3-6) was refuted by K. von Fritz, *Gnomon*, XIV (1938), pp. 104-5.

<sup>9</sup> Brochard never mentions any of the original fragments specifically and makes only a general remark on the close relationship between the arguments against motion and those against plurality (p. 4).

in the trickery of suppressing some words and making Brochard's remark appear more general than it was actually meant to be.<sup>10</sup> We thus brought out in sharper relief the fundamental coincidences between conjecture and evidence and between one group of fragments and the other.<sup>11</sup> The experiment bears out, first, that Brochard's view was sound; second, that the paradoxes of motion are indeed closely related to the arguments against plurality; and, third, that Zeno, when he invented the four paradoxes, did not by mere accident hit on certain ideas which, under the benevolent interpretation of someone else, would yield profound implications. Zeno himself, in another paragraph of his book, did develop one such implication, and it is thus securely established that he was not merely juggling with the superficial aspects of a grave problem.

But we have allowed ourselves to use frag. B 3 for one particular purpose, without previously ascertaining its full and exact meaning. It contains an obscurity which we now must try to remove. Zeno's assertion that "there are always other things between the things that are" is rather startling, and, in the absence of any clue in the text, we have to guess what led the author to his contention. According to Zeller<sup>12</sup> and others, Zeno meant that two things can be two only if separated from one another and that to separate them something else must be between them. There is, as far as I can see, no evidence for this explanation, and it does not sound probable. Nowhere does Eleaticism deny that two things can be in direct contact.<sup>13</sup> Whenever Zeno speaks of plurality, he includes divisibility,<sup>14</sup> and by divisibility he does

<sup>10</sup> What Brochard actually wrote is this: "La question est de savoir comment, dans l'un et dans l'autre (*scil.* dans l'espace et dans le temps), cette série de divisions, par définition inépuisable, peut être épuisée, et il faut qu'elle le soit pour que le mouvement se produise." Cherniss formulates the problem in its broad generality: "... denying that continuity can be constructed of elements whether finite or infinite" (p. 161).

<sup>11</sup> For another remarkable coincidence of the same kind cf. *infra*, note 24.

<sup>12</sup> E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, 6th ed. by W. Nestle (Leipzig, Reisland, 1919), I, 1, p. 752.

<sup>13</sup> The hypothetical assumption in frag. B 1 (to be treated in the second section of this paper) of corporeal surfaces can hardly be used to support Zeller's view.

<sup>14</sup> Calogero contends (p. 127) that Zeno did not consciously and ex-



not mean physical separation alone but also the mental distinction between parts or regions within the continuous body of the object. There is literally no room for the insertion of a partition to segregate one definite region from another contiguous region, and much less is there any reason to posit an intervening third thing to distinguish two things from one another.<sup>15</sup> *Res rem finire videtur* (Lucretius, I, 998).

In order to explain the second part of the fragment, there seems to be left only the alternative of operating with things, or parts, of indefinite magnitude. If we assume plurality, i. e. divisibility of any unit, some part of it is here and some other part is there. But even if Here and There are very close together, nothing can prevent us from making the Something here and the Something there small enough to allow for a third thing to be squeezed in between them. The operation can be repeated indefinitely without reaching a limit. The premise of plurality and divisibility does not admit the assumption of an ultimate indivisible unit, and strict logic does not allow a gradual transition from the very small to the unextended. For it is the nerve of many of Zeno's arguments that lack of magnitude must be radically distinguished from any magnitude, however small.<sup>16</sup>

plicitly make the presupposition of infinite divisibility in the abstract, though he admits that in the concrete Zeno reasoned in accordance with that principle. But Calogero's arguments in favor of his view are far from compelling, and it would be strange if Zeno were not aware of a principle which he applied so persistently and successfully.

<sup>15</sup> Parmenides discusses differentiation twice (*Vorsokr.* 28 B 8, 22-25 and 44-49). To prove his contention that Being is homogeneous and does not suffer internal differentiation, he argues both times on the same lines and states that, if there were any distinction between parts or regions, the parts would have to be either separated from one another by gaps or distinct by different degrees of being here and there. He does not require that a third thing should be there to keep two things apart. Zeno, in frag. B 1, speaks of possible distinction in terms of *ἕτερον πρὸς ἕτερον ἔσται*, which again shows that two things are enough to produce differentiation. As to the demarcation setting off a single object from others (*πέρας, ὅρος*) it is in Greek philosophy conceived either as the beginning and end of the object itself or as the beginning and end of other contiguous objects (*τὸ περιέχον*); but not as an independent third object.

<sup>16</sup> For the explanation of Zeno, scholars often make use of the notion "infinitely small" (infinitesimal), a term, that is, which mediates between the contraries Extended and Unextended. The term easily lends

The idea of decreasing quantities, as we tentatively suggested it for the explanation of frag. B 3, recurs in Zeno's dichotomy, Achilles, and frag. B 1. The closest parallel, however, is to be found in Plato's *Parmenides*, in a dialogue, that is, which was meant by its author to elaborate and refine the methods of Zeno's dialectics and to supplement his achievements by working out the points he had failed to make.<sup>17</sup> In the second part of that dialogue, and in a passage which, as we shall see later, echoes one of the extant fragments of Zeno, Plato uses the following reasoning (165 a-b): If, in a given object, we mentally (*τῇ διανοίᾳ*) distinguish certain parts according to their position, and e. g. single out some indefinite mass (*ὄγκος*) as occupying the central position, then we can again single out, within the central part, a smaller quantity which is more central than it.<sup>18</sup> Plato afterwards makes it clear that the argument can be applied with devastating results to any part of any object: *θρύπτεσθαι δὲ οἶμαι κερματιζόμενον ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ ὄν, ὃ ἂν τις λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ*. The procedure is exactly the same as we assumed it to be for Zeno, and it

itself to misuse: the infinitesimal can conveniently be considered either as a negligible quantity, i. e. no quantity at all, or as a unit which, though small in itself, can by multiplication yield any great quantity. B. Russell (see *supra*, note 1) has shown in § 333 that for the treatment of Zeno's paradoxes the infinitesimal is not admissible; and the material we possess yields no indication to justify the assumption that Zeno did admit the infinitesimal. (It is true that Lee, no. 2 operates with the infinitesimal, but Zeno's authorship for the argument, far from being certain, is based by our source on conjecture alone, and a very weak conjecture at that, cf. Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 140, 21-26.) Where Zeno hypothetically speaks of objects with no magnitude, he does not reach this stage by gradual decrease but by taking extension away in one mental act (cf. *infra*, p. 16). Lee, on p. 33, ascribes to Zeno the idea that "the element ultimately to be reached has the properties of a point." It is, however, precisely Zeno's contention that in a process of continued division no "ultimate" can ever be reached, cf. frag. B 1: *οὐδὲν αὐτοῦ τοιοῦτον ἔσχατον ἔσται*. To this extent I also take exception to Lee's remark (p. 31) on the fragment under discussion: "The second part of the fragment must again make nonsense unless it is understood that the 'things' in question are supposed to have the properties of points in a line."

<sup>17</sup> Cf. especially Plato, *Parmenides* 135 e-136 c.

<sup>18</sup> We simplify the Platonic context and omit what is unnecessary for the present purpose. A fuller quotation will be given in the second section of this paper.



is here explicitly stated that the quantities we distinguish are to be made smaller with each new step.

The main idea, then, of frag. B 3 is this. If we admit plurality and divisibility, all the parts together will make up the whole of the universe. In order to be complete, their number, whatever it is, must be finite.<sup>19</sup> Looking, however, the other way, not from the parts toward the whole but from the whole toward its parts, the summation proves never to be exhaustive and the number of parts is infinite.

The fragment is significant because here the problem of an infinitely divisible finite continuum is set forth in its simplest form. The quandary is not complicated by an interplay of two continua such as space and time. In conceiving his antinomy, Zeno certainly thought only of the spatial continuum (or, more precisely, the number of things coexisting in a finite space). But, as a matter of fact, not one alteration in the wording would be necessary to make it apply to any other continuum, e. g. time, or motion, or change in general.

The next fragment to be studied cannot claim any such sweeping generality of import. It commands our special interest, however, because it, like the famous four paradoxes, attacks the reality of motion. We possess two versions:

τὸ κινούμενον οὐτ' ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τόπῳ κινεῖται οὐτ' ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἐστι  
(*Vorsokr.*, frag. 4 = Lee, no. 17, from Diogenes Laertius).

"That which moves moves neither in the place (position) where it is nor where it is not."

τὸ κινούμενον ἤτοι ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τόπῳ κινεῖται ἢ ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἐστι. καὶ οὔτε ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τόπῳ κινεῖται οὔτε ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἐστιν. οὐκ ἄρα τι κινεῖται  
(Lee, no. 18, from Epiphanius).

The second version is longer and complies with the rules and conventions of post-Aristotelian syllogisms. The first version has a better claim to authenticity and probably quotes Zeno's<sup>20</sup> actual words. In its greater conciseness, it makes the verb contradict

<sup>19</sup> Cf. e. g. Plato, *Parmenides* 144 e-145 a.

<sup>20</sup> Sextus Empiricus twice mentions a very similar syllogism and ascribes it not to Zeno but to Diodorus Cronus (*Pyrrh. Hypot.*, 3, 71 and, with one variation, *Adv. Phys.* 2, 87). The second quotation, however, is introduced by the remark οὗτός γε (scil. Diodorus) τὸν περιφορητικὸν συνερῶτᾱ λόγον εἰς τὸ μὴ κινεῖσθαι τι, which indicates that Diodorus was not the originator of the argument.

its subject: τὸ κινούμενον οὐ κινεῖται, just as in the Arrow, according to Aristotle, Zeno had contended that ἡ ὁριστὸς φερομένη ἔστηκεν.<sup>21</sup> The absurdity could not be brought out more forcefully and playfully. Zeno first allows the object to move, then he analyzes its motion and shows that, even if taking place, it does not take place.<sup>22</sup>

But what precisely did Zeno have in mind when he implied that, if motion were real, the moving object must either move in a place where it is or in a place where it is not? Certainly he had some reason for setting up the dilemma, the first horn of which hardly requires an explanation whereas the second stands very much in need of elucidation. Again we shall first suggest a possibility and then try to support it.

The human mind, when trying to give itself an accurate account of motion, finds itself confronted with two aspects of the

<sup>21</sup> In addition to the parallel of the Arrow, we have Plato's explicit statement that Zeno ridiculed both plurality and motion by the method of antinomy and contradiction (see *supra*, note 6), showing that "the same things are at rest and in motion," i.e. that an object, while in motion, is at rest.

<sup>22</sup> For this reason, of the two constructions of which Aristotle's account of the dichotomy is capable (cf. Lee, pp. 67 ff.), I reject the one adopted by the ancient commentators. They subdivide the first, not the second, half of the distance, so that the half-way points surge up immediately, close down on the object, and block it before it has had a chance to set out for its goal. The other construction is more dramatic and corresponds more closely to the Achilles. The runner is allowed at first safely to cover one stretch of the stadium track and to reach the half-way mark of the turning point; but on the home stretch, he is more and more entangled in the infinite number of subsequent half-way points. The closer he approaches the goal, the thicker they come up and, without actually stopping him, prevent him from finishing the race. The latter explanation is also recommended by a passage in Aristotle's *Topics* (8, 8, 160 b 7 = *Vorsokr.* A 25; missing in Lee): πολλοὺς γὰρ λόγους ἔχομεν ἐναντίους ταῖς δόξαις, καθάπερ Ζήνωνος ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι οὐδὲ τὸ στάδιον διελθεῖν. The last remark can refer only to the dichotomy. It gives evidence that Zeno spoke of a runner in a stadium, and the expression διελθεῖν shows that the athlete had managed to get under way but could not complete the run. Furthermore, Aristotle's discussion turns on the completion of an infinite number of contacts; for this it is necessary that the motion be started. It is only on second thought that we are expected to apply the same reasoning to the first part of the distance and so to become aware of the fact that the motion could never have begun.

phenomenon. Both are inevitable but at the same time they are mutually exclusive. Either we look at the continuous flow of motion; then it will be impossible for us to think of the object as being in any particular position. Or we think of the object as occupying any of the positions through which its course is leading it; and, while fixing our thought on that particular position, we cannot help fixing the object itself and putting it at rest for one short instant. In order somehow to coördinate the two aspects, we are forced to form a "cinematographic" <sup>23</sup> pattern. We single out a number of discrete positions which are very close together and think that the object now "is in" this position and then in the next, but in between it "is not in" any particular place but rather on its way from the one to the other definite position. Zeno, then, in fragment B 4 objects that the thing does not move if it "is in" a position, nor can it be thought to move in a place "in which it is not." <sup>24</sup>

The explanation we attempted rests on the idea that motion, if it exists, might be of a discontinuous character. The hypothesis of a cinematographic character of motion is by now generally acknowledged to be implied in the fourth of Zeno's paradoxes of motion, the Stadium. The first step for developing the pattern is to single out positions. All the four paradoxes take this step. From this point of view we consider the result rather than the process and think of motion in terms of one position given up in favor of another; or, in short, of an "exchange of position." This was precisely the form in which even Parmenides had contemplated motion. When contending that both motion and change exist in name alone, he speaks of both in terms of "exchange," using synonymous verbs for the one and the other:

<sup>23</sup> I borrow the term from Lee, p. 100. The cinematographic pattern operates with certain indivisible quanta of motion. The quandary between the assumptions of (a) elementary quanta and (b) infinite divisibility is well exemplified in the argument of the millet seed (*Vorsokr.* A 29 = Lee, nos. 37 and 38). A bushel of millet seed, when falling upon some object, makes a noise. Is this noise the sum of the sounds produced by (a) all the individual seeds or (b) all the single parts of all the individual seeds?

<sup>24</sup> Cf. B. Russell (note 1 *supra*) § 333: "a state of change . . . involves infinitesimals and the contradiction of a body's being where it is not." The quotation is taken from Russell's explanation of the Arrow paradox, but it happens in part to coincide, even to the very wording, with Zeno's fragment B 4. The coincidence is similar to the one discussed above, p. 3, and we can draw from it the same inferences.

καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διὰ τε χροῶ φανὸν ἀμείβειν

"To exchange the place and permute the shining color"  
(*Vorsokr.*, 28 B 8, 41).<sup>25</sup>

There was no special word for "position" in the language of Parmenides, and therefore he had to use the broader term *τόπος*, "place." No doubt Parmenides thought here only, or at least primarily, of two positions: the initial and the final. But with Zeno it is a favorite practice to transfer a mode of reasoning from the whole to any of its parts. Thus, in the fragment we are studying, the first of its two points is that an object cannot be thought to move *in* any of the positions *through* which it is supposed to move.

<sup>25</sup> It is worth while also to follow up for a moment the second half of the line quoted. At first sight, "exchange of the shining color," *scil.* for black, does not appear exactly parallel to "exchange of place." While "change of position" covers any motion, "white turning black," or vice versa, seems to be but one example for changes of condition. In Parmenides' world of appearance and change, however, shining color and invisible blackness are the qualities of its two components, and in 28 B 9, 2 Parmenides indicates that any possible quality is equivalent to either whiteness or blackness (cf. *Nachrichten der Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, 1930, p. 175). With Parmenides, then, the terms White and Black, rightly understood, exhaust all qualities, and we can at will substitute for them e.g. Hot and Cold, or Alive and Dead. In addition, White and Black are adjectives, and thus Parmenides was able to point out in terms of "is" and "is not" the contradictions to which the idea of change leads. We may feel reasonably sure that he actually did elaborate all these points in his oral teaching. With disciples like Zeno he would certainly discuss his doctrine in much greater detail than he cared to do in his one comprehensive book, in which he concisely summarized his grandiose system with archaic reserve and discretion. After Parmenides, we find Melissus mentioning "alive and dead, black and white, and all the rest which men think to be real" (*Vorsokr.* 30 B 8; the last words echo what Parmenides had written, in the passage under discussion, line 39: ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ). Empedocles and others declared White and Black, the colors of the sun (cf. "the white sun" *Vorsokr.* 31 B 21, 3) and water, to be the basic colors (cf. Theophrastus, *De Sensibus*, 59). Anaxagoras spoke of colors only in terms of Black and White (Theophrastus, *loc. cit.*), and he commented on the phenomena of change by using the example of a change from white to black (*Vorsokr.* 59 B 10 and 21), from white snow to black water (*Vorsokr.* 59 A 97). Aristotle illustrates the phenomena of ἐν τῇ ἀντιφάσει μεταβολή by a change from non-white to white, and he does so in a passage which immediately follows upon his discussion of the

Before we come to the second point, it will be better to widen the topic. First, the difficulties resulting from the cinematographic pattern apply in exact correspondence to the two continua space and time. Whatever may be said about positions is also true, *mutatis mutandis*, for the instants in which they are occupied. Second, whatever can be stated with respect to motion is equally valid for any other change, if only for "position" we substitute the more generic notion "condition." We have seen that even Parmenides treated motion and change on the same lines, and it is well known that in Greek philosophy the one term Motion often serves for any kind of change. These considerations allow us to take as identical corresponding problems of space or time or condition in general, such as they arise from an analysis of either motion or any other change; and we are now able to illustrate and support our interpretation of Zeno's fragment B 4 by a comparison with two cognate passages from Plato's *Parmenides* <sup>26</sup> and Aristotle's *Physics*.<sup>27</sup>

The cinematographic construction presents motion and change under a combination of two aspects, and it was our contention that the two points of Zeno's fragment B 4 refer to these two aspects. On the one hand, we fix and correlate definite positions in space, or conditions, and definite instants in time. Zeno's

Zenonian paradoxes of motion (*Physics* 6, 9, 240 a 20). This arrangement caused Aristotle's commentator Themistius (*Phys.*, p. 201, 8) to introduce the *κατὰ ἀντίφασιν μεταβολή* as "another argument, in addition to the preceding four (Zenonian paradoxes of motion)." No doubt the problem implied in color change is substantially identical with that of the four paradoxes; and, since we see both Parmenides and Aristotle discuss them in immediate succession, it is probable that even in Zeno's book a paradox of color change followed on the paradoxes of motion. Much as Anaxagoras did, Zeno might have insisted on the continuous succession of imperceptible transitions by which a black object can gradually turn white, Anaxagoras in order to prove infinite divisibility and Zeno in order to disprove it. In any case the material shows the continuity from Parmenides to Aristotle in the treatment of the problem of *ἐν ἀντιφάσει μεταβολή* (cf. also Plato, *Theaetetus* 182 d, etc.).

<sup>26</sup> Plato, *Parmenides* 156 c-d. The passage, which appears closely to parallel Zeno's ideas, not only occurs in the second part of the *Parmenides* but, moreover, is concerned with the problem of rest and motion. But Plato modifies the argument and, as he often does, transfers it, as it were, to a higher order. While Zeno simply dealt with the transitions implied in motion, Plato comments on the transition from rest to motion.

<sup>27</sup> *Physics* 6, 9, 240 a 19, see note 25 *supra*.



paradoxes expose the grave difficulties to which this aspect leads, and so does fragment B 4 in its first part. But even greater is our embarrassment when we try to give a rational account of the other aspect and scrutinize the assumed transitions (*μεταβολαί*) from each definite position or condition to the next. Plato justly remarks that the nature of this transition is extremely strange (*ἄτοπός τις φύσις*). While the object is going through it, it is not in any definite condition at all. Zeno, in the second part of B 4, makes the point for space, speaking of the object as, hypothetically, "moving in a place where it is not." Plato, in addition to pointing out the puzzling fact that an object should be in no condition, dwells on the temporal aspect of the problem. The time of transition is given by him the name "suddenly," and he says that it "is not in any one time," i. e. in any definite instant.<sup>28</sup> It will be noted that this "is not in" is an exact counterpart of Zeno's "in a place where it is not." There is in fact no way of locating the transition more accurately than by stating that it is "in between" (*ἐγκάθεται μεταξύ*, Plato) and on the way "from" something "to" something definite, but "not in" something definite. In this manner Aristotle says, with reference to change, that a thing, while changing "from" non-white "to" white, "is not in either one" (*ἐκ τοῦ μὴ λευκοῦ εἰς τὸ λευκὸν μεταβάλλει καὶ ἐν μηδετέρῳ ἐστίν*). The expression "is not in either non-white or white" is indeed unusual; normally one would say "it is neither non-white nor white."<sup>29</sup> But we now understand the wording as molded by the type of reasoning and its fixed tradition.

Thus our tentative explanation of Zeno's frag. B 4<sup>30</sup> gains additional probability. The same point which we assume to have been made in it by Zeno with reference to space was made again, in identical terms, with reference to time and condition by Plato

<sup>28</sup> Just as, for "position," Zeno had to use the term "place" or "space" (*τόπος*), so Plato, for "instant" uses the word "time" (*χρόνος*).

<sup>29</sup> As a matter of fact, Aristotle himself felt the need of explaining the unusual expression: he adds a translation, as it were, into normal phrasing.

<sup>30</sup> Calogero (p. 138) indicates, without elaborating upon it, a similar explanation: "La contraddizione del moto è appunto quella dell' essere in un luogo e del non esservi, e del superare così quella propria delimitazione spaziale che è insieme determinazione e immobilità temporale." This is, in a nutshell, a clear exposition of the complex quandary.

and Aristotle respectively in passages which seem to be based on Zeno's <sup>31</sup> book.

At the stage we have now reached, it would be tempting to speculate on the actual meaning of the Arrow paradox. In frag. B 4 Zeno insisted on the difficulty of finding a position in which the object should move. In the Arrow he seems to have made a similar point with reference to both space and time. But here his argument appears to have been more subtle and circumstantial. Zeno might have pointed out that the arrow, whether at rest or in motion, must occupy an equal space at every moment,<sup>32</sup> and, since it even while in flight cannot at any time reach beyond its own length, it must during the whole time occupy an equal, and consequently the same, stretch in space; i. e. it must be at rest.<sup>33</sup> The evidence, however, for the Arrow is not ample and dependable enough to justify an elaborate conjecture.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>31</sup> See notes 26 and 25 *supra*.

<sup>32</sup> The choice of an arrow, instead of runners (as in the Dichotomy or Achilles) or masses (as in the Stadium) indicates that this time Zeno based his reasoning not on the number of points to be reached nor on the distances to be covered nor on mass quanta but on the stretches of space which the arrow, by virtue of its own dimension in length, is occupying at different times. These stretches are said by Zeno to be equal, equal, that is, to one another rather than to the arrow. Of course, the latter is also true but *dei katà tò ἴσον* makes the point that the arrow occupies the same amount of space at any time and under any condition.

<sup>33</sup> If we strip the text of what obviously and admittedly was added by Aristotle (cf. Calogero, pp. 133 f.), the argument is reduced to the statement that the arrow, even while in flight, *dei ἔστι katà tò ἴσον*. From this Zeno could easily derive the conclusion that it is at rest all the time. For *dei* can mean both "at any given time" and "all the time." In this connection it may be recalled how Plato in his *Parmenides* (145-46) treats two similar propositions. He uses the premise, *τὸ ἐν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔστιν* (cf. *Parmenides*, *Vorsokr.* 28 B 8, 29 f.), for deducing that the One is at rest, and the premise, *τὸ ἐν ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔστιν*, for concluding that it is in motion. The latter conclusion is reached with the aid of the ambiguities implied in the terms *ἑτέρον* and *δέλ*. After stating that the One is in something else (= not within itself), Plato smuggles an *δέλ* into the sentence: *τὸ ἐν δέλ (= all the time) ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔστιν*. Then he reinterprets the very same sentence so that it now says: The One is somewhere else in each moment, i. e. it is in motion. This exuberantly tricky play may have had some milder precedent in Zeno's Arrow. But even in this case it would be rash to assume that Zeno had failed to realize the actual gravity and importance of the argument.

<sup>34</sup> Aristotle's exposition of the Arrow is mutilated by textual cor-

One thing, however, is patent. All of Zeno's arguments against motion amount to demonstrating that motion is impossible because it cannot in any plausible way penetrate the continua of space, time, and mass. To analyze and justify motion, we must first of all differentiate within the continua. But if we do set up a multiple continuum and try to make motion operate in it, one of two things will happen. Either motion will be smothered and brought to a ridiculous standstill among the too numerous and too fanciful elements of the artificial medium; or motion will wreck the articulate continuum by splitting the units out of which we constructed it. The experiments drastically bear out the fact that a continuum does not yield to differentiation and plurality. It is homogeneous:

οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ὁμοῖον . . .  
τῷ ἑννεχὲς πᾶν ἐστιν.

So said Parmenides,<sup>35</sup> and Zeno follows suit.<sup>36</sup> Disproving motion, he disproves the thesis of plurality in one of its major applications.

— The remaining fragments deal with plurality directly. Their exact position within the original book is not known,<sup>37</sup> but their mutual connection is obvious and the context from which they

ruption, and in addition it is quite possible that Aristotle misunderstood what Zeno had intended to say, just as he failed to see Zeno's point in the Stadium. The explanation offered by Simplicius is of no value for us. As his words clearly indicate, he did not use independent material but only tried to explain Aristotle's text which he read in the same corrupted form in which it has come down to us. While in each of the other paradoxes there is a certain geometrical construction to guide our interpretation, none is implied in the Arrow.

<sup>35</sup> *Vorsokr.* 28 B 8, 22-25.

<sup>36</sup> As the context shows, with *διαίρετός* Parmenides meant "capable of differentiation" rather than "divisible." We cannot differentiate between parts of the continuum because it is *ὁμοῖον*, i.e. homogeneous throughout. The opposite contention, therefore, the contention of plurality, has first of all to answer the question of homogeneity. Thus the very first proposition of Zeno's was, as we learn from Plato, *Parmenides* 127 e (= Lee, no. 12 = *Vorsokr.*, p. 251, n. 7): *Εἰ πολλά ἐστι τὰ ὄντα, δεῖ ἄρα αὐτὰ ὁμοῖά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια*. For the subsequent history of *διαίρεσις* (distinction and classification) and speculations on the *ὁμοῖον* cf. J. Stenzel, *R.-E.*, III A, cols. 1641 ff., s. v. "Speusippos."

<sup>37</sup> We are told only that the fragments anteceded frag. B 3 ("The elements are both infinite and finite in number").



are taken can be reconstructed from the evidence we possess. For the sake of convenience, before studying the fragments in detail, we restate<sup>38</sup> the general outline of Zeno's arguments: "If there is plurality, these absurdities will follow:

- (a) The single units of which the One is composed will have no magnitude,
- (b) and, as a consequence, will be non-existent (= *Vorsokr.*, frag. B 2 = Lee, no. 9).
- (c) Thus, since the assumption is that they exist, they will have magnitude. This leads to the conclusion that their magnitude is unlimited (= *Vorsokr.*, frag. B 1 = Lee, no. 10, first part).
- (d) Thus, if we accept the thesis of plurality, it results that the units are both small so as to have no magnitude (= a) and great so as to be unlimited (= c)" (= *Vorsokr.*, frag. B 1 = Lee, no. 10, second part).

Of the four points (a-d), the evidence for (a) is Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 139, 18-19 (= *Vorsokr.*, p. 257, test. B 2): . . . προδείξας (scil. ὁ Ζήνων) ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔχει μέγεθος ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἐαυτῷ ταῦτόν εἶναι καὶ ἓν.<sup>39</sup> This means that, if the principle of plurality is accepted, the universe ultimately consists of single particles, each of them a unit. Within each unit no parts should be distinguishable, because the plurality of parts would be incompatible with the character of the whole as a single thing and a unit,<sup>40</sup> and the diversity of the parts from one another and the whole would nullify the identity of the thing with itself. Thus the elements to which we come in the last analysis must be indivisible; and yet our assumption was that plurality and divisibility are unlimited. It looks as if we were caught,<sup>41</sup> but there is a

<sup>38</sup> The order and connection of Zeno's arguments (though not the single points) were correctly rendered by E. Zeller, *op. cit.* (see note 12), I, 1, pp. 749-52. In the *Vorsokratiker*, however, point (b) has received the number B 2 and follows after (c + d) = B 1.

<sup>39</sup> For the reading see *infra*, note 46.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Melissus, *Vorsokr.* 30 B 9: Εἰ δὲ ἔχοι πάχος, ἔχοι ἂν μόρια, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν εἴῃ, and Plato, *Parmenides* 137 c-d and 159 c 5: Οὐδὲ μὴν μόριά γε ἔχειν φαμέν τὸ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἓν. For Zeno himself see the next note.

<sup>41</sup> We can expect Zeno to have elaborated this quandary in one of his forty *ἐπιχειρήματα*, and in fact there is some evidence for it in certain of Aristotle's commentators. None of them, however, seems to have used

loophole. Divisibility applies only to things with extension. Thus we can have indivisible ultimate elements, if only we do not allow them to have magnitude.

So far for point (a). With reference to the whole series (a-d), the order in which the four points were made results with certainty from the intrinsic logic of the argument. But in addition there is Simplicius' testimony to confirm the arrangement. It

Zeno's book directly for his exposition of the argument, and thus the authenticity and fidelity of their renderings remain doubtful. The argument is reproduced, with more or less clarity, by the following authors (for the editions see note 7 *supra*):

1) Philoponus, *Phys.*, p. 80, 25 = Lee, no. 3: *Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν εἴῃ τὸ ὄν καὶ ἀδιαίρετον ἀλλὰ διαιροῖτο εἰς πλείονα, οὐδὲν ἔσται κυρίως ἐν· εἰ γὰρ διαιροῖτο τὸ συνεχές, ἐπ' ἀπειρον ἂν εἴῃ διαίρετόν. Εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἔσται κυρίως ἐν, οὐδὲ πολλά, εἴ γε τὰ πολλὰ ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν ἐνάδων σύγκειται, etc.*

2) Themistius, *Phys.*, p. 12, 2 (quoted also by Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 139, 19) = Lee, no. 1: . . . *Ζήνωνος, ὃς ἐκ τοῦ συνεχές τε εἶναι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον, ἐν εἶναι τὸ ὄν κατεσκεύαζε, λέγων ὡς, εἰ διαίρεται, οὐδὲ ἔσται ἀκριβῶς ἐν διὰ τὴν ἐπ' ἀπειρον τομὴν τῶν σωμάτων. . .* In this form, however, the exposition defies any logic. It can be rewritten thus: *Ζήνων συνεχές τε εἶναι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον* (cf. Parmenides, *Vorsokr.* 28 B 8, 22 and 25) *καὶ ἐν τὸ ὄν κατεσκεύαζε, λέγων ὡς, εἰ διαίρεται, οὐδὲν ἔσται ἀκριβῶς ἐν διὰ τὴν ἐπ' ἀπειρον τομὴν τῶν σωμάτων.* For the last of the suggested changes, *οὐδὲν* instead of *οὐδὲ*, we have not only the parallels in the other versions but also some manuscript authority. The manuscript tradition on which the Aldine edition of Simplicius is based had apparently a marginal variant *οὐδὲν ἔσται ἀκριβῶς ἐν*, which, however, subsequently was misplaced. Not recognized as a variant, it now appears as an "interpolation" in Diels' note on line 17.

3) Alexander *apud* Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 138, 4 = Lee, no. 7: *Ζήνωνος . . . λέγοντος ὡς, εἰ μέγεθος ἔχει τὸ ὄν καὶ διαιροῖτο, πολλὰ τὰ ὄν καὶ οὐχ ἐν ἔτι ἔσσεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τούτου δεικνύντος ὅτι μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν ἐν (ἐστὶν ἐν scripsi: ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν libri).*

4) Alexander in turn referred to Eudemus, cf. Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 99, 12 = Lee, no. 6: *Ὁ μέντοι Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἀναιρῶντος μεμνήσθαι τὸν Εὐδῆμον οἶεται. Ὡς γὰρ ἱστορεῖ, φησιν, Εὐδῆμος, Ζήνων ὁ Παρμενίδου γνώριμος ἐπειράτο δεικνύναι ὅτι μὴ ὅλον τε τὰ ὄντα πολλὰ εἶναι, τῷ μηδὲν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ἐν, τὰ δὲ πολλὰ πλῆθος εἶναι ἐνάδων.*

The four versions are strictly parallel; thus it is easy to correct the slight mistakes committed by either scribes or doxographers. The point being made is that, if the principle of divisibility is once admitted, nothing will be immune from it and, consequently, there will be nothing in the whole world (*μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων* or *μηδὲν ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν*) which, strictly speaking (*κυρίως* or *ἀκριβῶς*), could be called a unit (*ἐν*). (In Plato's

is true that the discussion of Simplicius suffers from confusion,<sup>42</sup> but the incidental remarks by which he indicates the original connection of single points are not affected by the cuts we might make to disentangle the disorder. Here is the evidence:

Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 141, 1 (= *Vorsokr.*, test. B 1 = Lee, no. 10): Προδείξας γὰρ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἔχοι μέγεθος τὸ ὄν, οὐδ' ἂν εἴη (= b), ἐπάγει· “Εἰ δὲ ἔστιν, etc.” (= c + d). The passage attests the order (b, c, d) and suggests that (c) followed directly on (b).<sup>43</sup>

Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 139, 16 (= *Vorsokr.*, test. B 2, p. 257): <sup>44</sup> ὅτι μέγεθος ἔχει ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἄπειρον,<sup>45</sup> τῷ πρὸ τοῦ λαμβανόμενον αἰεὶ τι εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἐπ' ἄπειρον τομὴν (= c) · ὃ δὲ δεικνύσι προδείξας ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔχει μέγεθος ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ἐκ τοῦ <sup>46</sup> ἐαυτῷ ταῦτόν εἶναι καὶ ἓν (= a). The evidence shows that in the original work point (a) preceded (c).

The following quotation outlines the general array of Zeno's arguments:

Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 139, 5 (= *Vorsokr.*, test. B 2 = Lee, no. 9): 'Εν μέντοι τῷ συγγράμματι αὐτοῦ, πολλὰ ἔχοντι ἐπιχειρήματα,<sup>47</sup> καθ' ἕκαστον δεικνύσιν ὅτι τῷ πολλὰ εἶναι λέγοντι συμβαίνει τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν. Ὡν ἓν ἐστὶν ἐπιχείρημα ἐν ᾧ δεικνύσιν ὅτι, εἰ πολλὰ ἔστι, καὶ μεγάλα ἐστὶ καὶ μικρά· μεγάλα μὲν ὥστε ἄπειρα τὸ μέγεθος εἶναι, μικρὰ δὲ οὕτως ὥστε μὴθὲν ἔχειν μέγεθος (= d). 'Εν δὲ τούτῳ δεικνύσιν ὅτι, οὐ μήτε μέγεθος μήτε πάχος μήτε ὄγκος μὴθείς ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἂν εἴη τοῦτο.

*Parmenides* one of the tentative premises is *εἰ ἓν μὴ ἔστι*, 160 b.) But the principle of divisibility and plurality demands units of which the multiple may consist.

<sup>42</sup> E. g. the words *Καὶ ταῦτα οὐχὶ τὸ ἐν ἀναιρῶν ὃ Ζήνων λέγει ἀλλὰ* (p. 139, 16) have no connection either with what precedes or with what follows. They rather belong in line 22 (after *σωμάτων*). The sentence, p. 139, 16 (ὅτι)-19 (καὶ ἓν) = (a + c), duplicates lines 7-9 = (d) = (a + c). In his discussion of Zeno Simplicius seems with indifferent success to have combined several sources, inserted critical remarks of his own, and added verbatim quotations for which we may be especially grateful. I have, however, not attempted to analyze methodically the whole passage in Simplicius.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Calogero, p. 98, note 1.

<sup>44</sup> There is no connection with what precedes, cf. *supra*, note 42.

<sup>45</sup> ἄπειρον scripsi: ἀπείρων libri.

<sup>46</sup> ἐκ τοῦ huc transposui et propter sensum et collata priore sententiae parte: post μέγεθος exhibent libri.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *Vorsokr.* 29 A 15 (Proclus, in *Parm.*, p. 694, 23): πολλῶν δὲ εἰρημένων ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγων καὶ τετταράκοντα τῶν πάντων . . .

"Εἰ γὰρ ἄλλω ὄντι" φησὶ "προσγένειτο, etc." (= b). From this it follows that (b) and (d) were parts of the same ἐπιχείρημα. Simplicius first summarizes the whole ἐπιχείρημα and for this purpose he aptly quotes its comprehensive conclusion (d); next, he discusses the single point (b).

After clarifying the content of point (a) and the general outline of Zeno's exposition, we shall now enter on a detailed study of the second point (b). The evidence for this point is threefold:<sup>48</sup>

1) The passage from Simplicius which we have just quoted. Here Simplicius starts out with a paraphrase of Zeno's words (Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ δείκνυσιν ὅτι . . .) but later continues with a verbatim quotation (φησὶν).

2) The same Simplicius, in *Phys.*, p. 141, 1 (cf. *supra*, p. 17), renders the whole argument in one short sentence: Εἰ μὴ ἔχοι μέγεθος τὸ ὄν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη.

3) Aristotle says, in *Metaphysics* II, 4, 1001 b 7 (= *Vorsokr.*, A 21 = Lee, no. 4): Ἐτι εἰ ἀδιαίρετον αὐτὸ τὸ ἔν (= a)<sup>49</sup> κατὰ μὲν τὸ Ζήνωνος ἀξίωμα οὐθέν ἂν εἴη. Ὁ γὰρ μήτε προστιθέμενον μήτε ἀφαιρούμενον ποιεῖ μείζον μηδὲ ἔλαττον, οὗ φησιν τοῦτο εἶναι τῶν ὄντων.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Eudemus, frag. 7 (= Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 97, 15-16 = *Vorsokr.* A 21 = Lee, no. 5) quotes not from Zeno directly but from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (our no. 3), cf. U. Schöbe, *Quaestiones Eudemeae* (Diss. Halle, 1931), p. 56. This makes his testimony useless for the reconstruction of Zeno's demonstration.

<sup>49</sup> Indivisibility is here meant to imply lack of extension; cf. Zeno's point (a) to which the conditional clause refers. The notion and term αὐτὸ τὸ ἔν, however, is not Zeno's but rather Platonic and Aristotelian. Zeno is not discussing αὐτὸ τὸ ἔν but a hypothetical tangible unit which is supposed to be the element of a world of plurality. Aristotle is pressing Zeno's argument into the service of a heterogeneous problem (cf. Cherniss, pp. 42 ff.), a procedure which leads to confusing incongruities.

<sup>50</sup> Next follows a comment by Aristotle on the premise under which Zeno's conclusion will hold: ὡς δὴλον ὅτι μεγέθους τοῦ ὄντος, καὶ εἰ μέγεθος, σωματικόν· τοῦτο γὰρ πάντη (πάντη ὅν libri: delevi ὄν), τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πῶς μὲν προστιθέμενα ποιήσει μείζον πῶς δ' οὐδέν, οἷον ἐπίπεδον καὶ γραμμὴ, στιγμὴ δὲ καὶ μονὰς οὐδαμῶς. Then Aristotle angrily censures Zeno: Ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ οὗτος θεωρεῖ φορτικῶς, etc. The criticism, however, seems to miss its mark in so far at least as it is directed not so much against what Zeno had tried to demonstrate but against the application, by Aristotle himself, of Zeno's reasoning to Aristotle's problem. And again Aristotle's

It will be noted that there is, from our point of view, a logical break in Aristotle's rendering of the syllogism. What he says amounts to this: "Zeno declares it to be *nothing*, and his reason for declaring it to be *non-existent* is . . . ." The rendering by Simplicius, which is more detailed, differs in this respect. Here the more radical proposition (non-existence) is made in the first instance: *ὅτι, οὐ μήτε μέγεθος μήτε πάχος μήτε ὄγκος μηθείς ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἂν εἴη τοῦτο*. Then follows, in Zeno's actual words, a demonstration for the startling proposition that whatever is unextended does not exist:

Εἰ γὰρ <sup>51</sup> ἄλλω ὄντι προσγένειτο, οὐδὲν ἂν μείζον ποιήσκειν. Μεγέθους γὰρ μηδενὸς ὄντος, προσγενομένου δέ, οὐδὲν οἷόν τε εἰς μέγεθος ἐπιδούναι· καὶ οὕτως ἂν ἤδη τὸ προσγιγόμενον οὐδὲν εἴη. Εἰ δὲ ἀπογιγόμενον <sup>52</sup> τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲν ἔλαττον ἐσται, <sup>53</sup> μηδὲ αὖ προσγιγόμενον αὐξήσεται, δῆλον ὅτι τὸ προσγεγόμενον οὐδὲν ἦν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπογεγόμενον (Simplicius, *Phys.*, p. 139, 11-15 = *Vorsokr.* B 2 = Lee, no. 9).

The text reads smoothly enough. Only the phrase *μεγέθους οὐδενὸς ὄντος, προσγιγόμενον δὲ* seems unnecessarily involved. A more serious objection, however, is the apparent lack of progress in the discussion. In the beginning the truism is proffered that a thing with no magnitude, when added to another thing, will not make it any greater; and the final conclusion seems to be that addition or subtraction of a thing without magnitude will not

next remark (lines 17-19) entirely coincides with Zeno's own intentions. In the intricate discussion the ground is shifted so frequently that it is hard to disentangle the logical structure.

<sup>51</sup> In the discussion above we took the *γὰρ* to be authentic, with the implication that in Zeno's original text fragment B 2 was preceded by the proposition that the hypothetical unextended unit is nothing (Aristotle) or that it is non-existent (Simplicius). The alternative is that Simplicius remolded the first words to suit his own context and that Zeno had written something like *Εἰ δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον, scil.* the unextended element as it results from (a). In the latter case, the statement that a thing without magnitude, thickness, or mass is non-existent followed our fragment B 2 and did not precede it (cf. *infra*, note 57). The explanation, however, of the text is not affected by our uncertainty with respect to the order and arrangement, and we cannot make a serious mistake if we simply follow Simplicius.

<sup>52</sup> It is hardly possible, in this text, to be dogmatic about the correct tenses for the participles; both present and aorist can equally well be justified.

<sup>53</sup> *ἔσται* Diels (?): *ἐστί* libri (no note in *Vorsokr.*).



result in increase or decrease. Can we lay our finger on any particular point within the fragment which marks a substantial turn in any definite direction?

The nerve of the demonstration is the statement which Zeno himself underscores by introducing it with *καὶ οὕτως ἤδη*. The sentence *τὸ προσγινόμενον οὐδέν ἐστιν* is equivocal; its ambiguity involves a transition from one meaning to the other, and thus the sentence carries the argument forward by a decisive step. On the one hand, *τὸ προσγινόμενον οὐδέν ἐστιν* "nothing is added" can be taken to mean *οὐ προσγίνεται οὐδέν* "no increase takes place"; the verb *προσγίνεται* is negated by virtue of its connection with the negative subject *οὐδέν* "nothing," and it refers to an increase in size. On the other hand, the same sentence *τὸ προσγινόμενον οὐδέν ἐστιν* "nothing is added" can also be read to mean "that which is added is nothing"; now the verb "is added" remains positive and refers not to increase but to one thing, viz. a nothing, joining the other. Thus Zeno reverses the ancient *οὔτις* trick by which once upon a time the wily Odysseus escaped the revenge of Polyphemus' friends and neighbors.<sup>54</sup>

But how did Zeno contrive to make his readers (which include ourselves) see that he was giving a curious twist to an innocent looking expression? The answer to this question removes the stylistic difficulty we mentioned. The phrase *μεγέθους δὲ μηδενὸς ὄντος, ἐπιγινόμενον δέ* (i. e. *ἐπεὶ μεγέθους μὲν οὐδενὸς ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπιγινόμενον, ἐπιγίνεται δέ*)<sup>55</sup> was shaped as it is for just this purpose. The one simple statement is split into two parts, one containing the negation and the other free from it. Thus the reader was able, when he arrived at the ambiguous sentence, to divorce the negation from the verb and to gather from it that the unextended thing is nothing. Aristotle saw the point, since he quotes Zeno to this effect (*οὐθὲν ἂν εἶη*).

It was, however, not enough for Zeno to demonstrate that the

<sup>54</sup> Homer, *Od.*, IX, 408 ff. We remember in this connection that Parmenides' entire doctrine is founded on the axiom: any negation deprives of reality the context in which it occurs. In this case, however, Homer is a truer Eleatic than Zeno. Homer's Cyclopes, on learning that "Nobody" is making an attempt on Polyphemus' life, infer that no attempt is being made; while Zeno, on finding that nothing is added, concludes that an addition is being made but the thing added is nothing.

<sup>55</sup> For this resolution of the absolute genitive cf. K. von Fritz and O. Becker in *Vorsokr.*, II, pp. 423-24.

unextended is nothing. The ultimate conclusion of the argument was rather that the unextended does not exist. For both Aristotle and Simplicius say so,<sup>56</sup> and the first words of the subsequent fragment B 1 (*Εἰ δὲ ἔστιν*) indicate that they once were directly preceded by a statement saying that the hypothetical element, if it had no magnitude, would not even exist in the first instance.

It is possible that such a statement was made by Zeno in a passage which is now lost, between the end of B 2 and the beginning of B 1.<sup>57</sup> The deficiency, however, can also be remedied, with small effort, by way of emendation. There are some good reasons, though none of them decisive, for changing, at the end of B 2, *οὐδὲν ἦν τοῦ οὐδὲ ἦν*. For the emphatic *δῆλον ὅτι* is more likely to have introduced the ultimate conclusion than another preliminary step; there is indeed little progress in the last sentence unless we make the change; Simplicius in his quotation would hardly have left out the final passage;<sup>58</sup> and lastly, *τὸ προσγενόμενον οὐδὲ ἦν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπογενόμενον* reads more smoothly than what the manuscripts give. After *οὐδὲν*, the *οὐδὲ* is illogical; we rather expect *καὶ*: "the thing added was nothing in the first instance, and so was the thing subtracted."

It is hardly necessary to inquire how Zeno might have connected the thesis of nothingness with that of non-existence. For us, there is a very great difference between the two assertions, but the Eleatics took it for granted that whatever is nothing is no thing and is not.<sup>59</sup> And we have already had occasion to remark (p. 19, *supra*) that Aristotle, when rendering Zeno's

<sup>56</sup> *οὐ φησιν εἶναι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων*, Aristotle; *οὐδ' ἂν εἴη*, Simplicius in both passages.

<sup>57</sup> In connection with the alternative as mentioned in note 51 *supra*, we might e.g. have frag. B 2 begin with *Εἰ δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἄλλω ὄντι προσγένοιτο*, and tentatively supply at the end of the fragment, from Simplicius, *Οὕτως οὖν, οὐ μήτε μέγεθος μήτε πάχος μήτε ὄγκος μηθεὶς ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἂν εἴη τοῦτο*. Next follows frag. B 1: *Εἰ δὲ ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη ἕκαστον μέγεθος τι ἔχειν καὶ πάχος*, etc.

<sup>58</sup> This reason, however, is void if the original arrangement was such as suggested in the preceding note.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Parmenides, *Vorsokr.* 28 B 6, 2: *Μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν*, and Melissus, *Vorsokr.* 30 B 7, 7: *Οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη τὸ μηδέν*. Even for the Platonic Parmenides the predicates "is not" and "is nothing" seem to be interchangeable, since he says (145 e) *Μηδαμοῦ ὄν (scil. τὸ ὄλον), οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη*, where we expect him rather to say *οὐκ ἂν εἴη*.

point (b), treated the two contentions of nothingness and non-existence as equivalent. Zeno seems to have progressed from the former to the latter with the tacit implication of their identity.

We are now in a position to go over the fragment from beginning to end and see how the reasoning proceeds. Zeno states first that the unextended, when added to something else, will not make it any greater. He then proves this by pointing out that a thing with no magnitude is unable to contribute magnitude. The proof only confirms an obvious fact, but in its clever wording it serves an ulterior purpose, since it contains elements which are suited to help the intended progress in reasoning. First, the term "nothing" (or "none") is twice repeated (*μηδενός, οὐδέν*) and thus brought to the reader's special attention. Second, the possibility is suggested of divorcing the verb *ἐπιγίνεσθαι* from the negation (*supra*, p. 20). Third, the one and original meaning of the impending ambiguous phrase finds unequivocal and precise expression (*οὐδέν οἶόν τε εἰς μέγεθος ἐπιδοῦναι*). Having thus prepared the ground for what will follow and having brought the reader into such a frame of mind that he will read both meanings into the ambiguous phrase when it comes, Zeno introduces that sentence with the triumphant words *καὶ οὕτως ἤδη*, i. e. "And thus, while consolidating our cautious first forward step, we have stumbled, as it were, into a new substantial advance." After this unexpected and ostensibly accidental turn of the reasoning, Zeno takes up again, with the last sentence, the methodical march of his demonstration. The eventual conclusion to be reached, on this line, was the non-existence of the unextended. We have seen that a statement to this effect was made either in the last sentence of our fragment or in an additional sentence which is now lost.

But, strangely enough, this is not all. Our analysis of the fragment was conducted under the impression that Zeno had introduced the idea of addition merely as a device to make his verbal trick possible; and we should consequently expect him to drop the subject as soon as it has served that purpose. Instead, Zeno mentions addition again in the final sentence; moreover, he now makes the same point for subtraction as well. The inevitable inference is that Zeno, in point (b), had more than one purpose. In addition to proving that the non-extended is non-existent, he had something else in mind.



The ultimate object of Zeno's attacks is plurality, i. e. the concept that the whole of our universe is made up of single elements, combining in various ways so as to build up the various things and separating again so as to destroy them. Zeno, on his way to the antinomy "the parts are both small and great" (d), had made the hypothetical assumption that in the presumptive plurality the elements have no magnitude (a). On this point, he makes a digression (b) which will prove to be far more important than the intended antinomy "both small and great." He points out that, by the addition of a thing with no magnitude, the other thing does not increase; nor does anything decrease if a thing with no magnitude be taken away from it. The implication is that nothing with magnitude can be created by any accumulation of such material; nor, conversely, could anything disintegrate through loss of such material. The demonstration is convincing even for us.

But we have not yet exhausted Zeno's point (b). We still have to ascertain the full bearing of the introductory words, as rendered by Simplicius (see *supra*, p. 17): ὅτι, οὐ μήτε μέγεθος μήτε πάχος μήτε ὄγκος μηθείς ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἂν εἴη τοῦτο. The wording<sup>60</sup> indicates that the criterion for having, or not having, magnitude is the possession or lack of thickness and mass, i. e. of the complete set of all three dimensions.<sup>61</sup> The unextended, therefore, will include, in addition to points, both lines and planes, and we shall have to think of planes in the first place.<sup>62</sup> Zeno then would primarily demonstrate that solids do not consist of planes. In order to prove this, he could point out that, if one should lay film upon film, none of them possessing thickness, then no number of them, however great, can produce a solid with "magnitude, thickness, and mass." In fact, however, Zeno starts with adding one plane to an existing tri-dimensional body, and later

<sup>60</sup> Μήτε μέγεθος μήτε πάχος μήτε ὄγκος μηθείς can, of course, be understood to mean: "no magnitude, viz. for that matter, no thickness or mass." Cf. μέγεθος τι καὶ πάχος in frag. B 1 with "defining" καί.

<sup>61</sup> This was also Aristotle's explanation, see *supra*, note 50.

<sup>62</sup> Zeno makes it clear that he is trying to demonstrate that lack of the third dimension (which entails lack of mass) implies non-existence. This he could not conclusively show unless he proved it for objects which lack nothing but mass and the third dimension, i. e. for planes. *A fortiori* it will then follow that lines and points are likewise non-existent.

he takes away a plane from a solid body.<sup>63</sup> The operations of adding and removing obviously take place at the surface of the solid, and this suggests that Zeno had a theory in mind according to which the constitutive elements of solids are their surfaces. The view that solids are formed by putting surfaces together in a certain way was actually held in antiquity. Plato's *Timaeus* is a very well known example.<sup>64</sup> Read in this light, Zeno's point is that by no manipulation<sup>65</sup> can a solid be produced out of planes, e. g. its surfaces, nor can it disintegrate through loss of planes. There is no hoist, as it were, to lift an object from the two-dimensional level to the three-dimensional. So far Zeno is right, and with a grain of salt we may even admit that, as long as we reckon with masses, any object below that level, any plane or line or point, is a nullity and non-entity.

As soon as we realize the implications which the text conveys, the tempo of Zeno's exposition appears rather brisk. The philosopher, while investigating the presumptive elements of a plural universe, had first, in point (a), concluded that they, in order to be indivisible, must of necessity lack extension (*scil.*

<sup>63</sup> The words *μείζον*, *ἐλαττον*, and *αὐξήσεται* indicate that the other partner in the addition and subtraction does possess magnitude, which makes it, according to the preceding tenet, possess all three dimensions.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 53 c ff.; also Aristotle, *passim*, e. g. *De Caelo*, III, 1, 298 b 33: *Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ καὶ πᾶν σῶμα γενητὸν ποιοῦσι, συντιθέντες καὶ διαλύοντες εἰς ἐπίπεδα καὶ ἐξ ἐπιπέδων*, probably referring to Plato. I am not familiar with the history of Greek mathematics but I feel that Zeno's fragment B 2 (in itself and even more so, as will be shown later, in connection with the subsequent fragment B 1) indicates a knowledge of the theory that solids can be derived from planes, viz. their surfaces. I do not contend, however, that Zeno is merely attacking one certain theory. While making his point in such a way that the informed reader will think of that theory in the first place, Zeno was careful to couch his arguments in such terms as to defeat any possible theory of a plural world (see *infra*, notes 84 and 92).

<sup>65</sup> Zeno, speaking of "mass," has no operations in mind other than addition and subtraction. His parts are building materials, not data for a mathematical construction. Plato, on the other hand, creates solid figures out of planes, arranging them about and within the recipient space (*χώρα*, cf. *Timaeus* 52 a). His theory, however, since it lacks the concept of mass, does not easily lend itself to explain the phenomena of weight. To account for them, Plato had to make the additional assumption that the different elements have affinities to different regions of the universe (cf. *Timaeus* 63 e).

in the dimension in question). Immediately then, in point (b), he starts a mental experiment with one of those hypothetical units, putting it on the body of some object and removing it from it. The operation, thus performed, drastically bears out the conclusion that a full-dimensioned object is in no way affected by the coming or going of a thing with a lesser number of dimensions. But even before the experiment is completed, a new and more radical refutation of plurality springs forth. Zeno makes it appear that, given the premise, the unit would be nothing. The universe then would be said to be built out of a number of nothings! No further word seems necessary to ridicule the absurdity.

But even better than that! We are led to believe that such units cannot exist. If the parts of the One are swept out of existence, it is most directly established that the One is indivisible. The thesis of plurality is utterly defeated even before the intended antinomy "the parts would be both small and great" (= d) is carried through. Point (b) has no relevance for that antinomy (d); but, instead, it independently launches three vigorous and vicious attacks against plurality. In the sportive fury of his onslaughts upon the enemy, Zeno overtakes himself, as it were. The welter of argumentation in which he is trying to drown the assumption of plurality can be likened to a surging wave which develops new waves on its own crest. While rolling on against the unhappy swimmer, they bend over and break and dash foam into his face, even before the bulk hits him with heavy impact.

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*(To be continued.)*

## THE STRUCTURE OF THE *CAPTIVI*.

All extant drama, ancient and modern, contains inconsistencies in plot, character, or other ingredients of drama. In so far as they contribute to the comic or dramatic effect, or at least fail to mar it, they are very common. In the plays of Plautus I have consistently maintained that these inconsistencies, considered merely as such, are no evidence of contamination. This view, which has too often been ignored by scholars more intent upon written consistency than effective theatre, is again coming into gradual acceptance and has found its most recent and keen expression in a review by K. M. Abbott of Kuiper's fantastic reconstructions of Greek comedies.<sup>1</sup> It is a view which, in spite of repeated warnings by Prescott and others,<sup>2</sup> continental scholarship has as a whole failed to heed, and has consequently sometimes mired in its own absurdity. Adherence to this point of view, however, does not mean that inconsistencies which concern the main dramatic effect or clear understanding of the intrigue may be similarly condoned either in Plautus or elsewhere. License does not exceed the requirements of dramatic art; in fact, it may exist only for the benefit of that art. Consequently, when we find, as in the *Captivi*, inconsistencies which affect the very heart of the intrigue, namely the deception of Hegio by Tyndarus and the anagnorisis of Tyndarus as Hegio's son, it is no betrayal of principle to ask for explanation. On the contrary, adherence to principle demands it, and if Plautine reworking offers the best explanation it becomes the most probable one.

In the first scene between Hegio and Ergasilus (129-194) the former states categorically that he knows the family and wealth of his prisoner Philocrates (170). When, however, he confronts the prisoners themselves, this same information is drawn forth from the pseudo-Philocrates as though Hegio knew nothing of his slave's origin (277). The information in question has been given in the prologue (24-26, 30-34) except for the name of

<sup>1</sup> *C. W.*, XXXIV (1934), pp. 53-55. This view has also been recently and forcefully reasserted by H. D. F. Kitto in his *Greek Tragedy* (London, 1939).

<sup>2</sup> *C. P.*, XIV (1919), p. 135, *T. A. P. A.*, LXIII (1932), pp. 103-125. Cf. also P. W. Harsh, *A. J. P.*, LVIII (1937), pp. 282-293.

Philocrates' father which appears here for the first time. The name, however, is wholly unimportant and unnecessary, for Aristophontes' exposition of the deception is effective without the Thensaurochrysonicochrysidides joke. It is only incidental to the real unmasking of Tyndarus' pretense, which rests upon Aristophontes' obvious sincerity and his description of Philocrates' physical appearance.

Also in the Hegio-Ergasilus scene, the old man speaks of Philopolemus as his only son (*unicus*, 147) and Ergasilus' rejoinder emphasizes the expression *unicus* by applying the hyperbole *magis unicus* to Philopolemus' relationship to himself. Although the emphasis on the only son may not be wholly inconsistent with a *senex* whose second son was stolen many years ago, the very parasite who here discussed Hegio's progeny as *unicus* suddenly appears as aware of the loss of another son when he introduces the slave Stalagmus (875) *qui aufugit domo, qui tibi surripuit quadrimum puerum filiolum tuom*.

These facts are true inconsistencies, and they clearly affect the two essential phases of the drama, the deception of Hegio and the anagnorisis of Tyndarus and Hegio. We are therefore justified in examining the play further to discover whether or not there are other situations in the *Captivi* which contribute to the intensification or solution of this problem. Up to this point the evidence suggests no more than that within the limits of the Hegio-Ergasilus scene (129-194) there are factors which do not fit the rest of the play.

The entrances and exits of Hegio around the scene in question are unique in Roman comedy for their confusion and unmotivated change of purpose. The sequence is as follows:

110: Enter Hegio; conversation with Lorarius.

126: Hegio says that he will go to his brother's to see if other prisoners made any disturbance; then he will return home.

128: Enter Ergasilus; conversation with Hegio.

191: Exit Ergasilus.

192-4: Hegio says that he will go into his house to do his accounts and then go to his brother's, as he had said before. Exit into his own house.

195-250: Scene between Lorarii, Tyndarus, and Philocrates.

251: Enter Hegio, wishing to converse with the captives.

453-460: Exit Hegio with Philocrates to the praetor's;



Hegio announces that he will then go to his brother's to see the captives and inquire if any know Philocrates.

461-497: Enter Ergasilus. Monologue. Exit Ergasilus.

498: Enter Hegio and Aristophontes. Hegio has been to the praetor's, started for home, but then went to his brother's.

That exits and entrances may at times be poorly motivated is not serious, but that they should be utterly stupid is another matter. There is not the shadow of an excuse for Hegio's going indoors at 194 when the trip to his brother's was the announced reason for his appearance at 126. Nothing which took place between these two points had any effect on his plans. Nothing could be lamer than the bank balance excuse. At 251, the brother is forgotten. Conversation with the captives is the announced motif for his re-entrance, and his declaration that he will be back right away if he finds out what he wants only obscures the already confused issue because he does find out all that he could possibly hope for, yet departs at 460 to the praetor's without first going indoors. This visit to the praetor's is of course justified by the intervening scene wherein Hegio decides to send the pseudo-Tyndarus away, but if any announced purpose is to be postponed it should have been his return indoors (251), not the visit to his brother's (now a second time postponed, 458).

These conflicting announcements would cause no difficulty were the single absurdity at 192-4 eliminated, where, without the ghost of an excuse, Hegio breaks the thread of his movements. Ergasilus has said nothing to change Hegio's plans. To us, of course, it is crystal clear that Hegio must be restrained from going to his brother's until after Philocrates gets away or Aristophontes would come too early upon the stage. I cannot conceive that this mention of the brother's prisoners is intended as a foreshadowing of Aristophontes,<sup>3</sup> for the audience as yet has not the slightest idea that there could be anyone at the brother's

<sup>3</sup> So Harsh, *Studies in Dramatic "Preparation" in Roman Comedy* (diss., Chicago, 1934), p. 32. But the deception which Hegio fears in 115 is not the kind that Tyndarus effects; Hegio here refers to the ordinary effort of all prisoners to escape. Ergasilus' remark (99) is irrelevant. The continual going to his brother's is the only suspense, but, for the reasons given in the text above and because it is the point at issue here, it cannot be submitted as evidence of foreshadowing.

who could identify Philocrates, and secondly, though some deception of Hegio is announced in the prologue, so far in the play not one single thing has been done to deceive him. Hegio, in fact, when he first mentions the brother, has not yet even seen his own captives! Foreshadowing and suspense may well be employed by Roman and Greek dramatists, but in this case it simply does not exist; if so intended, it fails; finally, there is no parallel in comedy for the rousing of suspense by a character's threatening to go somewhere or do something which would have no effect other than to bring about the dénouement too soon and thus end the play before it ever begins. This is too crude! Even in Menander, where the opportunities are legion, such a device is never used. The awkward way in which the visit to the brother is continually avoided until it can be safely brought to pass is not good "theatre" and serves to weaken rather than strengthen the dramatic effect. In seeking an explanation we have no other course than to suppose that the visit planned at line 126 for one reason (and carried out at 458 for an entirely different one) was in the Greek play put into execution for the original reason, namely to see that the other captives had caused no trouble during the night. Nothing can explain why any playwright should gratuitously insert line 126. Furthermore it is noteworthy that the Ergasilus scene is immediately preceded by this unfulfilled announcement and immediately followed by the lame excuse to postpone it.

This fact intensifies the discordant nature of the intervening scene and emphasizes the evidence that the movements of Hegio preceding this scene are dramatically wrong, unjustified, and inconsistent with the whole play. The alteration which would account for these difficulties is obvious: the omission of the Ergasilus-Hegio scene from the Greek original of the *Captivi*.

This suggestion is neither new nor popular. Proposed in various forms by Ladewig,<sup>4</sup> Herzog,<sup>5</sup> and Kakridis,<sup>6</sup> it has

<sup>4</sup> Ladewig, *Ueber den Kanon des Volcatius Sedigitus* (Neustrelitz, 1842), pp. 28-31. Ladewig attributes the *Captivi* proper to Anaxandrides, the Ergasilus motif to Antiphanes (or possibly some later New Comedy writer,—at least parts of it, i. e., III, 1). Ladewig's attributions are made on the basis of similarities in the text and fragments of Plautus and the Greek writers respectively. The division of sources is not defended or explained; he merely states his belief. To Anaxandrides he gives I, 1, 93-109; I, 2, 110-132; II; III, 2 through the end of the act;

received scant acceptance among Plautine scholars. Since no one of the three proponents presented it convincingly or thoroughly, the task of refutation has been correspondingly easy and lightly executed. Kakridis argued so poorly that one reviewer could and rightly did dismiss him with a few scornful phrases.<sup>7</sup> Herzog's brief note was more concerned with refuting Ladewig's proposed source for the insertion than with the evidence for the insertion itself. Pascal's refutation<sup>8</sup> of Herzog deals, therefore, with that secondary phase of the problem. Ladewig's contention is more strongly put, though briefly and neither in the present form nor with the support of a detailed analysis.<sup>9</sup>

No complete analysis of the *Captivi* exists, save in the critical work of Lessing.<sup>10</sup> His famous essay is more often quoted by editors for its encomiastic praise of the play<sup>11</sup> than read by scholars for its critical material. Ladewig is the only writer on the structure of the *Captivi* to mention Lessing, and he only to

V; to Antiphanes, I, 1, 69-92; I, 2, 133-194; III, 1; IV; to Plautus, various additions and expansions most of which are not specifically cited.

<sup>7</sup> E. Herzog, *Jahrb. f. Class. Phil.*, CXIII (1876), pp. 363-365. Herzog contends that the Ergasilus motif is wholly Plautine rather than Greek. He gives no discussion of the whole structure of the play.

<sup>8</sup> T. Kakridis, *Barbara Plautina* (Athens, 1904), pp. 18-23. Kakridis believed that Ergasilus' introduction into the play from an outside source caused the dropping of one of Hegio's visits to his brother. Everything works out smoothly if this assumption is made, according to Kakridis.

<sup>9</sup> Hueffner in *W. K. P.*, XXII (1905), p. 712.

<sup>10</sup> C. Pascal, *Riv. di Filologia*, XXIX (1901), pp. 1-15. Cf. especially pp. 1-6 and note 20 *infra*.

<sup>11</sup> P. Langen, *Plautinische Studien* (Berlin, 1886), pp. 22-28, 116-124, 271-278, analyzes the play in some detail; cf. p. 118 for notice of Hegio's knowledge of Philocrates' social position. But, as with all of Langen's analyses, no general conclusions on the structure are offered.

<sup>12</sup> *Kritik über die "Gefangnen" des Plautus*. References to this essay are given to the edition of Ed. Stemplinger, vol. XIII of Petersen and Olshausen, *Lessings Werke* (Leipzig, 1925).

<sup>13</sup> "Ich bleibe also dabei, dass die 'Gefangnen' das schönste Stück sind, das jemals auf die Bühne gekommen ist, und zwar aus keiner andern Ursache, welches ich nochmals wiederholen will, als weil es der Absicht der Lustspiele am nächsten kömmt und auch mit den übrigen zufälligen Schönheiten reichlich versehen ist." Cf. also *Von Leben und Werken des Plautus* (*ibid.*, p. 64): "Es ist gewiss, dass es das vortrefflichste Stück ist, welches jemals auf den Schauplatz gekommen ist."



echo the editors. One may look in vain, even in editors' introductions, for any reference beyond uncritical acceptance of Lessing's excessive tribute.<sup>12</sup> To be sure, Lessing dealt with a somewhat different phase of the drama, and his own comments are perhaps more enthusiastic than scholarly, yet they constitute the basic work on the *Captivi* and should not be ignored. The essay attempts to refute criticism of the play and of Lessing's translation of it emanating from an unnamed critic whose letter, incorporated in the essay, forms more than three-fifths of the whole. In these criticisms questions are raised the credit for which later critics have either ignored or usurped. Here will be found the first objection to Hegio's exit and entrance complex,<sup>13</sup> the correct implications of *mox* (194), and the argument that Hegio must be coming from his brother's when he speaks line 251. These and other observations Ladewig and his successors would have done well to consider.

The exits and entrances of Hegio are the kernel of any criticism of the play. I have presented them here with supporting dramatic and structural details from the same scenes as are involved in his movements,<sup>14</sup> and the alternative has been proposed that the Hegio-Ergasilus scene did not appear in the Greek original.

What does this entail? Is there any evidence for it elsewhere in the play? There is one very unusual circumstance in connection with the dénouement of the *Captivi* worth bearing in mind in any consideration of the Greek play. The direct instrument of the anagnorisis is the slave Stalagmus, who returns with Philocrates and Philopolemus. He is essential to the plot as long as Tyndarus is to be discovered as Hegio's lost son. His is as integral a part of the plot as any secondary character whom Plautus brings on the stage to certify an anagnorisis. With

<sup>12</sup> Niemeyer in Brix-Niemeyer, *Captivi* (Teubner, 2nd ed., 1910), Einl. p. 3, n. 1, refers to Lessing, but only concerning the so-called unity of time. This does not appear in Brix's first edition (1884).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. especially pp. 139-140 and notes s and t.

<sup>14</sup> Roman puns and other Roman references in the Ergasilus-Hegio scenes, even when combined, as here, with possible Greek material, cannot be considered as evidence for separation from the original Greek play. Herzog commits this error (pp. 363-364). They will be useful in determining the possible source of the insertion, once the fact of insertion is determined by other means.

this there can be no quarrel, yet this necessary resolving character is thrust into the spotlight at the most dramatic moment of the play without one word of explanation of his capture or motivation for his coming.<sup>15</sup> There is no more dramatic connection between Stalagmus and the rest of the play than if he or the lost child whom he alone can identify were never mentioned. This was seen by Lessing's critic<sup>16</sup> who further objected that, since Philocrates did not know Stalagmus (985) and since the slave was not at that time in Theodoromedes' house, Philocrates could not possibly have brought him back.

Does this mean that Stalagmus, too, was an addition to the original plot? If that were so, the lost brother motif would go with him and the plot of the *Captivi* would vanish. Such a supposition is neither sound nor necessary. But, if we look at the transition between the Stalagmus scene and the rest of the play, we find that it is provided not by Philocrates, as we should expect, but by Ergasilus. He, in true parasite fashion, volubly keeping Hegio in suspense for nearly one hundred lines (780-

<sup>15</sup> Harsh (*Studies in Dramatic "Preparation,"* p. 21 and n. 5) takes lines 759, 875, 881, and 887 as anticipation of Stalagmus. This is true, but all these references except 759 are in the very scene in which Ergasilus announces Stalagmus and 759 is in Hegio's speech immediately preceding this scene. This is surely too close to be genuine anticipation. Harsh himself feels the lack of any explanation for Stalagmus' arrival. His own citation of LeGrand (*Daos* [Paris, 1910], pp. 394 and 421) does not, however, resolve the difficulty, for LeGrand's comparison of Crito in the *Andria* and Hanno in the *Poenulus* is not apt. Crito's entrance is, admittedly, "un vrai coup de théâtre" and as such is eminently admissible, but Hanno's is neither dramatically nor theatrically effective. It is merely routine. Hanno, moreover, is really one of the main characters, but Stalagmus is not, and whatever theatrical effect he might have is lost because there were definite circumstances which would make it impossible for him to return under the conditions as presented in the play. The conclusion that Plautus may have omitted details concerning Stalagmus (so LeGrand) is an explanation more suitable to my beliefs than to those of others, for the introduction of Ergasilus from outside the original play offers a reason for condensation of the original. Those who hold Ergasilus to be an integral part of the Greek version find it extremely difficult to explain why Plautus should omit such highly important information. In favor of what was it cast aside?

<sup>16</sup> P. 133. Lessing haughtily (and unsatisfactorily) dismisses this objection (p. 158).

873), finally introduces the name of the runaway slave. Ergasilus, who knows nothing of the other son in 170, knows all about him when he brings him to Hegio. The character who is suspect in the earlier part of the play acts as the hinge between the two necessary but disjointed parts of the drama later. Why should Ergasilus be at the harbor if he was looking for a meal? He was last seen in III, 1 in monologue. He entered the stage alone, occupied it alone, and left it alone; he saw no other character and spoke to no one. He left bound for the harbor to bury his sorrow and seek gastronomic sustenance, yet in the very same breath he reminds us that he can eat at Hegio's house if he cares to (496). Why doesn't he? Why come on the stage to tell us that he has found no other patron? Why leave the stage without doing anything but complain? And above all, why go to the harbor?<sup>17</sup> The obvious explanation is that this monologue is a mere stop gap between Hegio's exit and re-entrance, but when Hegio's very exits have been already called into question this ceases to be an explanation. These are inconsistencies of a minor sort, to be sure; alone they are of no great import, for the general dramatic effect is not hurt. Humor is even enhanced by the incongruity of Ergasilus' movements and his purpose, yet the trail of the true inconsistencies previously discussed has led us to them, and in this light they assume very different proportions. We can excuse minor defects by themselves, but we need not be blind to their value as corroborative evidence when they may be reasonably interpreted as such.

In this case the hand of the dramatist, frequently heavy, has actually forced Ergasilus to the harbor, even against the very nature of his material. He is sent to announce Stalagmus and the returning party. Although such announcements may be frequent in comedy, none is necessary here, and the character who performs this unnecessary function is also unnecessary.

<sup>17</sup> Kakridis believed that Ergasilus' part in act IV was originally that of a slave who (like Pinacium in the *Stichus*) had a post at the harbor to watch for the arrival of someone. He seeks confirmation in Ergasilus' words describing his actions as *ut comici servi solent* (778). But does not the mention of *servi* just as surely confirm the contrast of rôle as the identification? It is an attractive conjecture, which I should be glad to be able to accept, but conjecture it remains (so Fraenkel, *Plautinisches im Plautus* [Berlin, 1929], p. 246, but without acknowledgment to Kakridis).

Indeed, the only essential task, namely the explanation of Stalagmus' presence, is not performed at all, either by Ergasilus or by those whom he introduces.

We have now seen that in three appearances Ergasilus is most obviously suspect in the first (his scene with Hegio before the deception). The strongest other evidence of discordant notes was his third and last appearance, announcing the travellers. The basis for this announcement was his trip to the harbor; this carried us directly to his second appearance (III, 1), where we found the trip wholly unjustified. The circle is now complete; a careful trailing of Ergasilus through the play leaves him outside the proper functioning of the plot and shows clearly the ill-fitting transitions into which he has been thrust. The evidence is the stronger because it is interdependent.

What is the result of removing Ergasilus from the *Captivi*? The first change must be the disappearance of the only other passage in which he appears, the opening monologue. This is no loss, for in it the parasite gives us nothing that the prologue has not already given. Unnecessary repetition of prologue information is no crime in Roman comedy, but it may emphasize an already suspicious circumstance. The original play probably opened with Hegio and the *lorarii* (after a prologue), quite possibly with the captives on the stage. Hegio announced his departure to his brother's and went, with the specific purpose of seeing whether they had rioted (126). The *lorarii* continued on stage with the captives as in the present II, 1. Hegio returned from his brother's and spoke line 252, *ubi sunt* . . . , not 251, which was undoubtedly written to explain his coming from his own house instead of from the wings. Possibly the whole speech is a Plautine substitute for a few lines of explanation concerning the visit to the brother's, for Plautus would naturally omit that in his version. An exclamation such as 252 is the easiest thing with which to begin a scene when the real beginning has been abandoned, for Hegio could easily come on stage without seeing the captives. He converses with Tyndarus and Philocrates, as in the Latin text, finding out now for the first time Philocrates' family connections and financial position. At the end of this scene he left with Philocrates to get the passport, returning later with a friend for the "Philocrates" who will remain as hostage. This can only be kindness designed

to permit "Philocrates" to see a friend; it had nothing to do with verifying the identity of his captive, for that would of course have been impossible in any plot. It is doubtful whether the purpose of this second visit was announced, for Hegio's later account of it (508) shows that it was only a second thought after he had started to return home from the praetor's.<sup>18</sup> The words in 458-460 "to visit captives and see if anyone knows Philocrates" are general enough to cover both purposes, but there is no point in identifying Philocrates unless it is done before sending Tyndarus off. Quite possibly Plautus inserted these lines for the purpose of foreshadowing the later unmasking of "Philocrates," forgetting that the visit was to be an afterthought, and then neglected to alter line 508 with which the insertion created a contradiction.

Tyndarus remained on stage after the departure of Hegio and Philocrates. The space before Hegio's return now filled by Ergasilus' monologue was probably taken by a monologue by Tyndarus which was interrupted by Hegio's return with Aristophontes. Support for this view may be found in the extreme improbability of the present situation at 516, where Tyndarus rushes out of doors when he was supposed to be closely guarded (456), yet no guards follow him and no punishment is even threatened by Hegio for what could appear to him only as gross disobedience.

The play then proceeded as does the *Captivi* through Tyndarus' discomfiture. He goes to the quarries; Hegio takes Aristophontes back. The returning travellers now entered, to be joined somewhat later by Hegio, who is now back from his brother's for the third time. The removal of Ergasilus from IV, 2 and 3 removes also the necessity for the *puer* scene (IV, 4). This scene, intimately connected with the Ergasilus motif, is quite possibly a Plautine addition (regardless of the construction of the Greek original) inserted to facilitate Ergasilus' change of costume to reappear in the rôle of Stalagmus or Philopolemus.<sup>19</sup> Hegio's meeting with the travellers took place on the stage in a dramatic scene which we sorely miss in the present play. It would offer also ample material to replace the excised Ergasilus

<sup>18</sup> So Kakridis, his strongest (and only real) argument.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. H. W. Prescott, "Three Puer-scenes in Plautus," *H. S. C. P.*, XXI (1910), pp. 31-50; see especially pp. 37-39.



scenes. There is even some evidence of the omitted material, for the *hoc agamus* (929) of Philopolemus would lead us to expect the next words to come either from Hegio or from Philopolemus himself, yet they come, surprisingly enough, from Philocrates. These words would fit much better into the middle of a Philopolemus-Hegio dialogue which had been going on for some time (just as they are made in the *Captivi* to refer to off-stage conversation) and which dealt with matters other than those of Philopolemus' main interest. Such would undoubtedly be the explanation of how Stalagnus happened to be with the returning boys, the very crucial point which is missed in the *Captivi*. The *hoc agamus* would then be a joint by which Plautus returned to the original after inserting the stock entrance speech covering material the audience does not need to know. This normal comic function, however, is not well treated here, for, although the technique is very common, the material covered here is actually not known by the audience. This very use of a stock technique in a situation which does not conform to the stock situation is in itself suspicious and adds evidence to the theory that Stalagnus' presence should have been explained. The play then continued through the anagnorisis as it now does.

From what source did Ergasilus come? Are he and all his dialogue a Plautine addition? In parts, yes, but the long monologues and the main sections of the Ergasilus-Hegio dialogue come undoubtedly from some Greek parasite play<sup>20</sup> which offered the following features: a philosophizing monologue (I, 1), to which Plautus added expository material to make it fit the plot of the *Captivi* (91-100); a plea for dinner (129-192), to which Plautus added a number of Roman jokes; a second monologue of despair (III, 1), to which Plautus gave a wholly Roman tone (even a Dossenus); and a teasing scene in which a parasite withholds good news<sup>21</sup> (768-900),<sup>22</sup> with the end of which Plautus has tampered to make it fit the present circumstances

<sup>20</sup> That it may have been of Epicharmus (Pascal, *loc. cit.* in note 8 *supra*) I do not deny. My separation of Ergasilus from the *Captivi* need imply no disagreement with Pascal's criticism of Herzog, since I join the latter only in disassociating Ergasilus from the *Captivi* original, not in claiming a Plautine source.

<sup>21</sup> Possibly originally a *servus currens* scene; cf. note 17 *supra*.

<sup>22</sup> And possibly also 901-908; cf. Fraenkel, *op. cit.*, p. 248.



(details of 873-876, 882-890, expansion of a simple oath by Apollo and Kore). These are common enough themes and could be found for the seeking in the pages of any Greek writer. It is noteworthy that none of the general themes is so closely related to the *Captivi* plot that it cannot be withdrawn from it without destroying the whole. These are stock situations which could be introduced with but little alteration for local use.

That Plautus did not originally create the Ergasilus scenes is clearly indicated by the not infrequent passages in which Roman references and Latin puns are clear expansions of a briefer Greek original section.<sup>23</sup> The Ergasilus speeches, however, are so much more expanded<sup>24</sup> than are other parts of the play and the Roman tone of his whole rôle is so emphasized that we may safely assert that his part has undergone more alteration than all other parts of the play together, regardless of source.

In conclusion, inconsistencies of a real, i. e., anti-dramatic, nature indicate that Ergasilus is a stranger to the *Captivi*. The evidence from Plautine expansions shows unquestionably that it was this rôle and its relation to the original with which Plautus was mainly concerned in his adaptation. In this adaptation many of the indubitably Roman passages served two purposes, both humorous effect and the cementing of the new material to the original framework. By demonstrating that the evidence is interlocking and mutually confirmatory, a conclusion hitherto unpopular and inadequately presented, namely that Ergasilus was not in the original Greek play, is considerably strengthened.

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<sup>23</sup> Lines 85-87, 90, 96, 152-166, 464-468, 475, 485, 491-495, 768, 774, 796, 811, 823, 825, 833, 849, 863, 864, 881-883, 888. Had Plautus created the whole, there would not exist these easily recognizable nuclei. But whether Ergasilus came from Antiphanes (Ladewig), Epicharmus (Pascal), or any other specific Greek writer is now, and will probably forever remain, beyond our power to determine.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Herzog, p. 364. All but six (125, 266, 274, 561, 766, 998) of the thirty passages which Fraenkel considers to be Roman expansions are spoken by or to Ergasilus. Ladewig mentioned as Plautine only 489 and 491-492 specifically (but he believed in a Greek source), though he refers in a general way to Plautine additions throughout the play.

## THE ROMANS IN SOUTHERN GAUL.

Although the Romans had often passed through the country lying between the Pyrenees and the Alps, it was a long time before they turned to their own advantage the resources of that region. In fact, they even aided Massilia to maintain her commercial supremacy in the Rhone valley. But shortly after 125 B. C. Roman policy in respect to southern Gaul underwent a sudden and portentous change, with the result that during the following century the whole of Gaul came under the domination of Rome. The story of the Romans in southern Gaul (later known as Gallia Narbonensis or simply as Provincia) and of Caesar's conquest of central and northern Gaul is a familiar one, but the sequence of events during the years 124-120 has not been clearly explained. A study of the accounts of those years given by modern writers reveals that they conflict in several respects, since they depend upon the use made by each writer of the apparent contradictions in the sources and upon the writer's interest in the tactical and geographical problems.<sup>1</sup> This paper is an attempt to present a critical and, if finality cannot be achieved, at least a plausible account of the events in those years. I hope to demonstrate that the sources are not so contradictory as they have generally been considered.

<sup>1</sup> Works consulted: Mommsen, *The History of Rome*, transl. by Dickson, III (New York, 1900), pp. 417-20; E. Herzog, *Galliae Narbonensis Prov. Rom. Historia* (Lipsiae, 1864), pp. 45-47; A. Lebègue, *Fastes de la Narbonnaise* (XV of Devic and Vaisseté, *Hist. gén. de Languedoc*, Toulouse, 1892), pp. 6-9 (quotes most of the sources); G. Maurin, "La Conquête de la Narbonnaise," *Mém. de l'Académie de Nîmes*, XVI (1893), especially pp. 245-56 (good survey, especially in topographical matters); W. H. Hall, *The Romans on the Riviera and the Rhone* (London, 1898), pp. 92-96 (superficial, inaccurate); *R.-E.*, s. vv. "Bituitus" (Klebs), "Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus" (20), cols. 1322-24 (Münzer), and "Q. Fabius Maximus Allobrogicus" (110), cols. 1794-96 (Brassloff); Drumann and Groebe, *Gesch. Roms*, III, 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1906), pp. 14-15 (gives sources); W. E. Heitland, *The Roman Republic*, II (Cambridge, 1909), pp. 332-33; C. Jullian, *Hist. de la Gaule*, I, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1914), pp. 14-19 (discussion, sources); H. Last in *Cambridge Anc. Hist.*, IX (Cambridge, 1932), pp. 111-13; Bloch and Carcopino, *La République romaine de 133 à 44 avant J.-C.*, I (Paris, 1935), pp. 276-77 (cited in the notes as "Carcopino").

Massilia and Rome probably had few common interests before the appearance of Hannibal in Gaul. But for commercial reasons, if for no others, Massilia joined Rome at the time of the Second Punic War in an endeavor to destroy the maritime supremacy of the Carthaginian empire. The vicissitudes of the war itself frequently brought the Greeks and Romans together, and for a long time after the war they remained friendly.<sup>2</sup> In fact, the Greek city profited by this friendship and, as time went on, came to depend more and more on Roman armies to help maintain her economic control of the Rhone valley. For example, in 181 she asked the Romans to check the Ligurian pirates who were active along the coast of southern Gaul,<sup>3</sup> and in 154 a Roman army defeated two Ligurian tribes who were besieging Antipolis and Nicaea, towns subject to Massilia. As a result, the Greek city acquired additional territory and the transalpine Ligurians were deprived of their own seacoast.<sup>4</sup>

In the second century, then, and probably earlier, Massilia was the head of a commercial empire that controlled the economic life of the Gallic tribes situated within and adjacent to the Rhone valley. One of these tribes, lying in the plains and hills

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Livy, XXI, 20, 7-8; 25, 1, and especially 26, 3-5; cf. also XXXVII, 54, 21 (speech of the Rhodian embassy before the Senate against Antiochus, 189). According to Justinus, XLVIII, 5, 10, Rome had an early treaty with Massilia (it is probable, however, that the grief expressed by the Massiliotes for the Romans when the Gauls sacked Rome and the treaty made at that time may be a historical retrojection from later times when the two states were friendly). For a brief notice of the importance of Massilia in the Second Punic War, cf. Tenney Frank "Rome, Marseilles, and Carthage," *The Military Historian and Economist*, I (1916), pp. 403-06; for her commercial rivalry with Carthage prior to the war, cf. S. Gsell, *Hist. ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord*, I (Paris, 1914), pp. 412 ff., 444 ff.

<sup>3</sup> No doubt the Romans were acting for their own interests as well. At that time L. Aemilius Paullus was fighting a Ligurian tribe, the Ingauni; C. Matienus was in command of the fleet operating in the *sinus Gallicus* (west of the Rhone); Livy, XL, 18, 4-5 and 25-28.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Livy, *epit.* XLVII and Polybius, XXXIII, 8 (the Ligurians besiege Antipolis and Nicaea), 9-10 (the Roman envoys en route to Massilia are attacked by the Ligurians; Opimius, consul in 154 [*Fast. Cap.* 600 = 154], defeats the Oxybii and Deciates, and gives some of their territory to Massilia. Thus the Greeks recovered not only their two subject-towns but all the intervening land as well. Opimius spent the winter of 154/3 in Liguria).

between the territory of Massilia and the Druentia river, was the Salluvii.<sup>5</sup> In 125, perhaps urged on by the ambitious Arverni who had made their power felt over a large part of southern Gaul, they made a raid across the border. That the Massiliotes were quite unprepared to meet the danger may be inferred from the fact that once again they asked Rome to come to their aid. This appeal, as the subsequent events showed, proved to be momentous for the Greeks, for the Romans, and especially for the Gauls, because it marked with a precision rare in historical developments the true beginning of the Roman conquest of Gaul: this time, after they had defeated the barbarians, the Romans took a personal interest in the country.

The reasons for this abrupt change of policy on the part of Rome are closely connected with the equally abrupt change of policy within the state itself. The reader need merely be reminded that the appeal of Massilia coincided with the troubled political situation brought about by the popular reforms of Tiberius Gracchus. Although Tiberius himself had perished, his *lex agraria* was still in force and the triumvirate to administer it was functioning despite the active opposition of the *Optimates*.<sup>6</sup> Now it is to be remembered that the Senate, which by the nature of the situation represented the conservative party, had always managed foreign, i. e., military affairs. When the Massiliotes asked aid from Rome, the Senate immediately granted their request and, taking advantage of the situation, placed M. Fulvius Flaccus, ardent Gracchan and consul in 125, in command of the expedition. In this unexpected manner a dangerous and powerful leader of the *Populares* was removed, at least for a few months, from the political scene at Rome.<sup>7</sup>

The campaign of Flaccus consumed one, possibly two, seasons; he triumphed in 123. The Salluvii, Ligurians, and Vocontii (north of the Druentia river) were defeated but were not treated

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Strabo, IV, 1, 11 (*init.*).

<sup>6</sup> For the agrarian reforms of Tiberius, cf. e. g., Carcopino, *op. cit.*, pp. 190 ff., 224 ff.

<sup>7</sup> Flaccus was a turbulent partisan of C. Gracchus and popular despite the suspicion that he had incurred with Gaius of having murdered Scipio Aemilianus a few years previously (129); Plutarch, *Gaius*, 10, 3-4. In addition to being consul in 125, he was a member of the Land Commission; Livy, *epit.* LIX, Appian, *B. C.*, I, 18.

with undue severity, and Massilia was relieved of her fears.<sup>8</sup> It is noteworthy that Flaccus, though a Gracchan and presumably an "expansionist," annexed no territory and did not even establish a garrison.

We turn now to an exposition of the campaigns during the years 123-21.

C. Sextius Calvinus, a senatorial and consul in 124, set out the following year to fight the tribes named above, a fact which suggests that perhaps the triumph of his predecessor had not been well earned. Deep within the territory of the Salluvii, about eighteen miles (or one day's forced march<sup>9</sup>) north of Massilia, he founded a *castellum* which he named Aquae Sextiae, the first site in Gaul permanently occupied by the Romans. This time they had come to stay. The campaign, including the construction of the fortress, lasted probably until 122, when Sextius was awarded a triumph.<sup>10</sup> Commercial enterprise was

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Livy, *epit.* LX. The use of *primus* (*Flaccus primus transalpinos Ligures domuit bello . . .*), which is echoed by Florus, I, 37, 3 (who has compressed this campaign and the subsequent one of Sextius into one sentence), and by Ammianus, XV, 12, 5, seems erroneous in view of the previous campaign of Opimius. The word, however, may be original with Livy and mean that Flaccus was the first of a group of commanders who fought in Gaul during the next few years. Cf. the curious statement in Plutarch, *Gaius*, 15, 1: (The partisans of Fulvius, on the day when he and Gaius were killed, armed themselves near his house with the spoils) ἀ Γαλάτας νενικηκώς ὅτε ὑπάρτευσεν, εἰλήφει. For the triumph, cf. Velleius, II, 6, 4, Plutarch, *Gaius*, 18, 1, *Acta Triumph.* 631 = 123 (*C. I. L.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 1, p. 176).

<sup>9</sup> Cf. T. R. Holmes, *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul* (London, 1890), pp. 626-27, especially n. 6.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Fast. cons.* 630 = 124 (*C. I. L.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 1, p. 150), Livy, *epit.* LXI (the use of *colonia* to describe Aquae Sextiae is incorrect), Strabo, IV, 1, 5 (who properly calls it a *φρουρά* 'Ρωμαίων, a permanent garrison), Velleius, I, 15, 4 (who may be using the same source, probably Posidonius, as that of Strabo; he does not belong in the Livian tradition: his *Sallues* is a transliteration of the Greek name and is not the same as the Latin form, *Salluvii*, found in Livy and the *Acta*). Diodorus, *epit.* XXXIV, 23 (Dindorf, Paris [Didot], 1885), tells of an understanding between Sextius and Craton, an Arvernian who was pro-Roman. (Diodorus' ὑπατος is inexact; Sextius was proconsul, ὑπατικός.) Münzer, however, in *R.-E.*, s. v. "C. Sextius Calvinus" (20), col. 2045, takes Diodorus literally and asserts therefore that Sextius was in Gaul three years (124 as consul, 123-22 as proconsul). Eutropius, IV, 22, confuses the campaigns of C. Sextius Calvinus and Cn. Domitius



undoubtedly one of the motives for the establishment of a garrison. It was to protect Roman and not merely Greek interests in Gaul, and to guard the road to Spain. Later, other centers, Narbo and Forum Domitii, were organized along the western segment of this important route.<sup>11</sup>

At about the same time as the campaign of Sextius occurred the occupation of the Balearic islands (infested with pirates now that the Carthaginians no longer controlled them) by Q. Caecilius Metellus, consul in 123.<sup>12</sup>

Although the Gauls had been defeated on the field of battle, they were by no means subjugated. The situation was growing rapidly worse for Rome despite her seeming success. It is very doubtful whether the Romans even at this time appreciated the power of the Arverni, the tribe that had assumed some measure of leadership over a large part of Gaul and had probably instigated the earlier clashes between the Gauls and Greeks. The single tribe in Gaul that had ties of friendship with Rome was the Aedui,<sup>13</sup> and, when they appealed to Rome in a border dispute with the Allobroges, Rome again had recourse to arms. She wanted not merely to assist her ally but to recover king Tutomotulus and the other Salluvian nobles who had taken refuge with the Allobroges, for, as long as these leaders were at large, they constituted a serious menace to the Romans.<sup>14</sup> By

Ahenobarbus, combining their names to yield Sextius Domitius Calvinus. Cassiodorus, *Chron.* A. U. C. 632 = 122 (*Monumenta Germ. Hist., Auctores Antiq.*, XI [Berlin, 1894], p. 131) mentions the founding of Aquae. For Sextius' triumph, cf. *Acta Triumph.* 632 = 122. The literary sources name only the Salluvii; the *Acta* give the same three tribes, viz., Ligurians, Vocontii, and Salluvii, which Flaccus had defeated.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. notes 27 (Forum Domitii) and 33 (Narbo) *infra*.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *Acta Triumph.* 633 = 121 (where he is given the *cognomen* Balaricus); Livy, *epit.* LX (*sub fin.*); Strabo, III, 5, 1. He founded cities and colonized them from Spain. Münzer, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Q. Caecilius Metellus Balaricus" (82), col. 1207, says that the campaign lasted two years; probably so, since Livy calls Metellus consul and the *Acta* call him proconsul.

<sup>13</sup> They had long been on terms of unofficial friendship with Rome (Caesar tactfully dignified the status as one of *necessitudo*). In the time of Caesar, and probably earlier, they had official *amicitia* with Rome; Caesar, *B. G.*, I, 43, 6-7, V, 54, 4, Livy, *epit.* LXI (*sociorum* has been restored).

<sup>14</sup> Livy, *epit.* LXI, Appian, *Celt.*, 12 (cf. note 15 *infra*).



now the battles between Roman and Gallic armies had grown to major proportions. A third campaign requiring the services of two generals became necessary before the Romans could complete their undertaking.<sup>15</sup> Of the sources given in the foregoing note, the following are the most important:

1. *The Acta Triumphorum* A. U. C. 634 (= 120 B. C.).

Q. FABIVS. Q. AEMILIANI. F. Q. N. AN. DC[XXXIII]  
 MAXIMVS. PROCOS. DE. ALLOBRO[gibus]  
 ET. REGE. ARVERNORVM. BETVLTQ. X. K[--- month?]  
 CN. DOMITIVS. CN. F. CN. N. AHENOBARB. A[n.DCXXXIII]  
 PROCOS. DE. GALLEIS. ARVERNEIS. XVI. K[--- month?]

2. Livy, *epitome lib.* LXI.

Cn. Domitius proconsul adversus Allobrogas ad oppidum Vindalium feliciter pugnavit. quibus bellum inferendi causa fuit, quod Tutomotulum, Salluviorum regem, fugientem receperissent et omni ope iuvissent quodque Aeduorum agros, [sociorum] populi Romani, vastavissent. [There follows a notice of the death of Gaius Gracchus and Fulvius Flaccus, probably early in 121.] Q. Fabius Maximus consul, Pauli nepos, adversus Allobrogas et Bituitum, Arvernorum regem, feliciter pugnavit. ex Bituiti exercitu occisa milia centum viginti; ipse cum ad satisfaciendum senatui Romam profectus esset, Albam custodiendus datus est, quia contra pacem videbatur, ut in Galliam remitteretur. decretum quoque est, ut Congonnetiacus, filius eius, comprehensus Romam mitteretur. Allobroges in deditionem accepti.

3. Strabo, IV, 1, 11.

μεταξὺ δὲ τοῦ Δρονηντία καὶ τοῦ Ἰσαρος καὶ ἄλλοι ποταμοὶ ῥέουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀλπεων ἐπὶ τὸν Ῥοδανόν, δύο μὲν οἱ περιρρέοντες πόλιν Καονάρων κοινῷ ρείθρῳ συμβάλλοντες εἰς τὸν Ῥοδανόν, τρίτος δὲ Σούλας ὁ κατὰ Οὐνδαλον πόλιν μισγόμενος τῷ Ῥοδανῷ, ὅπου Γναῖος Ἀηνόβαρβος μεγάλῃ μάχῃ πολλὰς ἐτρέψατο Κελτῶν μυριάδας. εἰσὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ πόλεις καὶ Αὐενιῶν καὶ Ἀρανσίων καὶ Ἀερία, κτλ. . . . καθ' ὃ

<sup>15</sup> The accounts, all of which are cited below, survive only in epitomes or as casual references; the triumphs were recorded in an order the reverse of that in which they had been earned. *Acta Triumph.* 634 = 120 (for the consulship of Domitius and Fabius, cf. *Fast. Cons.* 633 = 121, and *Fast. Antiates* [Mancini in *Notizie degli Scavi*, LXXIII (1921), p. 129 and Pl. II]), Livy, *epit.* LXI, Florus, I, 37, 4-6, Orosius, V, 13, 2 and 14, 1, Eutropius, IV, 22, Velleius, II, 10, 2 and 39, 1, Appian, *Celt.*, 2 (*sub fin.*) and 12, Strabo, IV, 1, 11 and 2, 3, Cicero, *Pro Font.*, 36, Caesar, *B. G.*, I, 45, 2, Valerius Maximus, IX, 6, 3, Pliny, *N. H.*, VII, 166, Suetonius, *Nero*, 2, 1, Ammianus, XV, 12, 5.

δὲ συμπύπτουσιν ὁ Ἰσαρ ποταμὸς καὶ ὁ Ῥοδανὸς καὶ τὸ Κέμμενον ὄρος, Κόιντος Φάβιος Μάξιμος Αἰμιλιανὸς οὐχ ὅλαις τρισὶ μυριάσιν εἰκοσι μυριάδας Κελτῶν κατέκοψε, καὶ ἔστησε τρόπαιον αὐτόθι λευκοῦ λίθου καὶ νεὼς δύο, τὸν μὲν Ἀρεως τὸν δ' Ἡρακλέους.

When the Allobroges refused to deliver the Salluvian nobles to the Romans, C. Domitius Ahenobarbus, who had been consul in 122, was sent to Gaul the following year as proconsul to succeed Sextius.<sup>16</sup> Because Domitius feared that, if the Allobroges secured aid from the Arverni, the combined force would be stronger than his own army, he determined to meet the enemy as soon as possible rather than await him in the vicinity of Aquae Sextiae. Bituitus, king of the Arverni, one of the many able patriots whom the Romans were destined to meet in Gaul, endeavored, while collecting an army from his client-tribes, to delay the advance of Domitius by sending him an embassy to discuss the situation and possibly to offer attractive bribes.<sup>17</sup> The Roman, however, was not deceived. He brought his army as far up the Rhone as the Sorgue, *ad oppidum Vindalium*, before he met the Allobroges and perhaps an advance contingent of the Arverni. Here the battle was fought, probably in the late spring.<sup>18</sup> The several elephants which accompanied the Roman

<sup>16</sup> The majority of the scholars (Lebègue, Maurin, Mommsen, Herzog, Klebs, Münzer, cited in n. 1 *supra*) believe that Domitius went to Gaul as consul (122); the only basis for this assertion is an inaccurate statement in Suetonius, *Nero*, 2 (cf. Münzer, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus" [21], col. 1325, *init.*). Yet the *Acta*, Livy, and the other sources call him proconsul. If Sextius remained in Gaul two seasons (123-22; cf. n. 10 *supra*, *sub fin.*), Domitius probably succeeded him in March, 121.

<sup>17</sup> Appian, *Celt.*, 12. Bituitus could well afford to offer bribes, for his wealth was remarkable; Strabo, IV, 2, 3 (*fin.*), Florus, I, 37, 5.

<sup>18</sup> Livy and Orosius mention the town of Vindalium (Florus has the name but thought it was that of a river). Strabo's account (from Artemidorus of Ephesus, *ca.* 100 B. C.), quoted above in the text, says that the Soulgas, one of the more northern streams (between the Druentia and the Isara), flows into the Rhone *κατὰ Οὐνδαλον*. The Soulgas is probably the modern Sorgue which, along with other streams, enters the Rhone just north of Avignon (cf. the modern towns nearby of Ile-sur-Sorgue and Védène). Livy, XXI, 31, 4, though the text is corrupt, probably had Sorgas or Sorgia; cf. Walters and Conway *ad loc.* (Oxf. Class. Text, 1928). It would seem that Livy and possibly Polybius, III, 49, 6 (A [11th cent.] and R [later codd.] have *σκαρας*, generally read as Ἰσάρας; could it equal Σώρκας or Σώργας, from *σκαρας* [*σκωρας*]

army are said by Florus and Orosius to have terrified the barbarians. It was a long and fiercely contested engagement—the largest one fought up to this time by the Romans in Gaul—but Domitius finally routed the Allobroges, thus checking their progress southward.<sup>19</sup> He had shown himself an able strategist by having engaged the enemy at a place as far removed as possible from southernmost Gaul, a tactical plan that was employed two generations later by the ablest of Roman generals in Gaul.<sup>20</sup> However badly the Allobroges had been defeated, the large army of the Arverni under Bituitus had not yet met the Romans. By now the latter had involved themselves in a very serious situation. In spite of Livy's statement that the battle had been fought *feliciter*, it appears that the Roman victory had not been decisive; Valerius Maximus, although his account confuses the two battles, implies that the Allobroges had not even formally surrendered to Domitius. Accordingly, in response to his urgent request, another army was sent from Italy under the consul Q. Fabius Maximus. He came none too soon and, though ill, prepared to meet the enemy.<sup>21</sup> It is probable that the two

by metathesis? Cf. Schwieghäuser [Leipzig, 1789], I, and Hultsch [Berlin, 1888, *ed. alt.*], I, *ad loc.*) are referring to the same river as Strabo's Σούλας (originally Σούργας?). Maurin, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-51, discusses the probable battle-site but believes that the alluvial nature of the soil makes precise identification impossible; cf. also Jullian, *op. cit.*, p. 16, n. 2.

<sup>19</sup> Figures are confused. Strabo, IV, 1, 11, says that Domitius fought "myriads of Gauls," and in IV, 2, 3 he says that each of the two Romans met 200,000 Gauls (undoubtedly an error; that number probably fought in the second battle; cf. n. 22 *infra*). Orosius says explicitly that the Allobroges lost 20,000 killed and 3,000 captured.

<sup>20</sup> To integrate his work in Gaul, Caesar needed control of the resources of Narbonensis; cf. the importance he attached to Tolosa, Carcaso, and Narbo, *B. G.*, III, 20, 2. He planned all offensive campaigns so as to keep the enemy away from the Province. Four times, however, his plan miscarried, though the Province was never in serious danger; *ibid.*, III, 1 (57 B. C.) and 20-27 (56 B. C.), VII, 7 (52 B. C.), and 64 ff. (52 B. C.).

<sup>21</sup> It is not known when Fabius set out (or when he triumphed in 120; cf. *infra*); he was not in Rome when Gracchus and Flaccus were killed, probably early in 121; cf. Appian, *B. C.*, I, 25. If the request for a new army reached Rome in May, Fabius could have got his army together in northern Italy (headquarters seem to have been at Placentia; cf. Polybius, XXXIII, 10, *init.*). From Placentia to Arelate (*via Aquae*

Roman commanders, not knowing precisely where the Arverni would cross the Rhone, had not united their forces, each retaining his own *imperium*, and that Domitius was guarding the southern crossings, e. g., at Avennio and Tarusco, while Fabius had marched northward. This division of the armies was a manoeuvre that the sources failed to appreciate and may help to explain why they confused the order in which the battles were fought, the commanders who fought them, and the enemy defeated in each case. The host of Bituitus, ready at last, crossed the Rhone, perhaps at Valentia. Whatever the situation was just prior to the second battle, the sources yield some information on the engagement itself. It was fought between the Arverni under their king Bituitus, whose forces were doubtless augmented by the remnant of the Allobrogian army, and a Roman army led by Fabius, at the confluence of the Isara and the Rhone.<sup>22</sup> Pliny dates the battle August 8 (121). Most of the modern scholars maintain that Fabius and Domitius fought the battle together.<sup>23</sup>

Sextiae) is about 400 Roman miles or about a month's march (June). Fabius then marched up along the Rhone (July) and met the Arverni (August 8; cf. *infra*). How large was his army? Strabo says 30,000. This figure may be correct, for it makes 5 legions (of 6,000 each) or 6 legions (of 5,200 each, not full strength) according to the military organization of the 2nd cent.; cf. Schulten, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Legio," cols. 1197-98. As to Fabius' illness, Appian (*Celt.*, 2) says he was suffering from a wound, Pliny says he had the quartan fever (which left him in the excitement of the battle).

<sup>22</sup> Orosius and Florus say the battle was fought beside the Rhone; when the Arverni are defeated, they flee across the river (westward). The fact that one of the two bridges broke down created a panic and helped to increase the total of Gauls who perished. Strabo (quoted *supra* in the text) is explicit; the Isar of the sources undoubtedly is equivalent to the modern Isère (and not the Euygues [or Aigues, cf. Jullian, *op. cit.*, p. 17, n. 4] of Last, *op. cit.*, p. 111, n. 5). As to the figures: Strabo says 30,000 Romans cut to pieces (*κατέκοψεν*), 200,000 Gauls; Orosius states that, out of Bituitus' army of 180,000 men, 150,000 were killed; Livy gives 120,000; Pliny, 130,000. The totals, 180,000-200,000 Gauls and 120,000-150,000 killed, are tolerably consistent considering the difficulty of obtaining the information.

<sup>23</sup> They have doubtless based their conclusions on the fact that several of the sources for the sake of brevity name the two generals together (or Fabius alone). Livy, Strabo, and the *Acta* prove fully that two battles were fought in two different places at different times. Of the modern scholars, Carcopino, *op. cit.*, especially favors this "pro-Domitius" tradition, crediting him with both victories; cf. n. 29 *infra*.

Mommsen and, following him, Herzog and Klebs (cf. note 1, *supra*) have even reversed the order of the battles found in Livy to agree with the order given in the *Acta Triumphorum* and in Strabo, IV, 2, 3. (The latter, however, does not reverse the order of the other literary sources, but, by listing the exploits of the Romans in Gaul from the more recent times to the more remote [Caesar, Fabius, Domitius], implies that Fabius fought *after* Domitius.) It is quite possible to explain the (apparent) reversed order of the triumphs in the *Acta* and to reconcile this material with that given in the literary sources.

Domitius originally had been sent out as proconsul to organize southern Gaul as a province. He had defeated the Allobroges, and a second general, Fabius, had defeated the Arverni further to the north. Both commanders then set about commemorating their respective victories, the importance of which is indicated by the fact that they erected monuments on the battle-sites, stone towers with trophies according to Florus; according to Strabo, Fabius not only raised a large stone trophy but in addition built two temples, one to Mars, the other to Hercules. The triumphs, held separately at Rome the following year, likewise impressed the sources with their magnificence.<sup>24</sup>

The fate of Bituitus after his disastrous defeat is not certain. He escaped capture on the field of battle and subsequently appeared in Rome (so Livy, quoted above, implies; Eutropius and Valerius Maximus say that he was captured by Domitius and sent to Rome as a prisoner). The Senate feared to allow him to return to Gaul and put him (as well as his son and heir, Congonnetiacus) in prison at Alba Longa. Probably, however, he did appear in the triumph of Fabius: Florus pictures the Gallic chieftain in all his splendor, *nihil tam conspicuum in triumpho quam rex ipse Bituitus discoloribus in armis argenteoque carpento, qualis pugnaverant*.

The construction of elaborate trophies and temples (indeed, one ancient source declares that Fabius founded a town, called Fabia<sup>25</sup>) undoubtedly consumed the remainder of 121. Furthermore, since each commander is called proconsul in the *Acta*, there is good reason to believe that both remained in Gaul until

<sup>24</sup> Florus, Eutropius.

<sup>25</sup> Apollodorus *apud* Suidas s.v. Φαβία· πόλις Κελτογαλατῶν, κτίσμα Φαβίου στρατηγού Ῥωμαίων, κτλ. Its site is unknown.



120. Fabius returned home and held his triumph first (the dates of the triumphs are unfortunately lacking). He is credited in the *Acta* with having defeated the Allobroges (because, according to Valerius Maximus, they had been urged by Bituitus to surrender to Domitius' successor) and king Bituitus himself. Thus, by a strange turn of fortune, Fabius was given the *cognomen* Allobrogicus, although Domitius, and not he, had defeated that tribe.<sup>26</sup>

Domitius stayed on somewhat longer in Gaul. He may have captured Bituitus and sent him to Rome, as we noted previously, to appear in Fabius' triumph; he probably founded Forum Domitii, or at least renamed the old Celtic market-town there; he began the construction of the road that later bore his name; and otherwise "pacified" southern Gaul for Roman interests.<sup>27</sup> He appears to have satisfied his desire for *gloria*, for which the Domitii had always been notorious, by riding through his province on an elephant, followed by a crowd (*turba*) of soldiers.<sup>28</sup> To commemorate and perhaps exaggerate the exploits of Domitius in Gaul, his son, one of the founders of Narbo in 118, minted coins showing on the obverse a Gallic chieftain, thereby suggesting perhaps that the elder Domitius had defeated not only the tribes dominated by the Arverni but also the Arverni themselves and their king Bituitus.<sup>29</sup>

His task of organizing the province completed, Domitius

<sup>26</sup> The *cognomen* Allobrogicus does not appear in the *Acta* nor is it mentioned by any writer until the Empire: Valerius Maximus, III, 5, 2 and VI, 9, 4, Velleius, II, 10, 3 and 39, 1, Pliny, *N. H.*, XXXIII, 141, etc. Mommsen suggests, probably rightly, that the name was not official and was a retrojection from Imperial times, just as the name Persicus was given to the earlier Fabii (*Röm. Forschungen* [Berlin 1864], p. 52, n. 80).

<sup>27</sup> For the *via Domitia*, cf. Strabo, IV, 1, 3, Cicero, *Pro Font.*, 18 (who indicates that it was still unfinished some 45 years later), and possibly Polybius, III, 39, 7-9. For Forum Domitii, cf. Devic and Vaisseté, *Hist. gén. de Languedoc*, I [Toulouse 1872], p. 8, and Ihm, *R.-E.*, s. v. Carcopino, *op. cit.*, p. 277, gives in some detail the work done by Domitius in Gaul.

<sup>28</sup> Suetonius, *Nero*, 2, 1-2: . . . elephanto per provinciam vectus est turba militum quasi inter sollemnia triumphii prosequente. in hunc dixit Licinius Crassus orator non esse mirandum, quod aeneam barbam haberet, cui os ferreum, cor plumbeum esset.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Mattingly in *J. R. S.*, XII (1922), pp. 230-33 and Grueber, *Coins of the Roman Rep. in the Brit. Mus.*, I (London 1910), pp. 184-87, and plates there noted.



returned home to hold his triumph *de Galleis Arverneis*. This phrase is significant. That portion of southern Gaul which later was to be the province of Gallia Narbonensis was dominated by the powerful Arverni under Luerius and Bituitus, his son and successor.<sup>30</sup> The phrase in the *Acta*, therefore, means that Domitius held a triumph over the tribes of southern Gaul lying within the bounds of the new province, while Fabius triumphed over Bituitus and his Arverni.<sup>31</sup>

After the final defeat of the two most powerful nations in Gaul and the breakup of the Arvernian empire, the Romans met with no opposition for the next two decades. The territory of the Allobroges was surrendered to Rome (Livy says, *Allobroges in deditionem accepti*), but the Arverni, as we saw above (note 31), were left unmolested. The Romans continued to use Aquae Sextiae as their military base. It was left for Marius to secure southern Gaul forever and for Julius Caesar to extend the *imperium Romanum* clear to the English Channel. For the present, the victories of 121 were sufficient. Before Domitius relinquished his *imperium*, all the land from the Pyrenees to the Cévennes and Alps (except some portions of the coast held by Massilia) was actually or nominally under Rome. To the north were several tribes, some of which, like the Aedui and Sequani, were friendly with Rome. The others, at least for the time being, had no mind to dispute the newcomer, especially since he did not invade their lands.<sup>32</sup> Thus within the space of three years Roman policy in Gaul had altered completely. No longer were

<sup>30</sup> Strabo, IV, 2, 3, says that the empire (*ἀρχή*) of the Arverni extended from Narbo and the territory of Massilia, and that they exercised sovereignty over all the tribes as far as the Pyrenees, the Ocean, and the Rhone. For the most part, this is precisely the territory which formed the Roman province of Narbonensis. Quite reasonably, then, Domitius held a triumph over the Arverni, since he broke up their whole empire in southern Gaul.

<sup>31</sup> Caesar, in his negotiations with Ariovistus (*B. G.*, I, 45, 2), recalls that the Arverni and Ruteni had been conquered by Fabius, and that *they had not been included within the Province* nor made stipendiary tribes (some of the Ruteni were within the limits of the Province; Caesar, *ibid.*, VII, 74, calls them *Ruteni provinciales*). Cf. also Suetonius, *Nero*, 2 (quoted in n. 28 *supra*): Domitius rode *per provinciam* on an elephant.

<sup>32</sup> For the probable status of the Gallic tribes in 120 cf. Jullian, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

Massilia or the Arverni in undisputed control of the commerce of the Rhone valley. Roman business men, represented by the *equites*, had received a twofold impetus, the one from Spain now that the road thither had been rendered safe, the other from Gaul. It was inevitable that with the influx of merchants and settlers the military station at Aquae Sextiae should prove inadequate as a center especially for those engaged in business in western Gaul. The establishment of a *colonia* that would dominate the trade between Spain, western Gaul, and Italy was deemed by the *equites* a step most advantageous to the promotion of Roman business interests. This colony, Narbo, the first permanent colony outside of Italy and the single Roman seaport in Gaul, was founded amid senatorial opposition in 118, and from that time on the Gauls were exploited alike by merchants and soldiers.<sup>33</sup> Nor could Massilia long maintain her dominant position before the ever widening interests of Rome.

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<sup>33</sup> For the founding of Narbo, cf. Eusebius, *Chronica*, p. 131 (Schöne), Ol. 165.3 = 118 B. C., Cicero, *Pro Cluent.*, 140, Velleius, I, 15, 5, Eutropius, IV, 23, Valerius Maximus, V, 10, 3, etc.; cf. Last, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-13, and Carcopino, *op. cit.*, pp. 278-79.

## THE DYING WORLD OF LUCRETIIUS.

Nowhere does the poet Lucretius speak in more solemn tones than in those passages where he announces the end of the world. On that subject he promises (V, 110-112) "to utter oracles in a more holy manner and with much surer reasoning than the Pythian priestess, who speaks from the tripod and laurel of Apollo." The subject is repeatedly introduced and expanded to considerable length. In this paper an effort is made to compare the teaching of Epicurus and Lucretius on the end of the world and to show the relation of Lucretius' views to his general outlook on history.<sup>1</sup>

The Epicurean poet begins, of necessity, with the accepted principles of his school. Epicurus, like the earlier atomists, had taught that our visible world of earth and sky is only one of many, composed of atoms, and destined to dissolution.<sup>2</sup> Democritus had taught that some worlds are growing, some in their prime, and some decaying; that decay comes when a world can no longer absorb more atoms from without; and that destruction may result from collisions, when one world grows so large as to overcome a smaller one.<sup>3</sup> Epicurus denied that one world could grow so large as to collide with another<sup>4</sup> but argued that worlds grow by gradual additions from without, which also maintain their stability for a period,<sup>5</sup> and finally perish, like

<sup>1</sup> The extensive literature on the sources of Lucretius sheds little light on this question. Debate has been chiefly concerned with the extent of indebtedness to Epicurus and later Epicureans, especially for scientific data. John B. Stearns, *C. J.*, XXXI (1936), pp. 347 f., notes 23-28, mentions borrowings from non-Epicurean sources. Lucretius' aim was to follow in the footsteps of his master, hence one cannot expect to find any clear contradiction or dogmatic addition to the orthodox teaching. Lucretius' notion of the dying world has been noticed by J. Masson, *Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet* (London, 1907), I, pp. 1-3, by C. Martha, *Le Poème de Lucrèce* (4th ed., Paris, no date), pp. 323 f., and others, but no comparison is made between his views and those of Epicurus, or the bearing of this topic on Lucretius' view of history.

<sup>2</sup> Diogenes Laertius, IX, 31, 42; X, 73.

<sup>3</sup> H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin, 1929), p. 565, lines 11-14; p. 331, lines 21-23.

<sup>4</sup> Diogenes Laertius, X, 90.

<sup>5</sup> *Idem*, X, 89.

a plant or animal.<sup>6</sup> He taught that the worlds are infinite in number, some coming into being at every moment, and others perishing.<sup>7</sup> The testimonia to Epicurus' teaching on this point are rather numerous but reveal little beyond what has just been stated.<sup>8</sup> Most notable, in comparison with Lucretius, is the absence of reference to the present state of the world. It is true that most of Epicurus' writings have been lost, but this notion of the growth and decay of worlds was notorious and often referred to. Hence there is a fair presumption that, if he had taught that our world was nearing its end, Cicero and others would refer to the fact.

Furthermore, we have the testimony of Lactantius<sup>9</sup> that Epicurus gave no account of the causes that would lead to the end of the world, or the time when it would occur:

Unus igitur Epicurus auctore Democrito veridicus in hac re fuit, qui ait et ortum aliquando et aliquando esse perituum. Nec tamen rationem reddere ullam potuit aut quibus de causis tantum hoc opus aut quo tempore resolvatur.

It is likely that this statement is derived, at least in part, from Cicero. He and Lucretius were Lactantius' chief sources for his knowledge of Epicurean teaching,<sup>10</sup> and nothing like the above is found in Lucretius. The statement that Epicurus followed Democritus in predicting the end of the world is twice found in Cicero's extant works.<sup>11</sup> The added declaration that no explanation was given about the time or cause of the world's dissolution may also have been found in one of his lost works.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Aëtius, *Placita*, II, 4, 10.

<sup>7</sup> Cicero, *N. D.*, I, 67; *De Fin.*, I, 21.

<sup>8</sup> Usener, *Epicurea* (Leipzig, 1887), frags. 300-305.

<sup>9</sup> *Inst.*, VII, 1, 10; Usener, frag. 304 (cf. frag. 382).

<sup>10</sup> Usener, *op. cit.*, p. lxxv, note 2. Cicero was Lactantius' chief authority in the whole field of philosophy (cf. Brandt's "Index Auctorum" in *C. S. E. L.*, XXVII, pp. 245-251).

<sup>11</sup> *De Fin.*, I, 21; *N. D.*, I, 73.

<sup>12</sup> No less than twenty-eight fragments of Cicero's lost philosophical works are preserved by Lactantius (cf. Brandt's "Index Auctorum"). In *Acad.*, II, 118 f. Cicero compares the cosmology of the other schools and mentions the Stoic anticipation of a general conflagration. In some similar passage he may well have referred to Epicurus' reticence on the subject. It seems less likely that Lactantius invented the statement.

When one turns to the treatment of the subject in Lucretius, much is found which merely confirms and explains the teaching of Epicurus. In the latter part of his second book the poet discusses the infinite number of worlds and the stages of their history. Like any other growing body, the world in its early period takes in more atoms than it gives off, until sea and land and sky reach their full size. But when old age comes they waste away, like any body which is unable to absorb more food. Made thin by loss of atoms, all bodies finally yield to blows from without and perish—

sic igitur magni quoque circum moenia mundi  
expugnata dabunt labem putrisque ruinas.<sup>13</sup>

At this point Lucretius introduces a new thought—that our world is already broken and enfeebled with age. The extent of its decline, he thinks, is shown by the tiny worms which the earth now brings forth when softened and impregnated by the rain, whereas in her prime she was able to bear the largest of beasts and the race of men. Then she freely produced luxuriant crops for man, while now the grudging fields scarcely supply food for those who till them. So the aged plowman often sighs that his labor has been in vain, compares the present time with the past, and envies the lot of his father. The vine-grower remarks that an earlier generation fared well on much smaller plots of ground than his own, and fails to understand that all things are wasting away little by little, and now, worn by old age, are drawing near the end.<sup>14</sup>

Such gloomy remarks might perhaps be as easily ascribed to a Greek farmer of Epicurus' time as to any contemporary of Lucretius.<sup>15</sup> But for two reasons it seems unlikely that the Roman poet derives his notion from Epicurus. First, the

<sup>13</sup> Lucretius, II, 1105-1149. Compare Diogenes Laertius, X, 89, and the notes on the passage in C. Bailey, *Epicurus, the Extant Remains* (Oxford, 1926), p. 284.

<sup>14</sup> Lucretius, II, 1150-1174.

<sup>15</sup> A. Sorlin Dorigny in Daremberg-Saglio, *Dictionnaire*, IV, p. 900, refers this passage to Epicurus, as being his view of the degeneration of the earth; Masson, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 2 f., finds here an exaggerated description of the decline of Italian agriculture during the period of civil war.

announcement of an imminent end<sup>16</sup> could not well be repeated from a writer two centuries old. The complaint of the aged farmer is based on a deterioration of the soil observed in his own time, for his father was better off. He supposes that the earlier generation was blessed for its piety, whereas, Lucretius argues, the true conclusion is that the world is growing old and coming to its end. If that argument had been made by Epicurus it would have lost its force in the lapse of time, and Lucretius would rather have found it necessary, in reiterating the prediction, to explain the cause of the delay. Second, the whole passage is in a tone which is opposed to the cheerfulness of Epicurus. He had assured Menoeceus that philosophy and happiness were accessible to everyone at every time of life, since whatever is natural is easily procured, and only the worthless is hard to get. The one who follows the precepts of wisdom lives undisturbed, as a god among men.<sup>17</sup> The figure of the struggling farmer does not fit in well with Epicurus' pleasant picture of self-sufficiency (*ἀντάρκεια*) for all. His plight is rather a refutation of the reiterated statement that what is necessary is easy to supply.

It thus seems probable that the notion of imminence was added by Lucretius to the Epicurean doctrine of the end of the world.<sup>18</sup> The Roman poet also fills in the gap at the second point where his master is accused of reticence, in describing the manner of the world's dissolution. Three possible modes are suggested—earthquake, fire, and water.

The earthquake seems a natural conjecture based on the state of the aging world, which becomes thin from loss of atoms until it yields to blows from without (II, 1139-1143). Memmius is warned that he may see the great earthquakes begin, when

<sup>16</sup> It must be admitted that there is a vagueness in the notion of imminence. Epicurus and Lucretius both taught that the world would perish, and neither fixed a time for the end. But Lucretius announced its approach and warns the reader that it may come in his own day. A difference in the emphasis of such a point may show a great difference in the outlook of two men.

<sup>17</sup> Diogenes Laertius, X, 122, 130, 132. Epicurus defended the possibility of happiness even in extreme cases (*idem*, X, 118).

<sup>18</sup> It may be objected that the idea may be borrowed from some later Epicurean, but the style of the passages seems to indicate an original treatment of the subject.



earth and sea and sky will be shaken together, and all things will collapse in thunderous crash (V, 91-109). This is a natural development of the teaching of Epicurus, although the idea of imminence and the vivid picture of the earthquake are rather to be thought of as peculiar to the poet.

But there are two further possibilities of destruction: fire and flood (V, 380-415). Lucretius remarks that one can see the great members of the world (earth, air, fire, and water<sup>19</sup>) engaged in a civil war which may come to an end either when the sun evaporates all moisture and consumes all things or when the water washes away all things. The stories of Phaëthon and Deucalion tell of such occasions, though in the unscientific manner of the early Greek poets.<sup>20</sup>

This argument seems alien to the thought of Epicurus. The notion of strife between the elements was common to Empedocles and the Stoics.<sup>21</sup> The latter taught that a victory of fire would lead to the *ἐκπύρωσις* or general conflagration.<sup>22</sup> In the interval between successive conflagrations there was a similar destruction by water, the *κατακλυσμός*.<sup>23</sup> From the Chaldeans the Stoics borrowed the idea of the Great Year, whose winter solstice was marked by the flood, and summer solstice by the conflagration.<sup>24</sup> In some of the Stoic texts the destruction is only partial and leaves the earth cleansed for a new era,<sup>25</sup> while in others a complete destruction of the universe takes place.<sup>26</sup> The notion of a total dissolution in fire was much better established than that of a similar dissolution in water. On these common Stoic ideas the passage of Lucretius is based, and to them it owes certain incoherencies. The total destruction by fire is twice mentioned without its proper antithesis,<sup>27</sup> and there is confusion between

<sup>19</sup> The *maxima mundi membra* are enumerated earlier (V, 235-247).

<sup>20</sup> Compare the note by C. Giussani, *T. Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura libri sex: Libro V* (2nd ed., Torino, 1929), pp. 41 f.

<sup>21</sup> J. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1905-1924), II, p. 202, frag. 696.

<sup>22</sup> *Idem*, II, p. 185, frag. 600; Cicero, *N. D.*, II, 118.

<sup>23</sup> Von Arnim, *op. cit.*, II, p. 186, frag. 608.

<sup>24</sup> Seneca, *Q. N.*, III, 29, quoting Berossus; Cicero, *Rep.*, VI, 23.

<sup>25</sup> Seneca, *Q. N.*, III, 30; von Arnim, *op. cit.*, II, p. 337, frag. 1174.

<sup>26</sup> Heraclitus, *Alleg. Hom.*, 25; Censorinus, *De Die Natali*, XVIII, 11.

<sup>27</sup> Lucretius, V, 382-384, 410. In the first passage the clause *vel cum sol*, etc., is not balanced by the expected antithesis; and the *item* of line 411 does not lead to any proper balance for the preceding line.

the idea of partial destruction (familiar to all in the stories of Phaëthon and Deucalion) and the possibility of complete destruction, which the poet is seeking to prove. Neither in Epicurus nor elsewhere in Lucretius does one find such a strife of elements. Indeed, the Empedoclean "elements" are rejected as soft and mutable, constantly changing their nature, as the atoms change their positions and motions.<sup>28</sup> Such kaleidoscopic forms are hardly suited to the long struggle which may at last bring the world to its end.

The use of mythology in this passage is also foreign to the style of Epicurus.<sup>29</sup> He reviled Homer and his "silly tales," along with all the rest of the myths found in the poets.<sup>30</sup> Lucretius, on the other hand, had the greatest respect for Homer (III, 1037 f.) and often uses the myths as illustrations, while regularly warning the reader that they are not to be taken as true.<sup>31</sup> His method partly resembles that of the Stoics, for they, too, declared that the stories were false but used them to illustrate their own doctrines.<sup>32</sup> Cicero's Epicurean spokesman is doubtless faithful to the traditions of his school when he denounces even this use of mythology.<sup>33</sup>

It thus appears that both in suggesting an end due to the strife of the elements, and in the argument from mythology, Lucretius is adding to the teaching of his master. But the additions are presented merely as possibilities and illustrations, not as positive assertions which could be condemned as heresy. As Epicurus had offered a variety of explanations for one phenomenon,<sup>34</sup> so his disciple offers his three explanations of the end

<sup>28</sup> Lucretius, I, 753-829. The Stoic ecpyrosis seems also to have been attacked by the Epicureans; cf. the papyrus fragment described by W. Crönert, *Kolotes und Menedemos* (= C. Wessely, *Studien zur Palaeographie und Papyruskunde*, VI), p. 113, note 512.

<sup>29</sup> One can hardly find a name from mythology in the fragments of Epicurus. Usener, frag. 346<sup>a</sup> (= Diodorus Siculus, XVII, 7, 4) relates a legend about the fires of the sun gathering on Mount Ida and is assigned to Epicurus only because Lucretius, V, 663 ff., refers to the story. Lucretius begins with the phrase *fama est*, which does not suggest a quotation from Epicurus.

<sup>30</sup> Usener, frags. 228, 229.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Lucretius, I, 1-49; II, 600-640; III, 978-1023; V, 22-51.

<sup>32</sup> Cicero, *N. D.*, II, 63-70.

<sup>33</sup> *Idem*, I, 41 f.

<sup>34</sup> Diogenes Laertius, X, 86 f.

of the world, and the reader is left to choose among them according to his fancy.

There is a tragic irony in the figure of the peasant who cannot read the signs of the times or foresee the doom toward which all things move. A similar irony appears in the long sketch of human society which concludes the fifth book (V, 925-1457). Man is there said to have lived at first in a state like that of the beasts, surrounded by every discomfort and danger. Then little by little he discovered language, fire, family life, civil government, metals, agriculture, music, literature, and the arts. The last ten lines of the book sum all this up in language which, divorced from its context, has been taken to set forth the modern idea of progress.<sup>35</sup> But the five hundred lines which portray the history of civilization may better be taken to show that through all the changes of human experience there is no real progress, that is, no increase of happiness. Each new discovery, each supposed improvement, is attended by its own evils, and their demonstration convinces the reader that the change was vain.<sup>36</sup>

This theme first appears in lines 988-1010: gruesome as was the plight of savages devoured by beasts in the woods, at least they were not led beneath the standards of war to be slain by thousands in a single day; nor did the greed for wealth entice men in ships to be dashed on rocks by the storm. Then hunger

<sup>35</sup> Tenney Frank, *Life and Literature in the Roman Republic* (Berkeley, 1930), pp. 236-242, finds in Lucretius "promises of eternal progress." He cites Lucretius, V, 332-337 as a full commitment to the modern theory. Lucretius there points to progress in the arts as still going on, but there is no prediction as to the future. He is arguing against those who maintain the eternity of the world and cites recent and contemporary progress to show that the world had a beginning at no remote time. The poet's conclusion (V, 351-415) is that the world is perishable and may soon come to its end.

Dean W. R. Inge, *Outspoken Essays, Second Series* (London, 1923), p. 159 cites V, 1452-1455 and says that we owe to Lucretius "the blessed word Progress in its modern sense." While he also, p. 165, quotes Lucretius V, 93-96, on the ultimate fate of the world, he does not call attention to the passages in which the imminence of the end is stated.

<sup>36</sup> The larger aim of Books V and VI is to show that the world and all its phenomena are the result of natural law, operating without divine interference.

gave the weakened limbs to death, now it is excess which overwhelms them. Then the unwary filled their cup with poison, but now they are more clever and give it to others! The invention of language, fire, cities, and property led to the evils of greed and ambition (V, 1113-1135). The discovery of metals led to the love of gold and the use of new instruments of war (V, 1275-1349). Then came weaving, agriculture, music, song, and dance, with further refinements and comforts, but no cessation in envy, struggle, and bloodshed (V, 1430-1435):

Ergo hominum genus incassum frustraue laborat  
semper et <in> curis consumit inanibus aevom,  
nimirum quia non cognovit quae sit habendi  
finis et omnino quoad crescat vera voluptas.  
idque minutatim vitam provexit in altum  
et belli magnos commovit funditus aestus.

In these lines we have Lucretius' verdict on the question of progress: all the long effort of mankind has been in vain, from ignorance of the fact that pleasure is not increased by inventions and wealth; and this ignorance has gradually borne human life out into the deep sea, and has stirred up from the depths the great billows of war.

Such seems to be the obvious meaning of the passage, but Giussani<sup>37</sup> has suggested another interpretation for line 1434, taking the phrase *in altum* to refer to the progress of civilization. Bailey's translation<sup>38</sup> evidently follows Giussani: "And this, little by little, has advanced life to its high plane." The phrase *vitam provexit* is unique and may be interpreted either by analogy with the usage "*naves in altum provectae*" or "*ecquo te tua virtus provexisset.*"<sup>39</sup> May there not then be a double meaning by which the height of progress is also a sea of peril for the ship of life? The tone of tragic irony is notable in any case and is thus much strengthened.

The poet was well aware of the storm of war which was about

<sup>37</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 167.

<sup>38</sup> C. Bailey, *Lucretius on the Nature of Things* (Oxford, 1929), p. 233.

<sup>39</sup> Caesar, *B. G.*, IV, 28; Cicero, *Phil.*, XIII, 24. Lucretius elsewhere (IV, 194; VI, 1026) uses the verb *provehere* only in its literal sense, "to carry forward." The figurative use of the substantive *altum* (as in Cicero, *Verr.*, III, 98) seems not to be found elsewhere in Lucretius but cannot for that reason be excluded here.

to break upon the Roman world. His dread of the *fera moenera militai* prompts his petition to Venus in the first book, that she may tame the war god and grant peace to men. Throughout his account of history Lucretius is much preoccupied with the horror of war. His youth had seen the fearful days of Marius and Sulla, and, though for a time thereafter Italy enjoyed respite from bloodshed, the formation of the first triumvirate clearly marked the opening of a new revolution. While Lucretius was writing there were disorders in the streets of Rome, and the rivalry of the leaders constantly threatened to loose the inevitable war. The historical situation explains the mention of the storm of war as the climax of human effort and folly. In the closing lines of the book (V, 1456 f.) the climax is reëmphasized by the position of the word *cacumen*:

namque alid ex alio clarescere corde videbant,  
artibus ad summum donec venere cacumen.

Man has now reached the pinnacle of science, art, and luxury. What more was to be expected, if not the catastrophe of the drama?

It must be admitted that this is only one side of the poet's outlook. In bright contrast with this sombre picture stands out the great achievement of history, Epicurus' discovery of the true philosophy. He is represented as a victor who has slain the dragon of superstition and has thereby raised us up to heaven (I, 62-79). His teaching brings sweet joys to men throughout the world (V, 20 f.). The discovery is recent and is now for the first time set forth in Latin (V, 335-337). But Lucretius does not go on to predict the conversion of the masses or the beginning of a new age of happiness. On the contrary, the wise are described as a chosen few, who climb to heights whence they can look down on the misery of the rest (II, 1-16). Epicurean teaching was a bitter medicine from which the crowd shrank, requiring the honey of poetry to tempt the reader, who was still likely to lay the book aside before he understood the whole doctrine (IV, 1-25). Of the Romans who professed the Epicurean creed, few, if any, would conform to Lucretius' ideal of the wise man.<sup>40</sup> Most of those whose names we know were involved in politics, and

<sup>40</sup> W. W. Fowler, *Social Life at Rome in the Age of Cicero* (London, 1909), pp. 122 ff.; Tenney Frank, *Vergil* (New York, 1922), p. 51.

some were notorious epicures, who brought the name of their school into contempt. Lucretius has nothing but scorn for such men (III, 912-918), and the reader is left with the impression that he was detached and lonely.

There is no rational connection between Lucretius' outlook on human affairs and the doctrine that the structure of the universe was about to collapse. But it has been remarked <sup>41</sup> that at every crisis of Roman history there were learned predictions of the end of the world. Likewise in modern times each great war stirs many Christians to predict the return of the Lord.

As to the time of the end, Lucretius could not well be dogmatic beyond his master. Later generations of men might follow (V, 1197), or Memmius himself might see the dread event (V, 104 f.). The prayer that guiding Fortune might postpone the day (V, 107) corresponds to the prayer that Venus might avert the impending civil war. The danger in each case was felt to be real, and the prayer only serves to make it more vivid. On his own principles Lucretius should no more have dreaded the end of the world than death, which he declares is nothing to us. And indeed, his attitude seems rather to be one of fascination than of dread. As a detached spectator of the world's tragedy <sup>42</sup> he found a beauty in death as well as in life. What therefore could be more fascinating than the end of all? The ambition which drives men to seek new honors and pleasures is vain—"eadem sunt omnia semper." Equally vain is all the progress of history. Death, then, is Nature's proper decree for man and for the universe.

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<sup>41</sup> J. Carcopino, *Virgile et le Mystère de la IV<sup>e</sup> Eglogue* (Paris, 1930), pp. 143 f.

<sup>42</sup> Compare G. F. Else, "Lucretius and the Aesthetic Attitude," in *H. S. C. P.*, XLI (1930), pp. 163-166.



MOMMSEN'S *PRIDIANUM*: B. G. U., 696.

This papyrus was first published and commented on by Mommsen in *Ephemeris Epigraphica*, VII (1892), since which time the text has often been reprinted<sup>1</sup> and very frequently cited by students of Roman military affairs. Since the original publication, however, no other commentary, so far as the present writer knows, has appeared. This is surprising, because both Mommsen's text and his interpretation left room for improvement, especially in view of the increased material, resulting from later finds and publications of Latin papyri, which has since become available for comparison. This paper is accordingly an effort to supplement, and where necessary to correct, Mommsen's treatment.<sup>2</sup>

The best procedure appears to be to print the entire text once more and to comment first on the new readings, then on the meaning of the document as a whole. Mommsen's numbering of the lines has been retained in order to facilitate comparison.

Col. i

- PRIDIANUM COH(ORTIS) I AUG(USTAE) PR(AETORIAE)  
LUS(ITANORUM) EQ(UITATAE)  
A.D. 156 MENSIS AUGUSTI, SILVANO ET AUGURINO CO(N)-  
S(ULIBUS),  
QUAE HIBERNATUR CONTRAPOLLO-  
NOSPOLI MAIORE THEBAIDIS EX VIII  
A.D. 131 5 IDUS IULIAS, PONTIANO ET RUFIN[O] CO(N)S(ULIBUS).

<sup>1</sup> B. G. U., 696; Mommsen, *Ges. Schr.*, VIII, pp. 553-66; *Palaeographical Society Facsimiles of Manuscripts and Inscriptions*, Series II, vol. II (London, 1889-94), no. 165; C. Wessely, *Schrifttafeln zur älteren lateinischen Palaeographie* (Leipzig, 1898), no. 6; J. Mallon, R. Marichal, Ch. Perrat, *L'Écriture Latine de la Capitale Romaine à la Minuscule* (Paris, 1939), no. 24 (not complete). A portion of the papyrus is also reproduced in H. Delitsch, *Geschichte d. abendländischen Schreibschriftformen* (Leipzig, 1928), pl. I. Mommsen's commentary is cited from the *Gesammelte Schriften* as the latest edition of this paper.

<sup>2</sup> This article is a product of studies in Roman military accounts and records begun in 1932 at the suggestion of Professor M. I. Rostovtzeff of Yale University. A doctoral dissertation on that subject, written under his direction, was accepted by Yale University in 1934. The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor Rostovtzeff for encouragement and guidance in these studies.

- PRAEFECTUS M(ARCUS) IULIUS M(ARCI) F(ILIIUS) TRIBU  
 QUIR(INA) SILVANUS, DOMO THUBURSI-  
 CA, MILITARE COEPIT EX IX KAL(ENDAS) MA-  
 IAS, COMMODO ET LATERANO CO(N)S(ULIBUS),  
 A.D. 154 10 LOCO ALLI PUDENTILLI.
- PRIDIE KAL(ENDAS) SEPTEMBRES.  
 SUMMA MIL(ITUM) [PE]RF(ECTA) KAL DV  
 15 IANUARIAS, IN IS (CENTURIONES) VI, DEC(URIONES) III,  
 EQ(UITES) CXIV, DROM(EDARII) XVIII,  
 PEDITES CCCLXIII;
- ET POST KAL(ENDAS) IANUARIAS ACCESSER(UNT):  
 20 FACTUS EX PAGANO A SEMPRO- (CENTURIO) I  
 NIO LIBERALI, PRAEF(ECTO) AEGUPT(I),  
 silvano et augurino co(n)s(ulibus),  
 sextus sempronius candidus ex v kal(endas)  
 maias;
- 25 REIECTUS AB ALAE I THRAC(UM) DEC(URIO) I  
 MAURETANIAE AD VIRCAM CHOR-  
 TIS,
- A.D. 134 vibio varo co(n)s(ulibus),  
 a(ulus) flavius vespasianus ex vi nonas  
 30 martias;
- TIRONES PROBATI VOLUN- VIII  
 TARI A SEMPRONIO LIBERALAE,  
 PRAEF(ECTO) AEG(UPTI), IN IS EQ(UES) I, DROM(E-  
 DARIUS) I:
- in (centuria) herculani, silvano et augurino co(n)s(ulibus),  
 35 philon isognis ex [... n]onas maias;  
 a[p]ollos . . ia. minus ex idibus s(upra)s(cript)is  
 [i]n (centuria) marci, eodem co(n)s(ule),  
 anubas am[m]on e[.x] .i nonas  
 s(upra)s(cript)as;
- 40 in (centuria) gaiani, [eodem] co(n)s(ule),  
 c(aius) sigillius val[e]ns[  
 in (centuria) semproniani, eodem [co(n)s(ule),]  
 ammonius[

L. 10) Mommsen: *aeli pudentilli*

L. 14) M: *summa ad [pr] = kal*; *L'Écriture Latine*: *summa ad pr. kal*

L. 25) M: *ala EI*

L. 35) M: *[ap]olloni[u]s . . is ex . . nonas*; *L'Écriture Latine*: *apollonius . . . is ex . . nonas*

L. 36) M: *a[po]llo . . . min . . . idibus . . .*; *L'Écriture Latine*: *a[p]ollos iu . . min . . ex idibus . . is*

L. 37) M, *Eph. Ep.*: *marsici*; *Ges. Schr.*: *marci*; *L'Écriture Latine*: *masici*

L. 39) Mommsen offers no reading

## Col. ii

- A.D. 155 in (centuria) ga<ia>n[i, severo et sabiniano co(n)s(ulibus),]  
c(aius) iulius[ --- ex --- kal(endas)]  
ian[uaris;]  
silvano et a[ugurino co(n)s(ulibus),]  
5 heraclammon q[ --- ex ..]  
nonas m[  
in turma artemidor[i, eodem co(n)s(ule),]  
eq(ues) hermacisapyn. [ --- ex ----]  
apriles;  
10 in turma salviani, eode[m co(n)s(ule),]  
dro(medarius) cronius barbasatis ex xvi[  
kal(endas) maias;  
ACCEPTI EX LEG(IONE) II TR(AIANA) FORT[I]  
DATI AB EODEM PRAEFECT[O]  
15 AEGUPTI,  
A.D. 151 in (centuria) lappi, condiano et maximo co(n)s(ulibus),  
valerius tertius ex viii kal(endas)  
apriles;  
A.D. 148 in (centuria) candidi, torquato et iuliano co(n)s(ulibus),  
20 horatius herennianus ex iv idus  
novembres;  
TRANSLATUS EX COH(ORTE) I FL(AVIA) CIL[ICUM]  
A.D. 136 in (centuria) candidi, comm[odo] et pompeiano co(n)s(ulibus),  
mae'vi'us margellus [ex ----]  
25 ITEM TRANSLAT[I EX  
A.D. 141 in (centuria) lappi, severo [et { stloga (?)  
or 155 c(aius) longinus apollo[ --- ex ----] sabiniano (?) co(n)s(ulibus),]  
idus feb[ruarias;]  
in (centuria) sempron[i ex ----]  
A.D. 136 commodus et { [pompeiano (?) co(n)s(ulibus),]  
or 154 [laterano (?)  
31 eros e[  
ITEM FACTI [EQUITES  
in turma arte[midori ex ----]  
severo e[t { stloga (?) co(n)s(ulibus);]  
sabiniano (?)  
35 ision petsireo. [  
in turma s[alviani (?) ex ----]  
A.D. 152 glabr[ione et homullo co(n)s(ulibus);]

L. 1) M: gai[ani; L'Écriture Latine: ga[iani]

L. 5) M: heraclammon us[

L. 8) M: ..i hermacisapyni; Pal. Soc.: iThermacisapyni; L'Écriture Latine: in (centuria) hermacisapyni

L. 11) M: ..ccinius barbaiatis ex xv[; L'Écriture Latine: nuocrinis barbaiatis ex[

L. 35) M: .. spon petsireo

The general purport of this text as a detailed list of accessions to the *cohors I Augusta Lusitanorum* during a given period of time is obvious.<sup>3</sup> All the entries have the same form. First comes a heading indicating the source from which the individuals concerned reached the *cohors I Lusitanorum*—i, 31, *tirones*; ii, 13-15, *accepti ex leg. II Traiana*, etc. Then there is a statement of the century or *turma* to which each was assigned, the year of his enlistment, his name, and the day and month of his enlistment. The order seems to have differed in ii, 29-38, in that the day and month precede the year; but that is not significant. Before proceeding with the interpretation of the text as a whole, however, it will be useful to clear up the points in which the readings adopted above differ from those previously published.

Col. i, 10: Mommsen reads *aeli pudentilli* and says (p. 559) that the man is otherwise unknown. The facsimiles show, however, that the second letter of the *nomen gentilicium* has exactly the form of the third. Hence *alli* is the correct reading; and a *Q. Allius Q. f. Col(lina) Pudentillus, augur curiae xxviii*, and *minister Larum Aug.* is known from a Sardinian inscription.<sup>4</sup> It cannot be proved that this is the same man as the former prefect of the *coh. I Lusitanorum*; but, in view of the rarity of this combination of names, the identification of the one with the other seems quite possible.

Col. i, 14: Mommsen reads *summa ad [pr] x kal*, with the suggestion that the small *x* was a mark of punctuation (p. 556); but the latinity of such an expression as *ad pridie kalendas* is dubious; and his *x* is unquestionably the remains of an *F* or *E* (cf. *F(ilius)*, i, 6; *FACTUS*, i, 20; *PRAEF*, i, 21; *FACTI*, ii, 32; for *E*, *PRAEFECT*, ii, 14). Moreover, the traces of the next two letters after *summa* appear very difficult to reconcile with *AD*, though they suit *M* very well. Doubt is thrown on the restoration proposed here by the accusative *ianuarias*, in l. 15; but in view of the scribe's mistakes elsewhere<sup>5</sup> it is easy to believe that he either omitted *PR* before *KAL* or wrote *ianuarias* instead of *ianuariis*. In support of the interpretation that *kal ianuariis* was meant compare i, 19: *et post kal ianuarias accesser(unt)*.

<sup>3</sup> Col. i, l. 19: *post kal(endas) ianuarias accesser(unt)*.

<sup>4</sup> *C. I. L.*, X, 7953 = *I. L. S.*, 6766.

<sup>5</sup> i, 2, *AUGUSTI*; 25, *ALAE*; 26-27, *CHORTIS*; 32, *LIBERALAE*; ii, 25, *mae'vi'us*; regularly *eodem* instead of *isdem cos*.

I know of no exact parallel for *summa militum perfecta*; but the sense is satisfactory, denoting the sum total, as opposed to the analysis which follows, of the strength of the cohort on the date named; and one may compare *reliqui numero puro* and *summa vera* in Hunt's *pridianum*<sup>6</sup> as well as the abbreviations *n p mil cal* and *n p* which precede the totals in the *acta diurna* of the *coh. XX Palmyrenorum* at Dura.<sup>7</sup> These last, in their context, can readily be expanded as *n(umerus) p(erfectus) mil(itum) cal(igatorum)* and *n(umero) p(erfecto)*.

Col. i, 20: Mommsen understood the line between *SEMPRO* and the numeral *I* simply as a mark to separate them (p. 556). Note, however, that the next accession, in l. 25, is a decurion, followed in ll. i, 31-ii, 12 by a group of *tirones*. The list of new men is therefore arranged in descending order of rank; and comparison of this sign in l. 20 with the symbols for *centuria* in i, 37 and 40, and ii, 30, leaves no doubt that Sextus Sempronius Candidus was in fact made a centurion and is possibly the same person as the Candidus who is found in ii, 19 and 23. At any rate the discovery that he was a centurion makes it necessary to give up Mommsen's description of him as a *tiro lectus* (p. 562) and to find a new explanation of *ex pagano*, since it is obvious that the term as used here means more than simply "private citizen" (p. 563). For this I can suggest no better explanation than that which arises from Premierstein's discussion of the phrase *pagane cultus* which is applied in *P. Lat. Gen.*, 1 to a soldier in active service. Premierstein's opinion is that the soldier was assigned to secret police duty as a "plain-clothes man";<sup>8</sup> so one may suppose that the present centurion entered the army from the secret service of the civil police. It is certain that this was his first enlistment, for the date, which was a necessary part of every soldier's identification, is that of the year in which the papyrus itself was written.

Col. i, 25: Mommsen read *ala EI* and corrected to *ala II*, a corps which in 156 was stationed in Mauretania (p. 557). Cicho-

<sup>6</sup> A. S. Hunt, "A Register of a Cohort in Moesia," *Raccolta di Scritti in Onore di Giacomo Lumbroso* (Milan, 1925); *New Palaeographical Society*, Series II, vol. II, plate 186, ll. 50 and 74. I hope soon to publish a new commentary on this papyrus also.

<sup>7</sup> Unpublished, but see notes 19 and 20 *infra*.

<sup>8</sup> A. v. Premierstein, "Die Buchführung einer ägyptischen Legionsabteilung," *Klio*, III (1903), p. 41 and notes.

rius, however, prefers *alae I*, which was then in Egypt;<sup>9</sup> and the facsimile appears to support him. The substitution of *ae* for *a* is paralleled in *I. L. S.*, 2531 and 2966. *reiectus* and *ad vircam chortis* led Mommsen to regard this transfer as a reduction to a less desirable type of service by way of punishment, although he himself remarks *Reiectus quod item fit decurio . . . mirum est*. This is not in itself impossible; but he is certainly wrong in supposing that *ad vir<g>am c<o>hortis* perhaps meant that Vespasianus was beaten as well, for it would have been impossible for him to exercise any authority thereafter over the men in his *turma*. *virga* here must be the equivalent of *vitis*, the vine-staff which was the centurion's badge of office and which, as the symbol of his own power to inflict corporal punishment, must also have belonged to a decurion, whose rank was the equivalent of the centurion's. As for *reiectus*, it is true that *reicere* does at times signify removal with disgrace;<sup>10</sup> but it can also serve as a synonym for *remittere*.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, Domaszewski asserts that in the case of centurions in the legions every transfer from one legion to another indicates a promotion,<sup>12</sup> a principle which may very well apply in the present case also. A more satisfactory hypothesis, accordingly, especially in view of Vespasianus' twenty-two years of service, seems to be that Vespasianus had previously served in the *coh. I Lusitanorum*, was then transferred to the *ala I Thracum*, perhaps after service in other corps, and is now being returned, with a promotion to the decurionate, to this cohort.<sup>13</sup> At all events, Domaszewski's statement, based on Mommsen's interpretation of this papyrus, that a *decurio cohortis* was beneath a *decurio alae* in rank,<sup>14</sup> and Lesquier's adoption of Mommsen's opinion,<sup>15</sup> must be treated with caution.

Col. i, 35: The first name of the *tiro* is almost certainly

<sup>9</sup> *R.-E.*, s. v. "Ala," col. 1264. Cichorius' reading *mauretanae* is, however, mistaken. The papyrus certainly has *mauretaniae*; but cf. *I. L. S.*, III, ii, p. 819, for the insertion of *i* incorrectly in terminations of words and see note 5 *supra*.

<sup>10</sup> *Dig.*, XL, 12, 29; XLVIII, 16, 6, 6.

<sup>11</sup> *Dig.*, I, 16, 11; *Cod. Just.*, XII, 59 (60), 1.

<sup>12</sup> *Rangordnung d. röm. Heeres*, p. 94.

<sup>13</sup> I am indebted to Professor Rostovtzeff for most of the foregoing discussion of *reiectus*.

<sup>14</sup> *Rangordnung*, p. 57.

<sup>15</sup> *L'armée romaine*, p. 228.



*philon*. The second name begins and ends with *is*; but the four letters in the middle do not combine to form an intelligible name.

Col. i, 36: The first name is *apollos*. For the ligature of *ia* in the second compare ii, 16, *condiano*. The reading *s(upra)-s(cript)* is occasions difficulties, for abbreviation by contraction, as in the second element of the word, is usually supposed to have been introduced into secular documents at a much later date than this. Van Hoesen's earliest example of contraction in the Latin papyri is from a Vatican papyrus of A. D. 444.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, the reading offered here appears unavoidable. A month-name or its equivalent must be found at this point; and, as the reproduction in *L'Écriture Latine* plainly shows, only four (or at most, five) letters followed *idibus*, and the group begins and ends with *s*.

Col. i, 37: The name of the centurion appears to be *marci*, though a spot of ink visible between the *r* and *c* may be the remains of another letter.

Col. i, 38: There is room only for *ammon* as the second name.

Col. ii, 1: The letter after *a* seems to be *n*, and is almost certainly not *i*, though the centurion is presumably the same as in col. i, 40.

Col. ii, 4: The repetition of the names of the consuls instead of *eodem cos* as in col. i, 37 and 42 and ii, 10, shows that the entry in col. ii, 1-3 is to be dated in the preceding year, before the Kalends of January.

Col. ii, 8: The characters at the beginning of the line are plainly *eq*. For the form of the *e* compare those in *herennius*, ii, 20; the second *e* in *severo*, ii, 34; and the first in *petsireo*, ii, 35. For the *q* compare *torquato* in ii, 19. This reading is further confirmed by the assignment of the *tiro* to a *turma* instead of a century. Since he is distinguished as an *eq(ues)*, the *dromedarius* of col. i, 33 must be the *tiro* of col. ii, 10-12, who is also assigned to a *turma*.

Col. ii, 11: *dro* is unusual as an abbreviation for *dromedarius*; but no other reading seems possible. *cronius* is a common Graeco-Egyptian name.

<sup>16</sup> H. B. Van Hoesen, *Roman Cursive Writing* (Princeton, 1915), pp. 266-67. The Chester Beatty papyri, however, prove that abbreviation by contraction was practiced in the first half of the second century in Greek Christian texts, and in a manner which indicates that these abbreviations must have been quite commonly used and understood even earlier. See *Aegyptus*, XIII (1933), pp. 5-10; *Archiv für Papyr.*, XI (1935), pp. 112-14.

Col. ii, 25 and 34: The restoration of *stloga* as one of the consuls (A. D. 141) cannot be regarded as certain. M. Iunius Sabinianus was consul with L. Iulius Severus in A. D. 155, so that *sabiniano* is equally a possibility.

Col. ii, 30: Similarly, *pompeiano*, consul in A. D. 136, is possible in place of *laterano*, A. D. 154. Compare col. ii, l. 23.

Col. ii, 32: The restoration *FACTI* [*EQUITES* was proposed by Cumont from a comparison with his Dura parchment VI, l. 7;<sup>17</sup> and his suggestion is confirmed by the fact that the next two entries assign the men to *turmae* instead of centuries.

Col. ii, 35: The first name is *ision*, common in Egypt.

It is now time to consider the document as a whole. First of all, the two styles of writing obviously can hardly represent entries made by two different scribes, as Mommsen asserts (pp. 559 and 566), for he himself admits that it was written *uno tenore* (pp. 558-59). This being the case, it is absurd to suppose that any scribe could prepare in advance a frame-work of headings so skilfully that entries made subsequently by another person and in a different style of writing would always fill the spaces exactly, as in this papyrus. The plain explanation is that a single scribe wrote the whole piece, simply using capitals to distinguish the various headings under which the names were entered.

It must also be pointed out that this papyrus is not conclusive proof, as Mommsen thought (pp. 560-61), that a *cohors quingenaria equitata* had four decurions, for it must be remembered that the end of the document, in which all deductions from the strength of the cohort were detailed,<sup>18</sup> is lost. On the showing of the present text alone, now that Sempronius Candidus is discovered to be a centurion, one would have to assume that a *cohors quingenaria* had seven centurions, which is known not to have been the case. On the other hand, it is not safe to assume from the addition of Vespasianus that four is the total normal number of decurions, for the *pridianum* of the preceding December, as the totals quoted in col. i, 15 indicate, would have shown only three. Caution is further enjoined by the figures preserved in the *acta diurna* of the *coh. XX Palmyrenorum* at Dura. This

<sup>17</sup> F. Cumont, *Monuments Piot*, XXVI (1923), p. 40; *Fouilles de Doura-Europos* (Paris, 1926), pp. 314-17 and plate 107.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Hunt's *pridianum*.

was a *cohors miliaria equitata* and should accordingly have had double the number of decurions found in a *cohors quingenaria*; but in one of the Dura papyri the totals are eight centurions and five decurions,<sup>19</sup> and in another there are six centurions and four decurions.<sup>20</sup> These two papyri are not of course the same type of document as the *pridianum*, since they record the current status of the cohort day by day rather than a periodical comprehensive summary of its entire strength; but at least they support the view that the evidence of the *pridianum* on this question is not final.

The most important matter, however, is of course to determine the nature and purpose of such a text as this, a *pridianum*. On this point Mommsen's opinion seems to be that three *pridiana* were drawn up yearly, and that this was done in connection with the payment of the soldiers' three *stipendia* in order to determine the exact number of men in each unit at the time of the payment. The present text, he says, was written in May; but he is not consistent with himself in his remarks regarding either the time or the object of this *pridianum*.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, he seems to have overlooked or to have been led by his theory to misinterpret some lines of the text itself. Consequently, no attempt will be made to correct his view in detail; but the whole question will be discussed from the beginning.

First of all, the hypothesis that three *pridiana* were composed

<sup>19</sup> Dura papyrus 3, time of Severus Alexander; unpublished, but see M. I. Rostovtzeff, *Münchener Beiträge*, XIX (1934), pp. 369-70; E. T. Silk and C. B. Welles, *D. Rep.*, V, p. 296.

<sup>20</sup> Dura papyrus 9, A. D. 239; unpublished.

<sup>21</sup> P. 558: *Vocabulum illud [pridianum] . . . significat opinor matriculam cohortis stipendii solvendi causa quinto quoque mense ita per-scriptam ut demerentur dimissi mortuive, adderentur adlecti. Ita singulis annis matriculae ternae fiebant, appellatae ut videtur pridianum mensis Aprilis, pridianum mensis Augusti, pridianum mensis Decembris.*

P. 558: *Quadrimestre tempus . . . pendet omnino a stipendio militari . . . ter in anno numerato, scilicet k. Ian. et k. Mai. et k. Sept.*

P. 558: *Indicem militum sic ut ad numerum accesserunt institutum matriculam [Vegetius] appellat . . . Eius matriculae tamquam supplementum est index is quem tenemus, scilicet proficiscens a statu cohortis qui fuit k. Ian. a. 156, sed respiciens item ad eum qui fuit k. Sept. anni praecedentis.*

Pp. 558-59: *Indicem scriptum esse non secundum temporis ordinem, sic ut milites singuli in numerum referebantur, sed uno tenore mense Maio anni 156 vel paullo post.*

annually is mistaken. Mommsen does not mention the date in col. i, 13: *pridie kal(endas) septembres*. As the spacing of the lines on the papyrus shows, this date is not to be taken with the preceding lines regarding the two prefects but begins a new section and is in fact the date of the whole document. But if the date of this *pridianum* is *pridie kal(endas) septembres*, then it is the *pridianum mensis augusti*; and Mommsen's wholly unnatural assumption that *pridianum . . . mensis augusti* and *silvano et augurino consulibus* in col. i, 1-2 are not to be taken together (p. 558) is shown to be without foundation. On the other hand, the totals brought forward are described as the *summa militum . . . kal ianuarias* (i, 14-15); and the record of accessions begins *et post kal ianuarias accesserunt* (i, 19). But no account of accessions or losses could reasonably be based on any totals but those of the last preceding account, though by Mommsen's system a *pridianum* for April should have intervened between the present one and that for the previous December. Finally, conclusive evidence that there was no *pridianum* for the term ending April 30 (*pridie kal maias*) is furnished by the dates of enlistment, all earlier than the Kalends of May,<sup>22</sup> of three of the *tirones* listed in the present text; for, if such a *pridianum* had existed, these names would have been entered in it and not in the present one. The only dates for *pridiana* are therefore *pridie kalendas ianuarias*<sup>23</sup> and *pridie kalendas septembres*.

This means, of course, that the *pridianum* had nothing directly to do with the payment of the soldiers' *stipendia*. I have argued elsewhere that *stipendia* were actually paid on *vii idus ianuarias*, *vi idus maias*, and *vii idus septembres*;<sup>24</sup> but, whatever the exact dates of the payments may have been, this conclusion regarding *pridiana* is supported by the content of the one published by Hunt. Mommsen had guessed that *pridiana* would record losses from the unit concerned as well as accessions to it; but he

<sup>22</sup> Col. ii, 2-3 [--kal] *ianuarias*; 9:---aprilis; 11-12, *ex xvi[-] kal maias*. The first of these *tirones* evidently reached the cohort too late to appear in the December *pridianum*. Cf. the dates in *P. Oxy.*, 1022.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. again Hunt's *pridianum*, col. i, 26 [*summa militum*] *p(ridie) k ianuarias*; col. i, 29: [...CESSERUNT] *T[POST K IANUARIAS]*.

<sup>24</sup> R. O. Fink, A. S. Hoey, and W. F. Snyder, "The *Feriale Duranum*," *Yale Classical Studies*, VII (1940), commentary on col. I, 7-9.

envisaged only permanent losses.<sup>25</sup> A large proportion of Hunt's *pridianum*, however, details simply absences, men unfit for duty because of illness, and the like—matters of no importance at all so far as payment of a *stipendium* is concerned.

The real reason, however, for composing *pridiana* for December and August but not for April is, I think, easy to find. The Roman year ended on December 31; and just as with us this date would have been the normal time for taking inventories and making reports. In Egypt, however, the year ended on August 29.<sup>26</sup> For that province, accordingly, a second accounting was necessary; and this, in the army, was naturally approximated to the end of the Roman month. It is possible that this second *pridianum* was intended only for the use of the provincial administration; but in any case I do not believe that *pridiana* were prepared more than once a year, that is, *pridie kalendas ianuarias*, in any province but Egypt. A *pridianum* was not, as Mommsen calls it, a *matricula* in any proper sense of the word, nor a supplement to one, but an independent document submitted yearly (in Egypt twice yearly) to the provincial military headquarters or perhaps even to Rome, for the purpose of reporting losses, accessions, and the distribution of its forces for each unit of the army.

Recognition that the *pridianum* was normally compiled *pridie kalendas ianuarias* also makes the derivation of the term more comprehensible, for the Kalends of January were of course the Kalends *par excellence*,<sup>27</sup> thus rendering December 31 an outstanding *pridie*.

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<sup>25</sup> P. 558: . . . ita perscriptam ut demerentur dimissi mortuive, adderentur adlecti.

<sup>26</sup> Mitteis-Wilcken, *Grundzüge u. Chrest. d. Papyruskunde*, I, i, pp. lv-lvi.

<sup>27</sup> For a discussion of the Kalends of January in the life of the army see "The *Feriale Duranum*," *Yale Classical Studies*, VII (1940), commentary on col. I, 1.

# BRIEF NOTES ON MICHIGAN OSTRACA.<sup>1</sup>

## 1. *O. Mich.*, I, 539.

The editor's reading of this ostrakon is based on the assumption that a substantial portion is lost on the left side. In its published form the text appears to be a receipt issued to someone who has provided three donkeys for the transport of grain from Karanis to a canal port.<sup>2</sup>

A close study of an excellent photograph<sup>3</sup> has revealed that the ostrakon is complete. With respect to the object of transportation it belongs to a type not known apart from the Karanis ostraca. The new text runs as follows:

Λιβιανῆς κριθ(ῆς)  
 ὀνόματος  
 Σαραβούτος  
 ὄνον ἕνα  
 [...] Φαρμ(οῦθι) [...] <sup>4</sup>

References to "Livian" barley are rare. So far as I know, the phrase has occurred only in three similar transport receipts in the Michigan collection: *O. Mich.*, I, 387, 413, and 428. All of these texts were written in the late third century A. D., and to the same period belongs a fifth example which has turned up

<sup>1</sup> *O. Mich.*, I = Leiv Amundsen, *Greek Ostraca in the University of Michigan Collection*, Part I (*University of Michigan Studies*, Humanistic Series, XXXIV [Ann Arbor, 1935]).

<sup>2</sup> This would be the first stage on the journey to Alexandria. Cf. N. Hohlwein, *Le Blé d'Égypte (Études de Papyrologie, IV)*, pp. 100 f.; L. Amundsen, *O. Oslo*, pp. 54-59.

<sup>3</sup> The ostraca published by Amundsen, with the exception of Nos. 1-97, have been returned to the Egyptian Museum at Cairo, but the University of Michigan possesses a complete set of photographs from the skilled hand of G. R. Swain. For purposes of reading these are often superior to the originals. In justice to Amundsen it must be said that he had no photographs of 286 of the 699 ostraca which he published. After his departure from Egypt in 1929, as he remarks in his preface (p. x), he was forced to rely on his first readings and on tracings from the originals for subsequent work on these texts.

<sup>4</sup> There is space for the year before Φαρμ(οῦθι) and for the day after it, but nothing can be discerned on the photograph. Amundsen's transcript shows that the original was not more helpful.



among the unpublished ostraca in the Michigan collection. Unfortunately, it is very fragmentary and preserves little more than the significant word *Λιβιανῆς*.

Inv. 9446

Λιβιανῆς [κριθῆς

Καρανίδο[ς

ψ. [....]. [

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## 2. *O. Mich.*, I, 356.

This text, which Amundsen has rightly assigned to the late third or early fourth century A. D., is a list of five persons who transported wood to a *μονή*.<sup>5</sup> The names begin in line 3, where Amundsen has read *κεφ (αλαιωτῆς) Σαρᾶς Κομαρίον α*. In explanation of *Κομαρίον* he suggests that it may be for the genitive *Κομαρίον(ος)*, or perhaps *Κομαρί(ονος)* followed by *ὄν(ος)*. A fresh examination, however, has brought to light the diminutive *γομάριον*, "load," which is distinctly rare before the Byzantine period.<sup>6</sup> In line 7 Amundsen has read *Ἀκνᾶς Ἀπολλωνίου*, but the ostrakon has *Σώτας Ἀπολλωνίου*, who is mentioned also in two other lists.<sup>7</sup> In line 6 Amundsen's *Οὐαλᾶς* is in reality *Οὐάλες*, a variant of *Οὐάλης*, which is a Greek spelling of Valens;<sup>8</sup> the same person recurs as *Οὐάλες* in another list.<sup>9</sup>

For the sake of clarity I give the full text of the ostrakon with the corrections furnished by the revision.

<sup>5</sup> An illuminating discussion of *μονή* may be found in L. Amundsen, *O. Oslo*, pp. 60-63.

<sup>6</sup> It is cited by Liddell and Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, new ed., and Preisigke, *Wörterbuch der griech. Papyrusurkunden*, from one source only, *P. Flor.*, II, 274, 5, 11 (III cent. A. D.). It is used with increasing frequency in late Greek (*Sammelbuch*, III, 7168, 8; *P. Oxy.*, XVI, 1858, 6, which reveals the transition to its use in modern Greek to mean "beast of burden" as well as "load"; Sophocles, *Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods*, s. v.; Du Cange, *Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae graecitatis*, s. v.) and has survived into modern Greek in the form *γομάρι* (Pernot, *Lexique grec moderne français*, s. v.).

<sup>7</sup> *O. Mich.*, I, 354, 4 and 592, 3.

<sup>8</sup> Bernhard Meinersmann, *Die latein. Wörter u. Namen in d. griech. Papyri* (*Studien z. Epigr. u. Papyrusk.*, I, Schrift 1 [Leipzig, 1927]), p. 88.

<sup>9</sup> *O. Mich.*, I, 614, 8.

οἱ ἀπελθότες <sup>10</sup> ὑπὸ ξύλου  
 εἰς τὴν μονήν·  
 κεφ(αλαιωτῆς) Σαρᾶς γομάριον <sup>11</sup> α  
 5. Ὀρίων Λεονίδου α/  
 Λεονίδης Παπέει α  
 Οὐάλες Σαραπίονος α  
 Σώτας Ἀπολλωνίου α  
 δι(ὰ) Ἰσιδώρου  
 π]εδιοφύλαξ. <sup>12</sup>

3. *O. Mich.*, I, 559.

This text is a receipt issued in the late third century A. D. to a person who had provided three donkeys for the government transport of grain. In line 1 the editor has mistaken *Μαρωνίς* for a supposed *Καράνις*, and in line 5 he has read the strange Ἀχνου( ), which also appears with a query in his index of personal names. This difficulty is now eliminated by the revised text which has resulted from an examination of a photograph.

Μαρωνίς Πα-  
 λήμονος, ὄνοι  
 τρεῖς, γ(ίνονται) γ,  
 δι(ὰ) Κολλούθου  
 ὄνηλ(άτου), ἀχύρου.

The association of chaff with donkeys in the receipts is rare; measurement by load (γόμενος), basket, or pound is usual. A still unpublished ostrakon in the Michigan collection, however, provides a pertinent parallel. It also comes from Karanis and bears a text of the late third century A. D.

Inv. 9837.

Λογγεῖνα  
 ὄνους δύο εἰς ἄ-  
 χυρον.

4. *O. Mich.*, I, 90.

This text is a communication from the secretary of the village of Ibion Eikosipentarouron to a certain Agathis. Written in a

<sup>10</sup> Read ἀπελθόντες (Amundsen).

<sup>11</sup> γομάριον: γ corrected from α.

<sup>12</sup> Read πεδιοφύλακος (Amundsen). On the function of the πεδιοφύλαξ see G. Rosenberger, *P. bibl. univ. Giss.*, VI, 53, and especially the note to line 6 and the references there given.

hand of the late third or second century B. C. and dated in the 26th year, it is probably not later than the reign of Euergetes II. Amundsen, with commendable caution, assigns it tentatively to the reign of Philometor.<sup>13</sup> The message consists of a single sentence: *πάτησον τὴν Ζηνοδόρου ὑπόραν μετὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας γνώμης.*

The word *ὑπόρα* is not found in our lexicons, and the editor has resorted necessarily to conjecture. In a note Amundsen suggests that *ὑπόραν* may have been written for *ὑπόρειαν*, which might be taken to refer to a plot of ground at the base of a hill or, with Egyptian conditions in mind, at the edge of the desert, and it is under *ὑπόρεια* that Amundsen has entered the word in his index. Without his commentary it is impossible to know how he would relate *πάτησον* to *ὑπόραν* = *ὑπόρειαν*, unless the clue is to be sought in *καταπάτησις*, "inspection."

As it happens, *ὑπόρα* has been the subject of a brilliant investigation by Jernstedt,<sup>14</sup> and it will suffice to summarize his findings. Only one example has occurred in the papyri. In *P. Oxy.*, II, 298, a letter of the first century A. D., the writer imparts the information that *οὐπω πολλὰ ὑπόρα ἐγένετο ἐν Μέμφι ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος* (38 f.), "there has not been much fruit at Memphis up to the present." The editors of the Oxyrhynchus papyrus assumed the equivalence of *ὑπόρα* with *ὀπόρα*,<sup>15</sup> and their judgment is vindicated by numerous occurrences of the spelling with *υ* in Coptic sources where its meaning gives no trouble. On the Greek side, *ὑπόρα* reappears as *ὑπόρα* in Cappadocia in the eleventh century and may be recovered from the phrase *ὅτι ἔώρα ἡμῖν* at Rhodes in the fourteenth. Jernstedt cites the neuter variant, *ὑπωρον*, twice from a late Greek version of the Alexander romance and once from a late history of Athens. Of considerable interest are the Jewish Aramaic transliterations, and they also appear to reflect *ὑπόρα* or *ὑπωρον*. Finally, the modern dialect of Epirus presents the forms *οἴπωρο* and *οἴπουρο*, which derive from *ὑπωρο* and *ὑπουρο*.

The Michigan ostrakon is some two centuries older than the Oxyrhynchus papyrus and thus provides the earliest example of *ὑπόρα*. Throughout its long history *ὑπόρα* is simply another

<sup>13</sup> "Probably Aug. 13, 155 B. C.," and again "156/55 B. C.? Aug. 13."

<sup>14</sup> *Zeitschrift für Aegyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde*, LXIV (1929), pp. 129-135.

<sup>15</sup> The equivalence is accepted without comment by Bror Olsson, who reprinted the text in his *Papyrusbriefe aus der frühesten Römerzeit* (Uppsala, 1925) as No. 73.

form of *ὄπώρα*, which is sometimes written *ὀπώρα*. In all its forms the word designates fruit in general, and on occasion a specific fruit. In the Michigan ostrakon very good sense is obtained if *ὀπώρα* is taken to mean grapes,<sup>16</sup> since *πατεῖν* is a natural term for treading grapes in preparation for the making of wine.<sup>17</sup>

The situation reflected by the ostrakon is clear. In accord with Ptolemaic practice,<sup>18</sup> Zenodorus was not permitted to turn his grapes into wine until certain requirements were fulfilled. Before the grapes were gathered, it was necessary for the cultivator to invite the tax farmer to inspect his vineyard and to examine the wine presses, which must be sealed against illicit activity. When the vintage was completed, the cultivator was obliged again to summon the tax farmer, and the latter's presence at the making of the wine was mandatory. The *oikonomos* and his secretary, or their agent, had also to be present at the operation as witnesses for the crown, and were responsible for testing and sealing the jars to be used for storing the wine.<sup>19</sup>

In the text preserved by the Michigan ostrakon, Agathis may well be the tax farmer, and Orsenouphis, the secretary of Ibion Eikosipentarouron, will then be acting for the *oikonomos*. In this capacity he ascertains that Zenodorus has complied with the regulations that cover procedure through the harvest, and notifies Agathis that Zenodorus is officially authorized to tread his grapes. The imperative *πάτησον*, addressed to Agathis, is readily explained by the fact that the tax farmer is a necessary party to

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Hesychius s. v. *ὄπώρα*: τὸ θέρος, καὶ τὸ μετόπωρον, κυρίως δὲ ἡ σταφυλή, καταχρηστικῶς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀκροδρῶν. In *P. Oxy.*, IV, 729 (137 A. D.), a lease of a vineyard, is the stipulation: *ὅν δὲ ἐὰν βούληται ὁ Σαραπίων ὀπωροφύλακα φυλάσσειν* τῷ τῆς ὀπώρας καιρῷ φύλακα πέμψει (11).

<sup>17</sup> Liddell and Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, new ed., s. v. *πατέω* II. Cf. Clotilde Ricci, *La coltura della vite e la fabbricazione del vino nell'Egitto greco-romano* (*Studi della scuola papirologica*, IV, part I [Milan, 1924]), p. 54; Michael Schnebel, *Die Landwirtschaft im hellenist. Aegypten* (*Münchener Beitr. z. Papyrusf. u. antiken Rechtsg.*, VII [Munich, 1925]), p. 282; Raymond Billiard, *La Vigne dans l'Antiquité* (Lyon, 1913), p. 440.

<sup>18</sup> G. M. Harper, Jr., "Tax Contractors and their Relation to Tax Collection in Ptolemaic Egypt," *Aegyptus*, XIV (1934), pp. 56 f.

<sup>19</sup> B. P. Grenfell and J. P. Mahaffy, *Revenue Laws of Ptolemy Philadelphus* (Oxford, 1896), pp. 96 f.

the affair in hand and may be thought of as directing and being responsible for the proceedings.<sup>20</sup> It was very much to the advantage of the tax farmer that the yield be as large as possible. The message sent to Agathis may therefore be rendered "Tread the grapes of Zenodorus with my approval," or, more freely, "You have my consent to tread the grapes of Zenodorus."

On the other hand, it is conceivable that Agathis may be the agent or tenant of Zenodorus, and the permission from Orsenouphis to "Tread the grapes of Zenodorus" may be given to him in that capacity.

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<sup>20</sup> If I have proposed the correct background for the interpretation of the ostrakon, the aorist may be viewed as causative. It must be remembered, however, that this will be a logical and not a grammatical category and will exist only as an inference from the context as interpreted. Cf. Kühner-Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griech. Sprache*, II Teil, I Bd., pp. 99 f.

## A NEW EPIGRAM BY DAMAGETUS.

A new collection of the Greek inscriptions in verse is long overdue. The present writer hopes to publish the first part of such a collection in a reasonably short time. One of his main aims will be to fix the place of each epigram in the history or—one may say—in the system of the genre. Consequently there will usually be no reason to bring out separate studies of individual pieces, however beautiful, in advance of the complete edition. But the following inscription from Thyrraeum in Acarnania is an exception in every sense.

Τὸμ Μούσαις, ὦ ξεῖνε, τετιμένον ἐνθάδε κρύπτει  
 Τιμόκριτογ κόλπῳ κυδιάνειρα κόνις.  
 Αἰτωλῶν γὰρ παισὶ πάτρας ὕπερ εἰς ἔριν ἑλθὼν  
 ὠγαθὸς ἢ νικᾶν ἤθελε ἢ τεθνάναι.  
 πίπτει δ' ἐμ προμάχοισι λιπὼν πατρὶ μύριον ἄλγος·  
 ἀλλὰ τὰ παιδείας οὐκ ἀπέκρυπτε καλὰ,  
 Τυρταίου δὲ Δάκαιναν ἐνὶ στέρνοισι φυλάσσω  
 ῥῆσιν τὰν ἀρετὰν εἴλετο πρόσθε βίον.

This inscription has been published by the Berlin epigraphist Günther Klaffenbach in his "Bericht über eine epigraphische Reise durch Mittelgriechenland und die ionischen Inseln" (*Sitzungsb. der Preuss. Akad. der Wiss., Phil.-hist. Klasse*, 1935, p. 719) with a few important remarks. The stone, a cubical block, is lost so that, for the text, we depend on the copy of the local schoolmaster. Exact as this apparently is, one would be glad to get at the original, if only to inspect the shape of the letters.

The editor cautiously proposes a dating in the third century B. C. In particular he points to the attack of the Aetolians on Thyrraeum in 220 reported by Polybius (IV, 6, 2; 25, 3). This conjecture will become almost certain in the course of our investigation.

The editor stresses one bold expression in the middle of the plain style of the poem: *κυδιάνειρα κόνις*. In Homer this epithet qualifies *μάχη* or *ἀγορή* in the sense of *δοξάζουσα τοὺς ἀνδρας*.<sup>1</sup> But here it means rather *δοξαζομένη ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν* "glorified by men"

<sup>1</sup> So the Periphrasis of the *Iliad* in *Scholia in Homeri Iliadem ex recensione Immanuelis Bekkeri* (Berlin, 1825). Hesychius: *κυδιάνειρα: μεγάλους καὶ ἐνδόξους τοὺς ἀνδρας ποιοῦσα*.



though, of course, the two meanings are not strictly separated. For the second use Liddell and Scott give a single citation which will set us on the right track: *κυδιάνειρα πατρίς* is used of Sparta by the epigrammatist Damagetus, *Anthologia Planudea*, I, 1. The similarity of the two expressions and the identity of their metrical position—both in the second half of the first pentameter—are striking. Furthermore, examination of the other nine or ten epigrams which in the *Anthologia Palatina* and the *Planudea* bear the name of Damagetus will show definite relations both linguistic and historical to the new inscription.

The time of Damagetus has long since been fixed at 220 B. C. and the following years.<sup>2</sup> *Anth. Pal.*, VII, 438 memorializes the death of an Achaean Machatas killed in a battle against the Aetolians:

δριμὺν ἐπ' Αἰτωλοῖς ἀντιφέρων πόλεμον.

The battle has been located in the War of the Allies, 220-217 B. C.<sup>3</sup> It is a part of the events related by Polybius, IV, 6, 16-19. The defense of Ambracia mentioned in another epigram of Damagetus, *Anth. Pal.*, VII, 231, cannot by itself be dated with the same certainty. But the report of Polybius, IV, 61 makes it easy to connect it with the events just mentioned. Philip V of Macedonia in 219 led an expeditionary force into the territory of Ambracia (*εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἀμβρακιωτῶν χώραν*) of which the Aetolians had taken possession and which the Epirotes claimed as their own. In *Anth. Pal.*, VII, 541 Damagetus celebrates one Chaeronides of Elis killed in a battle at the Achaean Trench (*περὶ τάφρον Ἀχαιΐδα*), which battle, though unknown, may easily fit into the same group of events. *Anth. Pal.*, VII, 432 is written in honor of a Spartan killed in a battle over Thyrea against the Argives. The epigram alone leaves the time uncertain; the sympathies of the poet are decidedly in favor of Sparta.

In the political struggles and troubles about 220 B. C. Damage-

<sup>2</sup> Fr. Jacobs, "Catalogus poetarum epigrammaticorum," *Anthologia Graeca*, XIII, p. 880. G. Knaack in F. Susemihl, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur in der Alexandrinerzeit*, II, p. 547. R. Reitzenstein in *R.-E.*, IV, col. 2027. Cf. the pertinent annotations in *Anthologia Graeca* ed. H. Stadtmueller.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, III, 2, § 140; *C. A. H.*, VII, pp. 763 ff. (W. W. Tarn).

tus seems to hold a definite position: he is hostile to the Aetolian League, his sympathies are with the Achaean League, Sparta, and Ambracia. The author of the new epigram is anti-Aetolian, his sympathies are with the Acarnanian League and with Sparta.

Now let us proceed with the stylistic comparison. Damagetus, VII, 541 begins:

\*Εστῆς ἐν προμάχοις, Χαιρωνίδῃ, ὧδ' ἀγορεύσας·  
ἢ μόρον ἢ νίκαν, Ζεῦ, πολέμοιο δίδου

where the pentameter marked by the sharp antithesis recalls the second pentameter of the new epigram, the beginning of the hexameter resembles πίπτει δ' ἐμ προμάχοισι v. 5, and ξείνην . . . κόνιν (instead of γῆν) in v. 6 matches κυδιάνειρα κόνις (= γῆ), κόνις coming both here and there at the end of a pentameter. Cf. also ὀθνεῖην . . . κόνιν in Damagetus, VII, 497.

Damagetus, VII, 231 has in the first distich more than one resemblance. The first hexameter:

ὧδ' ὑπὲρ Ἀμβρακίας . . . ἀσπίδ' αἴρας

agrees with the second hexameter of the new poem:

. . . πάτρας ὕπερ εἰς ἔριν ἐλθών,

and the first pentameter:

τεθνάμεν ἢ φεύγειν εἴλετ' Ἀρισταγόρας

with

. . . ἢ νικᾷν ἤθελε ἢ τεθνάναι

of the second pentameter, while εἴλετο occurs in the same metrical place of the last pentameter.

One may finally compare the beginning of Damagetus, VII, 432

ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τὸν ἀρήιον ὕμνῳ ὁ τύμβος  
Γύλλιν ὑπὲρ Θυρέας οὗτος ἔχει φθίμενον.

The new epigram starts with a parallel structure: the direct address ὦ ξεῖνε, the attributive τὸν Μούσαις . . . τετιμένον, and the name Τιμόκριτον at the beginning of the pentameter. The second distich contains in both cases the occasion when Timocratus or Gyllis fell and, in the pentameter, the maxim by which they lived: here

τεθναῖν Σπάρτας ἄξια μῆσάμενος,

there

ὠγαθὸς ἢ νικᾷν ἤθελε ἢ τεθνάναι.

This last parallel leads to a third trait which, besides the identity of the historical situation and the stylistic similarities, links the poems of Damagetus with the new epigram. Its most striking feature is the fervor for Tyrtaeus; but, even before this enthusiasm is expressed, the poetry shows a Tyrtaean cast. Verses 3 and 4 mirror a verse like Tyrtaeus, 6, 2: *ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν περὶ ἧ πατρίδι μαρνάμενον*, and v. 5 recalls still more definitely the famous *ἐνὶ προμάχοισι πεσόντα* of Tyrtaeus, 6, 1 which recurs a second and a third time in what is left of the Spartan poet (7, 30; 9, 23: *ἐν προμάχοισι πεσών*). Now a similar *ἔστις ἐν προμάχοις, Χαιρωνίδη*, occurring in Damagetus, VII, 541 has a still greater resemblance to the command of Tyrtaeus, 8, 4 *ἰθὺς δ' ἐν προμάχοις ἀσπίδ' ἀνὴρ ἐχέτω*. In other words: You stood in front, Chaeronides, following the advice of Tyrtaeus. The strong Doric character prevailing in the epitymbia of Damagetus has been emphasized by Reitzenstein. But Doric is not enough. Such devices as (VII, 231)

*Δωρικὸς ἀνὴρ  
πατρίδος, οὐχ ἦβας ὀλλυμένας ἀλέγει*

and (VII, 432),

*τεθναῖν Σπάρτας ἄξια μῆσαμενος*

have a Tyrtaean character and may have had verbal prototypes in lost Tyrtaean poems.<sup>4</sup> Even among those preserved the jubilant

*Σπάρτα μοι Σπάρτα κυδιάνειρα πατρίς*

which Damagetus (*Anth. Plan.*, I, 1) puts into the mouth of a Spartan wrestler has a parallel in the Eunomia:

*οἷσι μέλει Σπάρτης ἡμερόεσσα πόλις.*

The history of the Tyrtaean tradition and its educational force has been traced by W. Jaeger<sup>5</sup> down to the fourth century and to Athens. The new epigram from Thyrreum and the poems by Damagetus which we could connect with it allow us to extend this line of influence in time and space. The historical importance of this poetry is that it shows the spiritual nourishment by which the people of the Greek Leagues in the last

<sup>4</sup> Herbert B. Hoffleit reminds me that *τεθναῖν* has the same metrical position in Mimnermus, I, 2 and Theognis, 343. It is likely that it once had its place also at the beginning of a lost Tyrtaean pentameter.

<sup>5</sup> "Tyrtaios über die wahre Arete" in *Sitzungsb. der Preuss. Akad. der Wiss.*, 1932, pp. 537 ff. Cf. *idem*, *Paideia*, I, pp. 116 ff. Jaeger, of course, saw the importance of the new epigram for his problem, cf. *Anthologia Lyrica* ed. E. Diehl, 2nd ed., I, 1, p. 22.

decades of Hellenic freedom lived. The words τὸν Μούσαις, ὃ ξεῖνε, τετιμένον do not necessarily imply that the man in question had been a poet himself any more than do the words ἦν δ' ὠνήρ Μουσῶν ἱκανὴ μερίς in VII, 355. The words τὰ παιδείας οὐκ ἀπέκρυπτε καλά have a similar implication. And it may be permitted to think of Damagetus as a man who not only praised the fallen as having obeyed Tyrtaeus but was eager to implant Tyrtaean poetry and spirit in the youth of Sparta, Achaea, and Acarnania. As a poet he had a tone of his own; for Meleager he was the "black violet" in the wreath of epigrammatists (*Anth. Pal.*, IV, 1, 22).

This may be the first time—it will not be the last—that the author of an epigram on stone can be identified.<sup>6</sup> It might seem more prudent to assign the new poem to "the circle of Damagetus" rather than to the master himself, and nobody can be prevented from doing so. May it be remembered, though, that the history of art once invented an anonymous Amico di Sandro, attributing to him a number of paintings from the work of Sandro Botticelli. Now the Amico has disappeared, and the Maestro holds the field.

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<sup>6</sup> G. Kaibel, *Epigrammata Graeca ex lapidibus collecta*, tentatively assigned his number 790 to Alcaeus of Messene ("haud circa probabilitatem conicias"). The epigram from Thermus, *I. G.*, IX, 1<sup>2</sup>, 1, 51, and the two Delphian epigrams in honor of Xanthippus of Elatea, *S. I. G.*<sup>3</sup>, 361, have been attributed by A. Wilhelm to the well known epigrammatist Poseidippus on the sole argument that the Aetolians conferred the proxeny Ποσειδίππῳ τῷ ἐπιγραμματεῖ Πελλαίῳ in the decree *I. G.*, IX, 1<sup>2</sup>, 1, 17, line 24. I should be eager to know a fragment which Klaffenbach, *loc. cit.*, p. 717 describes as follows: "aus (dem antiken) Agrinion das Fragment offenbar einer Grabstele mit den Resten eines Gedichtes, das sich auf einen Πανταλέων und Kämpfe um Oiniadai zu beziehen scheint, die der Schrift nach die des ausgehenden 3. Jahrh. v. Chr. sein müssen (Sommer 219 oder Spätherbst 212)." Several Hellenistic epigrams of four distichs from Thyreum have been published: *I. G.*, IX, 1, 489; *Ath. Mitt.*, XXV (1900), p. 113 (and XXVII [1902], p. 349); XXVII (1902), p. 339, No. 21. The last one attributed to the second century B. C. has a few traits in common with the new poem. It begins:

Καὶ λόγον αὐξήσαντα καὶ ἐν λιγυράχεσι Μούσαις  
κεκριμένον κρύπτει Σώπολιν ἄδε κόνις.

The style of Damagetus must have maintained itself in the local sepulchral poetry.

## THE AUTHOR OF THE ΠΕΡΙ ΎΨΟΥΣ.

Mr. Walter Allen, Jr., concludes a recent article<sup>1</sup> with the suggestion that a much needed reëxamination of the value of the *περὶ ὕψους* could very well start from the points discussed in his paper. Without disputing the need for further study of the treatise, I should like to enter upon a friendly controversy as to the nature of the evidence and the way in which it has been used in a few places in this article.

Allen's study seeks to demonstrate the following points: in a client-patron relationship, Terentianus was the patron and Longinus was his client.<sup>2</sup> Terentianus was a far more important personage than Longinus.<sup>3</sup> Longinus' statement that he is a Greek is likely to mean little more than that he spoke Greek as his preferred tongue.<sup>4</sup> The question of the social position of Longinus is acute; if he was a Greek it would not be high, if he was an oriental it would be even lower.<sup>5</sup> Since we can guess at the circumstances under which the treatise was written and since it is a work more concerned with rhetoric than with literary criticism we must revise our estimate of the value of the work.<sup>6</sup>

As evidence for the first point, on page 53 he states, "... the use of *φίλος* and *φίλτατε* would indicate that Terentianus was the patron and Longinus the client, since *φίλος* seems to be, in the Greek of the Roman period, the common form of address to denote this arrangement, just as *amicus* does in Latin." In a footnote the author summarizes his own earlier articles on this subject, "The only fact which need be noted here is that the adjectives *amicus* and *φίλος* are applied by either party to the other party to the arrangement." If this is so, only personal preference would seem to be responsible for the rejection of the equally logical conclusion that Longinus was the patron and Terentianus the client.

A somewhat similar instance of the nature of his argument is provided by the discussion of the term *κράτιστε* on pages 54 and

<sup>1</sup> "The Terentianus of the *περὶ ὕψους*," *A. J. P.*, LXII (1941), pp. 51-64.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 53-56.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 60-63.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

55. The caution with which it is suggested that *κράτιστε* may imply senatorial rank is admirable, and a good deal of evidence is collected for the use of the term. Since it is applied to "the equestrian prefects of Egypt," and "the low-born Felix," it is of limited value as evidence of high rank. Its use in a literary epistle of Dionysius of Halicarnassus to describe his friend Ammaeus would suggest the need for an even more cautious statement.<sup>7</sup> Roberts,<sup>8</sup> on the same pages of an article cited on page 58 (reference in note 33), remarks that the Ammaeus addressed as *κράτιστε* is probably not of Roman descent. Since the writer assumes on page 63 that he has demonstrated the superior importance of Terentianus, it is necessary for the reader to realize the tenuous nature of the evidence of the word *κράτιστε* which Allen cites on page 56 as the basis for his belief.

Although the reference on page 56 to "the Latinisms which authorities claim to have discovered in his Greek" is not supported by further specific argument, on the following page this statement occurs: "Nevertheless it seems possible to explain Longinus' Latinisms only by his residence in Rome. Even with such circumstances it is difficult to comprehend a man who spoke Greek as a native language and yet permitted Latinisms to creep into his writings." In substantiating these "Latinisms" the first reference to Roberts and the reference to Ellis are irrelevant, yet the claim of one page becomes the fact of the next. The other remark here suggests that it would also be difficult to comprehend a man like Milton who spoke English as

<sup>7</sup> The Epaphroditus addressed by Josephus as *κράτιστε* (*Contra Apion*, I, 1 and *Vita*, c. 76 *sub fin.*) is probably a grammarian and writer on Homer according to H. St. J. Thackeray, *Josephus*, I (London, Heinemann, 1926), p. xi.

<sup>8</sup> On page 51 the following statement occurs, "The man addressed, who is otherwise unknown and who has even been regarded as possibly the invention of the author of the work, is generally called Postumius Terentianus." This is documented by a reference to Roberts, *Longinus on the Sublime*<sup>2</sup> (Cambridge University Press, 1907), p. 22. Roberts' statement is as follows: "Some may feel inclined to regard the Terentianus of the treatise as an entirely fictitious person, the offspring of the literary convention which conducted such discussions in the form of dialogue or epistle. But so extreme a view, though it might be put forward, could hardly be successfully defended." The restatement seems to change Roberts' hypothetical mode of expression into a scholar's solution of a problem.



a native language and yet permitted Latinisms to creep into his writings. The important point is not the presence or absence of Latinisms in the style of Longinus, but how widely and deeply he knew Greek literature. For this we have the treatise as evidence.

The remaining problems are even more important. The effort to lead the reader from the statement (page 57), "The author tells us distinctly that he is a Greek," to the statement of the following page, "Certainly the evidence indicates that we have no right to regard Longinus, . . . as a real Greek in nationality," is an interesting example of the argument from probability. The force of "the evidence" is negligible since the reason Longinus refers to his race in chapter 12 is that he is hesitant about rendering a judgment of style except in works written in his own language. Incidentally Demosthenes is referred to in the same chapter as *ἡμέτερος*. In any case, what really matters is not where the author was born but whether his knowledge of Greek was such as to make his interpretations and judgments of Greek style and literature significant. The same type of argument is involved on page 59: "Granting Longinus' residence in Rome, the question of social position becomes acute." This seems to represent an unsatisfactory approach to the document. Naturally it is desirable to know what we can of the lives of men who are in any way of human importance. Nevertheless, though knowledge of the economic and social status of an unidentified author may contribute slightly to our understanding of social and economic history, in the field of literature an understanding of what the author thought and said, as we have it preserved, is more important than any effort to reconstruct probable details of his personal life.

Finally it is hard to see that anything has been gained by insisting (page 63) that, "we have a work which is more concerned with rhetoric than with literary criticism," if we are to have no clear definition of terms. Aside from what might be a pejorative tone, the reference (page 60) to "pure and undiluted literary criticism" is not illuminating. In the absence of definition it is impossible to determine whether the statement, "Quintilian serves as clear evidence that Longinus intended his entire work as a *rhetorical* treatise," is meant to suggest a depreciatory use of the term rhetoric or to indicate that what is meant by

rhetoric is the *ψυχαγωγία* of Plato's *Phaedrus* 271D and the Peripatetic theory of the affinity of the high style and poetry. Obviously there is much that is specifically practical in the *περὶ ὕψους* but the notion that "rhetoric" and "literary criticism" are mutually exclusive and antipathetic terms as descriptions of this and other comparable ancient works is not in accord with the actual material we possess.

Until these few points I have mentioned can be cleared up, I am doubtful of the results to be gained from the use of this paper as a basis for reconsideration of the *περὶ ὕψους*. The nature of the supposed client-patron relationship is not demonstrated; if Longinus were shown to be a client of Terentianus it would not affect the actual quality of his literary judgments; the practical rhetorical purpose of the treatise in no way invalidates the literary criticism therein. The pyramiding of hypotheses as to the probable social and economic status of the author will not provide as reliable a basis for interpretation as the study of the actual document.

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## THE ETYMOLOGY AND MEANING OF ΓΛΩΣΣΑΡΓΟΣ AND ΣΤΟΜΑΡΓΟΣ.

In the course of an investigation of compound words in Aeschylus, a peculiar folk etymology has come to light which has long gained credence and is accepted even in the new Liddell and Scott. The word *στόμαργος* (first occurring in Aeschylus, *Septem*, 447) "noisily-prating, loud-mouthed" seems to be modelled directly upon an earlier coinage of Pindar, *γλώσσαργος* (Frag. incert. loc. 125 [Bowra] from *Pap. Oxy.*, III, 408b; cited as *Parth. Fr.* 13b 67 in Liddell and Scott), of the same type and meaning. Aeschylus merely substituted *στόμα* for *γλώσσα* as the first compound member.<sup>1</sup> The second member, *-αργος*, fell victim, however, to folk etymology, which explained it in *γλώσσαργος* as *ἄλγος* with dissimilation of λ; and in *στόμαργος* as a direct transfer of the second member from the Pindaric compound.

According to this theory, then, traceable to Pollux (II, 101) and possibly originated by the late grammarians, *γλώσσαργος* was a dissimilated form of *γλώσσαλγος*, compounded of *γλώσσα* and *ἄλγος* "pain," and meaning specifically "talking till one's tongue aches" (Liddell and Scott).<sup>2</sup> The *-αλγος* form of the compound is the ordinary one in late Greek (Pollux, II, 108; VI, 119; Demophilus, *Sent.*, 7; Josephus, *A. J.*, XVIII, 6, 7). The derivative *γλωσσαλγία*, originating with Euripides (*Medea*, 525, *Andr.*, 689), is found also in late Greek. The word *στομαλγία*, a medical term meaning "mouth-disease" (*τὸ δὲ ἐν στόματι νόσημα*) is also said to mean "garrulity" (*ἡ φλυαρία*) in Pollux, II, 101. To prove the point Pollux cites denominative verbs *στομαλγεῖν* and *γλωσσαλγεῖν* the sole meaning of which is "to have a sore mouth,"

<sup>1</sup> Aeschylus' practice of borrowing *ἀπαξ λεγόμενα* and rare words from his predecessors, Pindar especially, and modifying them slightly to become his own coinages is well established: cf. *δέφυλκυς* (Frag. 363) with *γλυκύπικρος* (Sappho, 40); *ἀληθόμαντις* (*Agam.*, 1241) with *ψευδόμαντις* (Herodotus, etc.); *εἰσόπιν* (*Suppl.*, 617) and *ἐξόπιν* (*Agam.*, 115) with *κατόπιν* (Theognis, etc.). With Pindar cf. *ὀρθομάντεια* (*Agam.*, 1215), a derivative of *ὀρθόμαντις* (*Nem.*, I, 61); *ὀρθοδίκαιος* (*Eum.*, 994) with *ὀρθοδίκας* (*Pyth.*, II, 9), etc.

<sup>2</sup> Liddell and Scott (8th ed.), after Pott, *Etym. Forsch.*, II, p. 98, claim that the forms in *-αργ-* are Attic for *-αλγ-*!

apparently late medical terms.<sup>3</sup> It is worthy of note that γλώσσαλγος nowhere means "having a sore tongue," and no form \*στόμαλγος occurs.

Aside from the semantic crudity of this etymology, one would be surprised if Pindar in coining such a word as γλώσσαργος would employ the device of dissimilation; in so doing he might have been altogether misunderstood. It would be even more surprising that Aeschylus—if indeed he would choose a word of such homely etymology (which he certainly would have recognized, had Pindar so intended) as a basis for coining a similar one—did not observe that in στόμαργος there was no occasion for dissimilation. Indeed dissimilation would utterly obscure the meaning of his word, for he could hardly expect his hearers to call to mind a word somewhere in the poems of Pindar as the key to understanding his point.

But there are linguistic objections to the etymology even more compelling. A compound of an s-stem, such as ἄλγος, ought to show the s-stem adjectival suffix -ης: cf. ἀναλγής, θυμαλγής, ὄσφυαλγής, and many others. In fact, no compounds of ἄλγος in classical Greek have the -ος, -ον termination.<sup>4</sup> The words \*γλωσσαλγής and \*στομαλγής, lost late analogic compounds derived from ἄλγος<sup>5</sup> and having no connection with γλώσσαργος and στόμαργος, must have existed as sources of the verbs γλωσσαλγέω and στομαλγέω. Note that no -αργ- forms of these verbs are to be found. When Pollux (in II, 101 mentioned above) comments that στομαλγία "mouth disease" may also connote "garrulity,"

<sup>3</sup> στομαλγία, στομαλγείν· ἡλκῶσθαι τὸ στόμα. γλωσσαλγία, γλωσσαλγείν· λέγοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ γλῶτταν ἑλκῶν, Pollux, IV, 185. The citation of στομαλγία with στομαλγείν and γλωσσαλγία with γλωσσαλγείν (both verbs ἀπαξ λεγόμενα) in an attempt to connect them with the adjectives στόμαργος and γλώσσαργος leads Liddell and Scott into the curious error of translating γλωσσαλγέω "talk till one's tongue aches," while Pollux expressly states the meaning to be "have a sore mouth." But in citing στομαλγέω from the same passage Liddell and Scott give the correct meaning as cited by Pollux.

<sup>4</sup> κεφαλαλγός, cited in point (as κεφάλαλγος!) by Liddell and Scott (8th ed.), is merely a comparatively rare f.l. occurring in a few MSS for κεφαλαλγής, the correct and well attested form. φέραλγος, a compound of a different type, occurs only in Nicetas Eugenianus (6, 215), a twelfth century Byzantine poet, who has doubtless coined a false form.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. κεφαλαλγ-έω and -ία beside κεφαλαλγής (Hippocrates, etc.); ὄσφυαλγ-έω and -ία beside ὄσφυαλγής.

he is erroneously confusing the two distinct groups of words; nowhere else is *στόμαργος*, -ία written with -λ-. He was perhaps led into the confusion by the existence of the variants *γλώσσαργος*-*γλώσσαλγος* and the identity of *γλωσσαλγία* and *στομαργία* in meaning.

The first occurrence of -λ- in any of these compounds is found in Euripides, who twice uses the derivative *γλωσσαλγία* "wordiness," first in the *Medea* (τὴν σὴν στόμαργον, ὦ γυναῖ, γλωσσαλγίαν, *Medea*, 525); then in the *Andromache* (γλωσσαλγία contrasted with *προμηθία*, 689). It is probably these passages, the first of which is reminiscent of Aeschylus, which afford the starting point of the subsequent misinterpretations. Because of the proximity of *στόμαργος* in the *Medea* passage Euripides was led to accomplish the fatal *assimilation* of -ρ- to -λ- in *γλωσσαλγία*, to avoid immediate repetition of the second member. Once born, this form he again wrote in the *Andromache*. Philo (IV, p. 246, 13 [Cohn])<sup>6</sup> and Plutarch (*Moralia* 510a) followed suit. These are the only occurrences, since the *γλωσσαλγία* of Pollux has another source.<sup>7</sup> Once given the form with -λ-, the analogic proportion \**γλωσσαργία* : *γλωσσαλγία* : : *γλώσσαργος* : x gives us the later *γλώσσαλγος*.

<sup>6</sup> *γλωσσαλγία* in Philo, IV, p. 246, 13-14 (Cohn) smacks strongly of this assimilation in the phrase *γλωσσαλγία καὶ ἀχάλινον στόμα*, with which compare V, p. 13, 12 (Cohn) *στομαργία . . . καὶ ἀχαλίνῳ γλώσση*, in which Philo for the purpose of variety reverses the members of what is apparently a cliché with him. If he associated the two words so closely, he must have recognized the identity of the second members of the two compounds. Accordingly, then, we should expect -αλγία in both if the derivation were from *ἄλγος*: in *γλωσσαλγία* as the original undisimilated form (how strange after so many centuries if dissimilation had been supposed in the parent adjective *γλώσσαργος*!), and in \**στομαλγία*, first because we should expect the exact transfer of the second member of *γλωσσαλγία*, second since there is no occasion here for dissimilation. To regard *γλωσσαλγία* as assimilation settles the whole enigma.

<sup>7</sup> *γλωτταργία* in Lucian, *Lexiphanes*, 19 has a different origin and meaning (< *ἀ-εργία*). Lycinus has just asked Sopolis the physician to cure Lexiphanes of his Malapropian wordiness: Μὴ ἐμέ, Σώπολι, ἀλλὰ τουτονὶ Λυκίον, ὃς περιφανῶς μακκοῦ καὶ ἄνδρας πεφρενωμένους ὀλισθογνῶμονεῖν οἴεται κατὰ τὸν Μνησάρχον τὸν Σάμιον σιωπὴν καὶ γλωτταργίαν ἡμῖν ἐπιβάλλει—a typical perversion of an Attic word into an opposite meaning by Lexiphanes, who ironically *may* represent Pollux in Lucian's dialogue. Obviously the underlying meaning whence the pun is made is "garrulity."

What then is the source of our words γλώσσαργος and στόμαργος with their noun derivatives? They are simply compounds of γλῶσσα and στόμα with the adjective ἀργός "bright > clear (> loud)" to mean "having a loud tongue" or "mouth." From an Indo-European point of view this semantic development of ἀργός as "loud" is nothing unusual but is another case of the well-known relation of "sight-sound" meanings inherent in IE words of brightness: cf. the IE root \*bhā- at the base of both φαίνω and φημί. λαμπρός offers a close parallel, frequent in the meanings "loud, clear"; ὑπέρλαμπρον Demosthenes, 313, 22, "very loudly" (in Aristophanes, *Nub.*, 571 meaning "very bright") and φαεινός Pindar, *Pyth.*, 4, 505 are cases in point. The Latin cognate of ἀργός, argutus, has both meanings, "bright, clear" and "clear sounding, *prating*."

The compound of noun + adjective is admittedly rare. Aeschylus, however, affords us other examples. λίπαργος (occurring first in *Frag.* 304, 5), "with white coat," is a compound of ἀργός in its "sight" meaning, of the very same type. Perhaps these compounds are modelled on the analogy of the Homeric Πόδαργος, the name of a horse, a compound of πούς and ἀργός (reversed order compounds as *proper names* are not infrequent); and of ποδώκης, a crystallization of the common Homeric phrase τοὺς πόδας ὠκὺς, in which the first member may be said to stand in the relation of accusative of specification. Aeschylean examples showing other case relations are δορίμαργος (*Septem*, 687) and νυκτίσεμνος (*Eum.*, 108), whose first members stand in a dative relation; both these words are ἅπαξ λεγόμενα—perhaps an indication that the poet liked the type.

Since the compound-type of noun + adjective is rare, we perhaps have another reason why the compounds γλώσσαργος and στόμαργος were confused by the late grammarians, who were led into the unconscious error of attempting to simplify a rare type to the common pattern of noun + noun, and hit upon ἄλγος as affording a possible interpretation.

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## FROM ASIA MINOR TO INDIA.

The tetradrachm of the "tyrant" Heraus, which was recently acquired by the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge, and discussed by R. B. Whitehead in the *Numismatic Chronicle*, 1940, pp. 120 f. and plate VIII, 11,<sup>1</sup> is a restrike, as has already been noticed by him. It has now been possible for me to discover which type of coin was used. The new Obv. of the Cambridge piece cannot conceal remains of  $\Xi\text{AN}\Delta\text{PO}$  down on the right, and, in addition, on the left of the king's head an upright B, and more likely a  $\Phi$  than a monogram below this letter. Accordingly it is certain that a posthumous Alexander tetradrachm of spread fabric and thin flan of the type minted in Asia Minor during the second century B. C. came into the hands of the mint-masters of Heraus. The remains on the left of the restrike make it likely that the original coin formed part of the issue of Phaselis in Lycia which had dates of a local era over a  $\Phi$  on the left of the Rev.<sup>2</sup>

It should be noted that Rostovtzeff<sup>3</sup> has recently proved that the output of this and the other posthumous Alexander mints of Asia Minor in the second century B. C. was widely used in the eastern provinces of the Seleucid Empire. It is, therefore, not surprising that they came from western Iran over the frontiers of the state of Heraus in northwestern India. Many pieces from the mint of this ruler, who was, perhaps, also known to Chinese sources,<sup>4</sup> have been found in Afghanistan and western Turkestan, thus indicating either close political or commercial relations of Heraus with the countries north of the Hindu-Kush on the main trade route between Hellenistic Asia Minor and China.

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. also *Friends of the Fitzwilliam Museum, Thirty-Second Annual Report* (1940), p. 1 with plate.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. E. T. Newell in *Anatolian Studies Presented to William Hepburn Buckler* (1939), p. 292 and pl. X, 3.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. M. I. Rostovtzeff, "Some Remarks on the Monetary and Commercial Policy of the Seleucids and Attalids," in *Anatolian Studies Presented to William Hepburn Buckler*, pp. 277 f., and *idem*, *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (1941), pp. 655 f., 1480 f.

<sup>4</sup> W. W. Tarn, *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (1938), pp. 342, 505 f.

## REVIEWS.

AUGUSTO ROSTAGNI. *La letteratura di Roma repubblicana ed Augustea*. Bologna, 1939. Pp. 514. (*Istituto di studi Romani: Storia di Roma*, XXIV.)

A German reviewer of this book, writing in *Gnomon*, begins his article with a flourish of trumpets. "After the victory of Vittorio Veneto," he declares, "the Italian people with the Fascist revolution stepped once more into the van of European culture, and under the guidance of a Roman Führer broke a coalition of fifty-two states and founded an Empire." It is that spirit which is producing the enormous *History of Rome* of which Mr. Rostagni's work is volume 24. The aim of the series is frankly to glorify Italy and its capital Rome, *l'Urbe*, and to justify the policy of the Fascist party by identifying its ideals with the best and greatest of ancient, mediaeval, and renaissance Rome. It is therefore scarcely possible for it to be a critical history in the real sense of the word. It is not intended to tell the whole truth, but to arouse feelings of admiration. The valuable, but disruptive, force of aesthetic and spiritual doubt is carefully excluded from it; and, since the lesson it wishes to convey must be assimilated more by the emotions than by the mind, and more by a disciplined mass of students than by an intellectual élite, it is simplified to the point where its effect is not incisive, but massive. The Party does not want criticism; the Party wants obedience.

These considerations did not occur to me until I was half-way through Rostagni's book and was attempting to find reasons for my disappointment. I do not know whether he is an ardent Fascist or not, and if his book were good I should not much care. I found a good deal to admire in his *Arte Poetica*, which was written for a very different purpose, and on a very different method. In this work I found little to admire except the systematic bibliographies, and, every now and then, a penetrating summary of one argument or collection of facts. For the rest, the chief themes of the book were in my judgment false, the separate chapters were usually inadequate, and there were numbers of remarkable misinterpretations and errors of emphasis.

The principal theses of the author are (1) that Roman literature is just as genuinely original as Greek literature, on which it is falsely considered to be dependent; and (2) that it is not an imitation of Greek literature, but rather that it continues and transcends Greek literature and marks a definite and important advance upon it. Rostagni makes these points again and again, sometimes separately and sometimes in conjunction. Obviously he wants his readers to believe them, and it concerns us to examine the proofs he advances.

In the first place, he asserts that it is a relic of antiquated romantic notions to call Greek culture original, in contrast to Latin culture. The primacy of Greece, her unique position as creatrix of European art, science, and philosophy, was "a privilege of precedence and of lucky coincidences that can never recur" (pp. 6-7). I take that to

mean, first, that Greece invented so many eternal art-forms and asked so many fundamental questions merely because she happened to start before the Romans; and, second, that the richness of her cultural life was due merely to the haphazard combination of different productive elements in one unexpectedly fertile amalgam—the Dorian lyric and the Attic iamb in tragedy, perhaps, or the sensible autochthonous Athenians with their eager questing Ionian kinsmen in the sixth century. But both of these ideas are examples of the familiar effort, not to explain genius, but to explain it away. The “privilege of precedence” is almost complete nonsense. On Rostagni’s own theory (pp. 52 f.) the Italians had been in possession of some primitive dramatic forms of their own for centuries before Livius Andronicus introduced a play on the Greek model. Why did they not, then, create an art-form as beautiful and rich as Greek tragedy? They were not debarred from it by Greek “precedence,” as one mathematician is debarred from claiming a theorem previously published by another. It was simply that they could not. When they did make a Roman tragic drama, it was the *praetexta*—simply a Greek form taken over entire, with contemporary or historical Romans instead of mythical Greeks, and often with the splendid tragic lyrics replaced by parades and processions. As for “lucky coincidences,” *fortunate combinazioni*, it is a slander on genius to call it luck. Doubtless it was lucky for the world when a young Polish gentleman with strong national sentiments, exquisite taste, and nimble fingers coincided with the romantic movement and post-Napoleonic Paris and a score of harmonic innovations. But Frédéric Chopin’s music was more than luck: it was effort and perception and suffering; it was genius. And so was the Greek achievement.

Rostagni adds another reason for disbelieving in the comparative originality of Hellenic culture. A hundred and fifty years ago (he says), before Greek prehistory was explored, the current romantic notion was that the culture of Greece was native to the soil and had sprung from it spontaneously; whereas now we know that Greece “profited largely from the influence of very ancient civilisations which had flourished among various eastern peoples” (p. 7). Now, this is a striking misinterpretation of the facts. It is true that we have now come to realise the debt of Greek culture to previous civilisations, some of which belonged to the Near East. But the relation between the thoughts and skills which they gave Greece and the work which Greece achieved with their help is hugely different from the corresponding relation between Greek influence and Roman culture—so different that it is fatally misleading to compare them. It is possible to understand Greece without knowing anything of her predecessors. It is impossible to understand Rome without knowing Greece.

Next comes a larger and more complex argument. Rostagni asserts that the vulgar error of believing Roman literature to be essentially dependent on Greek influence is caused by the fact that it appears suddenly in the third century, “in obviously direct relation with Greek models.” This late and rapid efflorescence, he says (p. 7), “suggested to modern scholars rather severe judgments” about the dependence of Latin on Greek. But in reality, despite that

"obviously direct relation," the efflorescence was not caused by sudden contact with Greek stimuli. "There was a new factor which stimulated spiritual and intellectual vigour. It was not Hellenic influence, not the 'schooling' of the Greeks, but the political progress of Italy achieved through the virtue of Rome" (p. 8).

He expands this argument into three interlocking proofs. First: the impact of Greek influence was not sudden. The "greater penetration of Hellenism" about 250-200 B. C. "was the result of gradual and harmonious fusion, and kept along the line of the principles marked by authentic Roman tradition" (p. 101). Second: the Greek influence was subordinate in importance to the political position of Rome. Rome imposed upon Italy "unity of language, literature, and spirit. . . . If the Romans had been absorbed, penetrated, and conquered—as we are told they were—by Hellenism, how could they possibly have kept their language, which is the greatest sign of spiritual independence?" (pp. 8-10). Third: the "political unification of Italy" allowed the several peoples of the peninsula to make contact with one another and broke down the barriers of the provinces, thus revealing a vaster horizon to all the Italians (p. 9). Let us examine these heads separately.

(I) Rostagni gives no real evidence to prove that the fusion was gradual and harmonious. He cannot. Of course Greek influence had been infiltrating into Italy for centuries before it suddenly revealed itself in its full direct blaze to the astonished eyes of the Romans. But practically all the evidence, and almost unanimous confirmation from Roman scholars themselves, goes to show that Rome's first immediate contact with Greek culture in the third century was an abrupt spiritual revolution.

Poenico bello secundo Musa pinnato gradu  
intulit se bellicosam in Romuli gentem feram

sang, with more truth than poetry, Porcius Licinus; and Horace said the same thing more gracefully and more emphatically in *Ep.*, II, 1, 156 f.:

Graecia capta ferum uictorem cepit, et artis  
intulit agresti Latio.

The capture of Greece introduced uncivilised Rome to culture. (Horace and Porcius Licinus cannot be described as modern scholars, so that Rostagni's *moderni filologi*, p. 7, needs some qualification. But, modern or ancient, he will have none of them: Horace's epigram, he says, "inspired by the tastes and preconceptions of the Augustan age, is fundamentally erroneous and unjust.") It is needless to heap up evidence that Rome was at that time uncivilised. Polybius saw Roman soldiers playing checkers with priceless pictures squared off for cloths (Polybius XXXIX, 2, 2). L. Mummius—nearly a century after Livius' first play—contracted with the ship-pers of his Corinthian loot to replace any damaged masterpiece with a new one (Velleius Patereulus, I, 13, 4). In 167, L. Anicius brought the best actors and musicians from Greece to give a show at his Illyrian triumph. As soon as the musicians began to play, he sent a licitor to tell them to "make a fight of it," ἀγωνίζεσθαι, so that

they had to change the concert into a sort of free-for-all scrimmage (Polybius XXX, 22). The incessant opposition of the Roman officials to the very existence of a theatre and actors, to the teaching of Greek philosophers, and to the training offered by Greek orators, is well known, though Rostagni mentions it only cursorily. *Poeticae artis honos non erat*, said Cato approvingly, contrasting the Hellenised present with the good old days in which Romans were Romans. These instances, and many others, are enough to show that the Romans were bewildered when they came into direct contact with Greek culture, that they felt it *strange*, that the contact was the very opposite of gradual and harmonious and traditional fusion.

(II) If Rome was penetrated and dominated by Hellenism, how could she keep her language? Because a language is never imposed on a nation except by superior numbers or, sometimes, by political domination. The Jews abandoned Hebrew when outnumbered by their neighbors. The Normans abandoned French when outnumbered by their subjects. The Gauls, the Carthaginians, the Oscans, the Iberians abandoned their language when politically dominated by Rome—and even then, as we know from anecdotes and relics, not entirely. The Japanese never abandoned their language although they were culturally dominated by China for many centuries. The unhappy inhabitants of what had been the fairest part of Italy were brutally dominated, and in many cases (e. g. Tarentum) either killed or enslaved; this powerful argument gradually “barbarised” them (Hahn, *Rom und Romanismus*, pp. 19 f.). It is surprising that they managed to retain even the small proportion of their language and culture which did survive. But no one has ever claimed that Rome was so deeply influenced by Greece as to think of changing the official language of her laws, her senate, her army, and her common people. To say that she managed not to do so is to break down an open door.

(III) What Rome achieved in the third century was not the “unification of Italy.” Still less did she “make all welcome and all equal under her guidance” (p. 9). That is either an elementary blunder or a deliberate misstatement. The Italians were not given equal rights with the Romans, or with one another, and they were not unified—unless Rostagni defines unity as subjection to a single oppressor. For generations yet to come they harboured their *perpetuum in Romanos odium* (Livy, III, 4, 2; VII, 30, 7; XXXI, 7, 12, etc.) and thought of their unifiers as *raptores libertatis, lupos* (Velleius Paterculus, II, 27, 2). They were conquered and dominated by Rome, and it was Roman domination, not Italian unity and progress, which was the occasion for the appearance of early Latin literature.

And, although Latin literature was written by men from all over Italy, it was written at and for Rome, exclusively. The *Odusia* was created by an ex-slave from unhappy Tarentum for a Roman classroom. The *Bellum Poenicum* dwelt on the foundation and destiny of the one dominant city; its scanty fragments show that it was exclusively concerned, not with the unification of Italy and the revelation of vaster horizons to all the Italian peoples, but with Rome's duel against Carthage, punctuated by events like this:



transiit Melitam  
 Romanus exercitus, insulam integram urit  
 populatur uastat, rem hostium concinnat. (fr. 37.)

All the tragedies were either about Greek myths or about the glories of Rome's history and Rome's present—*Romulus*, *Clastidium*, *Sabinae*, and so forth. Naevius, the truest Roman of them all, is sometimes credited with a more broadly Italian view; but the joke about *Praenestini et Lanuini hospites* in his *Ariolus* does not go beyond the frontiers of Latium; and his *Tarentilla* was probably a *Ταραντίη* in the original. Early Latin literature was never Panitalic as early Greek literature was Panhellenic. What truth there is in this argument of Rostagni's is a far less elevated truth than he would have us believe. It is that Rome had, after a series of successful wars, become rich and powerful and had leisure to take in any culture which was offered her. She therefore attracted authors and artists and teachers from all over Italy and Greece—men who saw a chance to make money (like Plautus) or prestige (like Livius, president of the *collegium scribarum*, and Ennius, whom the Roman officials deigned to make a Roman citizen in his poverty-stricken old age). The wise, as Simonides said, must sit at the doors of the rich. *Unificazione politica*, meaningless at that time in the legal sense, is equally meaningless in the spiritual sense. Roman domination, not Italian unity, created the new poetry: in the sense that it offered rewards for its creation by men who were mostly neither Romans nor even free-born Italians.

In his final argument, Rostagni goes straight to the point. The Romans copied every literary form except satire and farce from the Greek. They borrowed every metre and even the quantitative system in verse and prose from the Greeks. For many centuries they modelled all their prose and verse on Greek types. They took nine-tenths of their subjects from Greece, subjects ranging from Aeneas to Priapus, from Jason to Chremes, from Epicureanism to Stoicism. How then can Roman literature be called original?

He replies that these borrowings are superficial, not essential. Despite "the appearance of imitation" (p. 101), the Roman spirit proceeded along its own path. The plots and the forms which were borrowed were "nothing but material and external things (*materialità ed esteriorità*) and did not influence the deep literary and artistic spirit" of Roman literature. I find it quite impossible to believe this *principio evidente, fondamentale e inderogabile* (p. 12), all the less since little attempt is made to prove it. When Ennius and Varius and Seneca all write of Thyestes, when Rome's first historians actually write in Greek, when every Roman poet boasts of equalling Homer or Hesiod or Alcaeus or Callimachus, when Roman literature is full of direct translations and thinly-veiled adaptations from Greek, that connexion cannot be called material and external. Such dependence on foreign models was not shown by Rome in any field except philosophy, science, and the arts. Compared with Roman law, compared with Roman strategy, compared with Roman government, Roman literature is very, very far from being fundamentally independent, *essenzialmente autonoma*.

No one, of course, would claim that Latin literature is simply a



mirror-image of Greek. Although much of what the Romans borrowed was essential, they contributed much that was vital to their finished product. Rostagni, however, spoils the force of much of his argument in this direction by his abuse of scholars who have endeavoured to distinguish Latin contributions from Greek borrowings within one author or one genus. He is sometimes drawn to extend this abuse to all who have dared to criticise the merits of any Latin poet. Here are two typical passages:

Most Terentian criticism is still engaged in foolish discussion of the same old gabble—about the possibility of denying Terence the paternity of his own comedies, about his plagiarisms, and about other such questions—or else it is occupied in debating, with equal stupidity, the problem of his Greek models: a problem which, instead of being confined to its proper limits, those of scholarly research, is rather applied to aesthetic ends, namely to the purpose of determining the originality and the artistic merits of the poet (p. 420).

Aesthetic critics have spent much effort on the *Aeneid*, but it has been mostly misdirected: it has applied to Vergil's work the standard of what are supposed to be the laws of heroic poetry, and has therefore brought out all kinds of imperfections and weakness, faults in the development of the action, in the characters of the chief personages—Aeneas especially—and so forth. These judgments, or rather prejudices, though depending on intellectual attitudes which belong to other ages than ours, are not wholly abandoned today, and appear in the majority of monographs and commentaries (p. 440).

This petulant attitude to the work of generations of scholars, along with the rather juvenile belief that we now live in a better age (*antiche dicerie, pensiero proprio d'altri tempi*, etc.), could be justified only by a much greater apparatus of scholarship than Rostagni displays and in its present context awakens distrust rather than agreement. I am willing to be convinced, but not to be shouted at.

Not, then, in detail, but in bulk, Rostagni tells us what is truly original in Latin literature. He gives four answers.

He says, first, that many things which were originally Greek entered Italy from the eighth century onwards, and were acclimatised in Italy for so long that they can fairly be called Italian. Such, for example, were many myths and legends (some of which came through Etruscan channels). Such were literary types like the mimes of Sophron—which are usually considered part of the Dorian farce tradition—and the phlyakes of Rhinthon. In one paragraph Rostagni actually implies that the rhetoric of Gorgias and other Sicilians directly influenced Roman oratory, and that it can be called truly Italian rather than Greek because it was created in Italy.

Caratteri propri e autonomi appaiono in particolare nelle creazioni letterarie; le quali non a caso sembrano molte volte collegarsi, per ragioni di affinità, più a quelle della letteratura latina che non della greca. . . . Il medesimo si può ripetere a proposito della prosa, particolarmente della retorica di Gorgia da

Leontini e degli altri maestri sicelioti, che ha affinità con la retorica a cui in ogni epoca appaiono molto inclini i Romani (pp. 29-30).

This kind of argument appears to me to confuse the issue. The Italians preferred, as he says, the myths of Aeneas and Odysseus to others, and "acclimatised" them quite early; but they were none the less Greek myths. Gorgias influenced the Roman orators (although not directly!); but he was none the less a part of the main stream of Greek literature, as Plato well knew. A model, a myth, is none the less Greek if the hinterland of Magna Graecia likes it and borrows it.

He goes on to add that a great deal of truly Italian literature survives in Roman work which was produced after direct contact with Hellenism. For example, Plautus was much influenced by the Atellan farce. The *Bellum Poenicum* of Naevius was "a sort of *carmen conuiuiale*" (p. 77)—i. e., it was, although more elaborate, recognisably akin to the *clarorum uirorum laudes atque uirtutes* which Cato (Cicero, *Brutus*, 75) recorded as having been sung at banquets many generations before his time. Such was the *carmen Priami*, whose first line, a Saturnian, survives. Rostagni even knows what these pre-Livian lays were like. Their special, non-Greek characteristic was that they intermingled the world of contemporary history with the world of myth (p. 50). That may be so. We have no evidence whatever to prove it, and Rostagni advances none. As a matter of fact, the scanty fragments of Naevius' poem would show that it contained few *clarorum uirorum laudes*, few ἀριστεῖαι. It looks much more like a versified chronicle, like the purely annalistic portions of Livy. He further conjectures that some of these *carmina* were dramatic in form, and that the *carmen Nelei* of which one iambic line still survives was one of them. How a dramatic poem was recited at banquets he does not explain. All he says is:

It is difficult to determine with absolute certainty whether among the anonymous *carmina* . . . there were any which—although in epic-lyric, that is to say substantially narrative, form—were presented in a dramatic form (!). But it is very probable; and it can be asserted with every likelihood for one of them, the *carmen Nelei*. In that work the iambic metre characteristic of dramatic poetry is already flourishing, and its connexions with Sophocles' tragedy *Tyro* are clear (p. 52).

The assumption that the *carmen Nelei* was a quasi-dramatic poem composed before Livius Andronicus, *qui ausus est primus argumento fabulam serere*, is made without any suggestion of proof and supported only by "the light of intrinsic probability" (p. 411). By the light of cold fact, the only statement about its date makes it contemporary with Livius' *Odusia* (Charisius, *G.L.K.*, I, 84, 9, reading *aeque prisco*); and, if it was a tragedy, the intrinsic probability is that it was composed after Livius' first plays, by some other member of the guild of poets and actors over which he presided. Rostagni's airy hypotheses are interesting to read, but they become a little tiresome when so little proof and so little argument is offered to ballast them.

Thirdly, Rostagni asserts that when the Romans began to write heroic poetry (both epic, p. 50, and tragic, p. 78), they gave it an "absolutely distinctive general character," which "sharply distinguishes Roman poetry from Greek" (p. 50). This was the device of associating the world of heroic myth and the world of recent or contemporary history in one poetic universe: as in the eighth book of the *Aeneid*. We can discard this argument at once. Throughout his triumphal odes, Pindar magnificently connects the heroes of his own day with their half-divine ancestors, and illuminates contemporary history by blending it with the tremendous background of the sagas. "Seine Helden sind gegenwärtig lebende und ringende Menschen. Er stellt sie in die Welt des Mythos hinein. Das bedeutet für Pindar: er stellt sie in eine Welt idealer Vorbilder, deren Glanz auf sie überstrahlt" (Jaeger, *Paideia*, p. 285). Nor was Pindar the only Greek to write like this. In *The Frogs* the god Dionysus is a perfectly contemporaneous Athenian, who has sailed in the fleet and is full of the jokes and gossip of 405 B. C. Perhaps the noblest of such assimilations is *The Eumenides*, at the end of which the Athenians of the fifth century could see their own jury-system inaugurated by their ancestors, guided by their own patroness. It is highly probable that the lost epic poets who lauded Alexander connected his deeds with those of his heroic prototypes—he himself loved to mythicise his character, his birth, and his adventures. Certainly Lycophron's *Alexandra* is nothing more nor less than a tremendous poetic panorama beginning in the myth, and ending, with no loss of continuity, in the immediate present: exactly as Ennius' *Annales* did.<sup>1</sup> And that very important poet Choirilos of Samos introduced some elements of saga into his epic on the Persian war (cf. frag. 5, Kinkel); Bethe in *R.-E.*, III, col. 2360 cleverly compares that act to the association of the battle of Marathon and the sack of Troy in the Painted Porch at Athens.

So, when Rostagni says that this device is "absolutely distinctive" of Roman poetry, he is mistaken. What truth there is in his assertion will, unfortunately, not increase our admiration for Roman poetry. It is that the Romans went far further than the Greeks in using the device: in fact, too far. Aeschylus knew well enough not to show Athena encouraging Themistocles in *The Persians*. Apollonius knew well enough not to write of the victories of Ptolemy, assisted by Ares and Hera. The Greeks had taste. But the Romans were able without a qualm to portray Anubis fighting Neptune, Venus, and Minerva at the battle of Actium (*Aen.*, VIII, 698), to tell how Pallas saved Hannibal from a duel with Scipio by carrying him off in a cloud (Silius, *Pun.*, IX, 484) and how Megaera tried to shatter the peace of the world by encouraging the ambition of her nursling Rufinus (Claudian, *in Ruf.*, I, 74 f.); they were able to describe, in one and the same poem, the transformation of Arachne to a spider and the transformation of Julius Caesar to a comet (Ovid, *Met.*, VI, 129 f., XV, 843 f.); they did not shrink from explaining how Pan

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ziegler, *Das hellenistische Epos*, who outargues Rostagni's thesis that the *Annales* were in no way Hellenistic in plan and technique: he shows that they are more probably to be compared with Hellenistic poems like Rhianus' *Μεσσηνιακά* and Phaestus' *Λακεδαιμονικά*.

had pursued a lovely and obdurate nymph through the park of a Roman millionaire (Statius, *Silv.*, II, 3); and thus they started a vicious habit which persisted until at least the eighteenth century. If Rostagni's argument that this device is both truly Roman and truly admirable were accepted, it would mean that we ought to prefer the *Bellum civile* of Petronius to that of Lucan, and to contemplate with pleasure the spectacle of Nero dressed as Apollo and Commodus in the garb of Hercules. It was an exaggeration to which the Romans were always liable. "Abiit ad deos Hercules; . . . licuit esse otioso Themistoeli, licuit Epaminondae, licuit (ne et uetera et externa quaeram) mihi," says Cicero in the *Tusculans*, without guessing how vain and foolish it sounds. Certainly it is not a thing to be admired; for it was only in its tastelessness that it was typically Roman.

Lastly, Rostagni declares that when the Romans took over those purely "external and material" things, the genera, the myths, and the styles, they infused into them a new spirit, which was truly Roman, and which was more advanced than the Greek spirit ever was. Graeco-Roman literature, he tells us, was a continuous development culminating in Latin prose and poetry—a development which was one phase of a huge spiritual process that actually found its climax in Christianity. Greek poetry was essentially focussed on the external and the objective world; it did not reason but merely looked upon the spectacle of life. It was the triumph of matter, not of spirit. But, with continued progress, the human spirit became reflective and turned from the Object to the Subject. Greek poetry failed to make this new step; but Roman poetry succeeded—partly because it came later in the process, partly because it had the energies which Greek poetry lacked. The Romans did not, it is true, create a mythology equal to that of the Greeks; but they created a far greater wealth of psychical themes, and were far better at putting their own personalities into their poetry. Therefore, concludes Rostagni (pp. 15-17), they are rightly called not imitators, but continuators of the Greek poets.

Now, is this true? Did the Romans really succeed in reflective poetry when the Greeks had failed in it? Of course they did not. The whole body of Roman epic is very far indeed from being more reflective than Greek epic. In drama there is no comparison—are we to pit Euripides against Seneca, or Plautus against Menander or Aristophanes? The Roman elegists are not more thoughtful than the Greek—even Propertius' fourth book compares poorly with Theognis and Solon for genuine depth of reflection. Not even the Roman satirists thought more deeply than their real prototypes, the Old Comedians and the philosophical poets like Crates and Cereidas. It can be agreed that the Romans often put more of their own personalities into their poetry than the Greeks, although the disappearance of the Alexandrian elegists and the Lesbian lyricists deprives us of some vital evidence. But it is not possible to assert that, *for that reason*, Roman literature represents a higher stage in the process of the soul. A later stage, doubtless. Baudelaire is later than Ronsard, and more subjective. Leopardi is later than Dante, and more subjective. But neither of the two epigonoi represents a higher stage in the journey of the spirit. I am not saying this merely for the sake

of argument. Despite all the energy which Rome deployed in the extension and stabilisation of the Empire, it is almost impossible not to feel a spirit of exhaustion and despair in all Roman poetry after Lucilius and all Roman prose after Cicero. The profound and settled melancholy of Vergil—a melancholy which is betrayed not only in his pathetic letter to Augustus, not only in his wish to destroy the unfinished *Aeneid*, but in the gloom and suffering of the entire poem, culminating in the pathos and frustration of the Marcellus episode—reappears in Livy's preface and Horace's Roman odes: and it is justified by the increasing hollowness of Silver Age literature, and only emphasised by the dark violent gloom of Tacitus and Juvenal, before the long silence at last sets in. The development which begins with Homer and ends with Juvenal and Claudian, which begins with Herodotus and ends with Apuleius, cannot be described as an upward march of the human soul; and it is only catchpenny rhetoric, not scholarly devotion to the truth, which could imply that it was, or that its later stages continued and transcended its glorious beginnings and its splendid maturity.

But all this is a useless task, and the Romans themselves would have agreed that it was: the Greeks even more so. Rostagni starts from the thesis that, if Roman literature is not original, then Roman civilisation is less great than we had supposed; and that to prove Roman literature to be more highly advanced than Greek is to exalt and vindicate the name of Rome (p. 1).

In the first place, this totally neglects the classical theory of imitation, the doctrine on which both Greeks and Romans worked. The ancients were proud to copy, in the hope that they might equal, their mighty predecessors. They believed in change and in completion, but little in progress. All that the most boastful Roman poet ever wanted to achieve was to equal Hesiod, to be the Umbrian Callimachus, to be Homer reincarnated, to fit Aeolian song to Italian rhythms, and so on. Nor was this imitation confined, as Rostagni says, to external and material things: there is a good chapter, showing how deep it went, in Kroll's *Studien zum Verständnis der römischen Literatur* (VII, especially pp. 159 f.). If he had wished to convince his readers, he ought to have demonstrated in detail exactly how much Terence, for instance, altered and enlarged Menandrian comedy (instead of merely saying that Terence "created something more largely human and universal" than Menander), and what was truly Roman and Ciceronian in Cicero's contribution to Graeco-Roman oratory. This, save for a page or two, he does not do; and he pours scorn on those who have tried to do it in detail.

Again, his attitude neglects what the Romans and the Greeks themselves thought. Hardly any Roman ever ventured to assert that Roman authors were superior to those of Greece. No Greek ever considered them anything but vastly inferior. Comparison of Greece and Rome, often with special emphasis on literature, was a very common subject for critics and philosophers from about 150 B. C. until about 100 A. D.<sup>2</sup> There is a well-known synkrisis in Quin-

<sup>2</sup> Wendling, *Hermes*, XXVIII (1893), pp. 351 ff.; Focke, *Hermes*, LVIII (1923), pp. 363 f.; Rabbow, *Neue Jahrb.*, CLV (1897), p. 318.



tilian, X; Cicero begins the *Tusculans* with another; and traces of many such debates appear in Gellius. Nearly all conclude in favour of the Greeks. Quintilian grants the Romans superiority in nothing but satire (for which there is no exact Greek equivalent), and equality only in elegy, history, and—for Cicero's sake—oratory. Cicero indeed claims that the Romans improved what they borrowed from the Greeks; but, except for his own case, he finds it rather hard to prove; and it is obvious that he is really vaunting his own oratory and his own philosophy. Both the manner and the matter of the *Tusculans*, in which he makes this boast, are borrowed from Greek philosophy; and it is difficult to assert that he has improved them.

The Greeks never felt that the Romans were "continuing" their work on a higher plane. It was neither political prejudice nor national vanity which made them regard the Romans as well-organised barbarians. The contemptuous silence with which they treat nearly all Roman literature<sup>3</sup> is an aesthetic and spiritual fact which Rostagni ought to have taken into account if he would have us believe that it actually improved and transcended the work of the Greeks. No account of Roman culture is complete if it passes over the derision and hatred which that culture provoked throughout the civilised world.<sup>4</sup> Part of it was historical and philosophical theorising: as when Dionysius describes Roman customs as imitations of Greek (II, 8 and 12, V, 73, etc.). Part of it was the natural loathing of the conquered for the conqueror—*paene iustum odium nostri imperi*, says Cicero, *De Prou. Cons.*, 6. Part of it was a reflex of Roman arrogance (Pliny describes his fellow-countrymen as *deorum quaedam immortalium generi humano portio*, *N. H.*, XXXVI, 15, 118), Roman brutality, and Roman contempt for the "greedy Greeky."<sup>5</sup> *Graecia facundum sed male forte genus*, says Ovid (*Fasti*, III, 102), and the same scorn is expressed or implied in many frank utterances of Roman poets and statesmen. But most of it was the very real and just feeling that Greece had nothing to learn from Rome, except the use of that power which was symbolised in her very name, and the political discipline which was at once its precondition and its product. The rest was tongue-tied barbarism, imitative poetry, parroted philosophy, second-hand science, vulgar, pompous, infertile art.

If then few Romans and fewer Greeks believed that Roman culture and in particular Roman literature transcended the achievement of Greece, it was Rostagni's duty to prove that point in detail for each period, each genre, and each author; or else to mark the exceptions to his main thesis and to explain them separately. Apart from the general arguments which I have examined above, and a cursory paragraph or two at the end of each chapter, he does not do so.

<sup>3</sup> Hahn, *Rom und Romanismus*, p. 198.

<sup>4</sup> Peter, *Die geschichtliche Litteratur über die Kaiserzeit*, I, p. 26; Jüthner, *Hellenen und Barbaren*, VII (*Erbe der Alten*, 1923); Fuchs, *Der geistige Widerstand gegen Rom*; Schnayder, "De Infenso Alienigenarum in Romanos Anima," *Eos*, XXX (1927), pp. 113 ff., and *Quibus Conuiciis Alienigenae Romanos Carpsent* (Cracow, 1928); Mahaffy, *Greek World under Roman Sway*, especially pp. 134, 145, etc.

<sup>5</sup> Colin, *Rome et la Grèce*, especially pp. 668 f.



But the general thesis is false. It is not true that a culture which does not possess a great and essentially original literature is therefore not great. The greatest Athenian poet said that his plays were only slices from Homer's banquets; but Athenian culture was not inferior to Homeric culture for all that. The culture of the Incas was undoubtedly a very great one, but it seems to have had no valuable literature at all. Egyptian culture is not only great but awe-inspiring: its tremendous architecture and statuary are artistically more important than anything of the same kind in the world; but it had no great literature—nothing but songs, hymns, folk-tales, religious manuals. Mediaeval western literature is, with few exceptions, negligible; but mediaeval culture was a great spiritual creation. In the most solemn passage of the *Aeneid*, Anchises asserts that others may well be better artists, scientists, and orators than the Romans. They must concentrate their energies on another duty: it is their mission to rule the world. And Vergil well knew his nation's most serious task: he symbolises it in a contrast at the end of the *Georgics*. Octavian, he says, victoriously

uolentis  
per populos dat iura uiamque adfectat Olympo.  
illo Vergilium me tempore dulcis alebat  
Parthenope, studiis florentem ignobilis oti.

That is, the highest effort of the Roman spirit was displayed in winning wars and imposing a lasting and orderly peace—not in writing poetry, however great it might be. Rome's mission was to consolidate the rule of political stability and universal law which the Greeks had never been able to achieve, and to disseminate a civilisation formed of the best Greek art, science, and philosophy, through political and social patterns drawn from the best in her own folkways. She had to civilise the barbarian West and stabilise the inconstant East. Her greatest men, therefore, were not her historians, poets, and artists; but her lawyers, soldiers, and statesmen. The road, planned by a governor and built by the legions, is the Roman equivalent of the Gothic cathedral, the Egyptian sun-temple, the Chinese philosophical treatise, and the Greek tragedy. *Tu, Romane, memento.*

Every scholar knows that, and most take it for granted. If Rostagni, who says he is convinced of the opposite, had proved it carefully and minutely, his work would have merited a great deal more consideration. On the contrary. His introduction and his prefatory chapters to each section are full of his peculiar theory of Roman originality and Roman transcendence, while the separate chapters on individual authors are for the most part quietly traditional. I found them no more than adequate, although the bibliographical and critical appendices were unexpectedly full. For a book of 514 pages, costing 55 lire, they might have been much richer. Thus, on Lucilius, Rostagni gives us about 2200 words, a short appendix on the chronology of his life, and a bibliographical note listing five editions and thirteen essays or monographs. Wight Duff has 3150 words, no critical appendix, and about half as many bibliographical citations. Schanz-Hosius have about 1850 words and, of

course, a gigantic bibliography. On Horace, Rostagni has about 8500 words (footnotes included), and a good page and a half of bibliography, expanded in a five-page critical appendix bringing out most of the chief Horatian problems. Wight Duff has 13,500 words (excluding his footnotes and his translation of *Sat.*, I, 9) covering a rather larger field than Rostagni. Schanz-Hosius have about 8200 words (excluding enormous footnotes and a paragraph on Horace since the Renaissance) and a bibliography covering eight pages of close print. Comparative lengths would have been irrelevant if Rostagni had loaded every rift with ore; but he has not. Article after article is limited to simple superficial narratives of the poet's life and superficial descriptions of the poet's works ("the *Amores* are mostly on erotic subjects, though Corinna is a fictitious character . . . the *Ars amatoria*, his masterpiece, is a parody of a didactic poem . . . the *Metamorphoses* are a huge web of reminiscences from Greek and Roman authors . . .") which scarcely ever rise to a real intensity of critical appreciation or historical perception. We look in vain for separate discussions of such important topics as the *praetexta*, the Roman attitude to history, the development of oratory, or the changes in the Latin language throughout this period.

Rostagni's book must therefore be judged a very mediocre literary history which is vitiated by its forced connexion with a false theory: like the living men whom Mezentius tied to corpses, *sanie taboque fluentis complexu in misero*. It is, also, the first frankly Fascist work of scholarship I have seen, and it arouses great misgivings in me for the future. If hundreds and thousands of young Italians are to be taught that Roman literature was *essenzialmente autonoma* and transcended the literature of Greece; if millions of young Germans are taught that the author of *Die Lorelei* is unknown, and that the greatest figures in Greek and Roman history were demonstrably Nordic in blood and therefore German folk-comrades, then within two generations Central Europe will have passed into a new Dark Age, full of all the particularism and obscurantism of the last. Does Rostagni realise what he is doing? And if he does, can he help it? I hesitate to suggest whether his intellect is weak, or his will, or both. Anyhow, his *Letteratura di Roma repubblicana ed Augustea* has increased my distaste for Italian propaganda and vastly decreased my respect for Italian scholarship. That is to say, it is a monument, not to the strength, but to the weakness of the new Empire.

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ROY J. DEFERRARI, SISTER M. INVOLATA BARRY, MARTIN R. P. MAGUIRE. A Concordance of Ovid. Washington, The Catholic University of America Press, 1939. Pp. ix + 2220. \$20.00.

ROY J. DEFERRARI, SISTER MARIA WALBURG FANNING, SISTER ANNE STANISLAUS SULLIVAN. A Concordance of Lucan. Washington, The Catholic University of America Press, 1940. Pp. vii + 602. \$6.00.

The useful index prepared by Daniel Crispin for his Delphin edition (Lyon, 1689), often reprinted and best known, doubtless, through its incorporation in the fourth volume of Peter Burmann's *Ovid* (Amsterdam, 1727),<sup>1</sup> after serving thousands of scholars during the past two hundred and fifty years, has now been definitively supplanted by a work complete and therefore far more extensive, namely, a concordance-index with some 252,000 entries as against a scant 105,000 in the Burmann reprint.

Except for an occasional ἀπαξ εἰρημένον, of course, every word that I have compared adds something, as in the following sample cases (where D stands for the earlier work, and W for the later): *vulpes* (2 D: 3 W); *fossa* (10 D: 11 W); *clementia* (9 D: 11 W); *verbum* (374 D: 437 W); *Aiax* (9 D: 22 W); *pro*, the interjection (5 D: 7 W); *pro*, the preposition (27 D: 282 W); *ob* (1 D: 8 W); and besides, the Washington list includes the hundreds and even thousands of instances of such words as *et*, *iam*, *-que*, *sed*, which Burmann's reprint either omitted entirely, or for which the merest handful of occurrences was offered;<sup>2</sup> because Dr. Deferrari and his colleagues have wisely given us a concordance for the more, and an index for the less, colorful portions of the vocabulary.

The printing (by the off-set method) seems to have been done accurately, and a series of brief random samplings, in order to test both accuracy and completeness, has disclosed not a single consequential error of any kind. The basic texts employed are the latest Teubner printings, as listed on p. viii, where, by a slight error in condensation, Friedrich Vollmer's text of the *Nux* is apparently ascribed to 1911 instead of 1923.

One or two matters of technique suggest brief comment. The spellings have been standardized so consistently that, although the text, for example, prints only *volpes*, the concordance classifies under *vulpes* (without cross-reference). Whether or not that is the most convenient method to follow might be debated. On the other hand, all will be glad, I believe, to see the paradigm-order of arrangement for inflected words, instead of the strictly alphabetical, which latter produces some scattering, and a good many bizarre collocations. Interesting, at least, is the system of listing all the occurrences in a single work of all the inflections of a particular word, and these in

<sup>1</sup> Unhappily, however, although expanded in some respects, it was distinctly contracted in others and thus rendered on the whole less valuable. See R. S. Radford, "The Crispin Index to Ovid," *C. P.*, XXII (1927), pp. 80-4.

<sup>2</sup> Thus, for *ergo* Burmann gives not a single example, and Crispin himself only 91, while the present work lists 102.

strict numerical sequence, before passing on to the occurrences in another work. Thus, all the thirty-three occurrences of *opto* in the *Metamorphoses*, in the order of occurrence (*optas*, *optaris*, *opta*, *opto*, *optatos*, *opto*, *optasse*, *optare*, etc.) are listed before going on to the *Fasti* and the other works. This procedure clearly has saved a great deal of time in collecting and classifying the original materials, and it is a convenience, no doubt, for one who wishes to study exclusively the vocabulary and usage of each separate work. But it complicates matters considerably for those who are concerned with merely a single form, like *optasse*, for in that case the entire article must be looked over; and it will also increase the labor of those who wish to use a word-list in order to find the source of a passage, or to learn whether a particular author ever used some particular word-form or phrase. Thus, in an index classified according to word-forms, even such a colorless expression as *pater arma ferebat* (*Ep.*, 8, 89) can be quickly caught by looking at the relatively few instances of a single form, and still more quickly by comparing the passages in which *pater* occurs with those that have *arma* in the accusative, actually looking at merely the one (or at most two or three) in which this particular combination occurs; whereas in the present work one must glance over the four solid pages each of either *pater* or *arma*, even if one avoids the eleven pages of *fero*. Or, again, in an actual attempt, for some other purpose, to locate the pseudo-Ovidian *abeunt studia in mores*, the exact location (*Ep. Sapph.*, 83) of which I had forgotten, it took one minute and forty-five seconds to find the source in the Washington index and but forty seconds to locate it in the Delphin edition, starting to count from the moment at which I took up each of the two books. Which method of arrangement is really the more serviceable to the larger number of scholars is for them to decide; in my own case I should doubt whether once in a hundred times that I use an index I am concerned with the collected usage of one single work at a time. Yet this particular experience may not be also universal or even preponderant, and, until scholars have expressed themselves clearly on the point, we should be only grateful for the consistent application of this method of classification in a work which is certain to be widely used and so will necessarily bring the matter sharply to attention.

Once more, the order in which the works are cited is scarcely defensible from the point of view of rapid use. Something could be said for observing the same order as that in the several volumes of the particular edition followed; still more for a chronological arrangement; and most of all, perhaps, for a strictly alphabetical order, although the editors have badly managed their business in this respect. But none of these has been adopted. Instead the most famous poem has been put first, followed by a second-rate work closely related to it in subject matter, and then the rest follow in the traditional order, which is only roughly chronological, for the *Epistulae ex Ponto* are actually later than the *Tristia*, yet cited before them, while the *Ibis* was written before most of the *Tristia*, though cited after them, and the *Fragments* are mostly from works anterior to the exile, although none but a pedant would object to letting these come last.

The decision to omit all variant readings of any kind whatsoever suppresses, of course, a considerable amount of pertinent informa-

tion. That is not so important when a particular conjecture is accepted against all the MSS and the implied or recorded objections of other scholars, for in any case the user of the index ought to consult regularly the apparatus of the best available *editio maior*. Far more serious is the failure to notify the user that in other instances as well either excellent or unanimous MS authority exists for the same word or phrase, or else a competent modern scholar has proposed the same thing; because here the user is quite helpless, since he cannot improvise such information on the spur of the moment.

For example: Ehwald reads *Actaeis* at *Met.*, I, 313, with practically all the MSS and Bernardini, who absurdly insists that the egregious blunder was made by Ovid himself, a contention which is about as plausible as to suppose that James Russell Lowell would have been likely to confuse the English Channel with the Irish Sea. Del Rio, however, long ago saw that *Oetaeis* must have been meant, and this reading has been approved by Giering, Lemaire, Riese, Merkel, Magnus, Slater, Lafaye, Stange, H. J. Müller, F. J. Miller, even Ehwald himself, in his right mind (1903), and I know not how many competent scholars besides. Now the student looking up *Actaeus* has only himself to blame if he disregards the evidence in the *apparatus criticus*; but the one who examines this concordance of Ovid for *Oeta-Oete* and *Oetaeus* has no possible chance of learning the facts about his usage from a word-list which omits highly pertinent information of this kind.

But this type of criticism is merely regret that a work so very good is not also a little better still, and that is too much like belouding gratitude with ungraciousness. Drs. Deferrari, Barry, and Maguire have produced an excellent work, indispensable to all students of Ovid.

Little more need be said about the Lucan Concordance. It is accurately reproduced by the off-set method<sup>3</sup> and follows much the same plan as the preceding compilation but wisely undertakes to include also "all variant readings which might possess some importance in the establishment of a new text." Opinion will always differ on questions of this sort, but I should think that such a lection as *abegit* (VI, 150), the reading of four out of the six oldest MSS, and accepted among recent editors by C. E. Haskins (1887) and C. N. Francken (1896), might at least have been considered. Complete dependence also upon A. E. Housman's text (the copy before me bears the date 1926, not 1927) eliminates from all record every word in such lines as he, in his always magisterial and frequently insolent manner, removes from the text, sometimes not deigning to quote them even in his apparatus.<sup>4</sup> Yet somebody wrote these verses, in at least recognizable if not always beautiful or correct Latin, and the total suppression of their contents is plainly an arbitrary procedure. Slightly more disquieting is the listing of all the words in an entire new verse (II, 703A) of which Housman says "finxi," and that without the slightest indication that they are the invention (ingenious enough, no doubt) of a modern scholar; and precisely

<sup>3</sup> I have noticed only one unhappy misprint, and that something quite obvious, in the second paragraph of the Preface.

<sup>4</sup> Those which I have observed are I, 436-40; IV, 251; VI, 152.



the same thing is done again at V, 535, where two new half lines are Housman's own pure concoction; and still again at IX, 674A, X, 122A, and X, 472A. But I have made too many indices myself to sympathize deeply with anyone who might thus be deceived because he neglected to verify his references; on which point Dr. J. W. Fuchs of the Hague, in his recent and most useful analytical index to Cicero's *De Inventione* ('s-Gravenhage, 1937), has expressed no less wittily than aptly the sentiment of all of us drudging makers of indices and concordances: "Si quis hunc indicem inspexerit neque ipsius Ciceronis verba perlegerit, si eum index fefellerit, iure deceptus esto."

Like the Ovid Concordance this one to Lucan is clearly indispensable and accordingly welcome. But one may still properly raise the question whether the enormous amount of conscientious labor expended upon it might not have been devoted more profitably to some of the many bodies of Latin literature without any respectable index or concordance at all, because we already have for Lucan an excellent index by George W. Mooney, of a date as late as 1927 (first supplemental volume to *Hermathena*).<sup>5</sup> In comparing the two I selected arbitrarily the first and the last eighteen words for verification. For the last eighteen words the two works were absolutely identical, but not quite so for the first eighteen. Here Mooney had omitted one example of the preposition *a* at IX, 892, and of course he has none of the twenty-nine different words which Housman "finxit."<sup>6</sup> On the other hand he lists an additional example of *ab* at I, 439, a line not even given in the apparatus criticus by Housman; and two additional important variants, one under *abduco* at V, 162, and the other under *abigo* at VI, 150. One must, therefore, regretfully add that, although careful, accurate, helpful, and indeed indispensable, the present Concordance does not completely supplant Mr. Mooney's Index,<sup>7</sup> although, to be sure, it marks a notable advance in comparison with it.

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<sup>5</sup> This is an important point; for example, the number of indices to Terence already in print or in MS is almost ridiculous, while far more important tasks remain undone. The mere advancement of learning (together with notable economy of effort and expense) might have been better served in this case by an index or concordance to the *Anthologia Latina*, let us say, plus a mere pamphlet, surely not more than eight or ten pages in size, containing additions and corrections to Mr. Mooney's Index, which could easily have been pasted in, or even bound in, at the back. Much more of this kind of supplement will be needed in the future, and not so many wholly new, and therefore expensive, publications. [It should be recorded here that, since the preceding note was written, Miss Ethel B. Sager, of Toledo, Ohio, has begun an index to the *Anthologia Latina*, and has therefore staked out a claim to this important field for herself.]

<sup>6</sup> Of these twenty-nine no fewer than six, or more than 20%, are never used by Lucan at all, although doubtless he would have recognized them. As reincarnated in Mr. Housman, Lucan appears to have modified, and presumably also improved, his poetical diction.

<sup>7</sup> Of course both works would have been made a good deal more useful by including all the important critical variants in the apparatus of editions now forty and fourteen years old respectively, together with a record of textual criticism since those dates.



Euripides, *Ion*. Edited with Introduction and Commentary by A. S. OWEN. Oxford and New York, Clarendon Press, 1939. Pp. 196. \$2.75.

This volume makes a fourth in the Oxford series of Euripidean plays; like its predecessors, it is just the businesslike and first-rate edition which the good undergraduate needs—though all of us can learn from it, as will shortly appear. Mr. Owen was plainly an admirable teacher as well as a fine scholar; throughout, he reveals notable skill in lucid, unpretentious explanation; moreover, he puts the reader in possession of the latest as well as the traditional opinions and interpretations. Metrical comment is full and highly competent; under this head falls the finest example of the donnish joke in existence—perfectly sound and relevant, but how remorselessly esoteric! V. 222 runs:

Ιω. οὐ θέμις, ὦ ξένοι.  
Χο. οὐδ' ἄν . . .

Mr. Owen remarks: "The boy's association with the oracle seems to have stimulated his gift of prophecy. He knows apparently that the first word of the reply will begin with a vowel, and thereby save his anapaestic monometer from becoming a dochmiac." How that would have rejoiced Gildersleeve or Shorey!

In v. 1, Elmsley's *νότοις χαλκίοισιν οὐρανόν* is rightly preferred to the vulgate; the breach of Porson's rule is here incredible. In v. 101, I follow Bayfield in accepting Verrall's *ἰλέας* instead of the MS *ἰδίας*; no doubt ill-omened words "in their private conversation" would be bad, but why emphasize that fact? In vv. 168 f. Owen accepts *αἰάξεις*—"you will turn your lovely song to a wail of woe." This strikes me as one of those emendations—I believe they grow more frequent; certainly they are common in Murray's text—which give an excellent sense but somehow do not *smell* like Greek. This sounds foolishly "objective," perhaps, but in the end one has to judge such suggestions by one's own feeling; and *αἰμάξεις* . . . τὰς καλλιφθόγγους ᾠδὰς strikes me as far more Euripidean. On v. 494, we are told that the Acropolis is "then to be pictured as containing στάδια χλοερά." I defy Owen, Euripides, or anyone else so to picture that mass of limestone, with its top of flat uncompromising rock in the poet's day as in ours. Would he ask his audience to imagine anything so different? In v. 602, for *λογίων*, which (whatever it means) will not scan, Owen seems to favour *λογαίων* = "pick of the citizens"; he refers to Ibycus' use of the word (Strabo, p. 59C.). I do not know that it occurs anywhere else, and in Strabo it means literally "picked out": *χῶμα, ὡς φησιν Ἴβυκος, λογαίων λίθου, ὃν καλεῖ ἐκλεκτόν*. Schaefer's *λεγόντων* is not good, because no one would alter it to *λογίων τε*. Klinkenberg's *λόγῳ τε* seems the best available; it looks hard and so might suffer alteration but is used in contrast with *σιγῶσι* (v. 599). In v. 630 *ψόγους* should be accepted. Owen approves Murray's attempt to defend the MS *ψόφους* by pointing to the word *ψοφοδεής*, but that will not serve; *-δεής* makes all the difference. The note on v. 828 is unsatisfactory; Owen's suggestion *ἐλθὼν δ' ἐκείσε* is flat, whereas *λαθὼν* provides the

perfect antithesis to ἀλούς; nor can I see that the caesura is any weaker than that of v. 581, for instance. On v. 890, the statement about golden flowers is incorrect; see Pindar, *Ol.* II, 72. At v. 1029 occurs the familiar οἷσθ' οὖν ὁ δρᾶσον, about which the commentators make too much pother. Owen rightly says: "as though δεῖ δρᾶσαι." That this is correct—that the imperative is felt as a statement—can be proved by Thucydides, IV, 92, 7: δεῖξαι ὅτι ὅν μὲν ἐφίενται πρὸς τοὺς μὴ ἀμυνομένους ἐπιόντες κτάσθων. . . . As to vv. 1137 ff.—the quaint remark that the square of 100 is 10,000, ὡς λέγουσιν οἱ σοφοί—we get no help from the suggestion that the phrase means "as experts direct," for arithmetic will not change its rules at the bidding of anyone, σοφός or ἄσοφος. Nor must we suppose interpolation; too many editors believe that a silly passage becomes less so if written by someone anonymous. We must assume that the mass of Athenians did not know how to do the sum  $100 \times 100$ . Next, why did Euripides drag in this information? All I can suggest is that he means: "The marquee was 100 feet square; that may not sound big enough for so huge a gathering, but 100 feet each way means a bigger area than you might suppose." (Most people are astounded when they hear for the first time that all the inhabitants of the earth could be assembled on the Isle of Wight.) And we must not forget that, though of course μυρίων is an exact numeral here, it does suggest the indefinite use of μυρίος. V. 1288 is printed by Murray ἀλλ' ἐγενόμεσθα πατρός· οὐσίαν λέγω, which even with his translation ("Xuthi factus sum: dei sum: de essentia loquor") remains sadly obscure. Kirchhoff's is not much easier: ἀ. ἐ. πατρός ἀπουσία λόγῳ, "In my father's absence I became in name the son of Loxias." λόγῳ is bad; by its position it becomes emphatic and makes Ion imply that his own argument is a pretence. Much the best, though not too pleasing, is Seidler's ἀλλ' ἐγενόμεσθα· πατρός ἀπουσίαν λέγω, "You were not Loxias' son, but your father's." "Ah, but I had become Loxias' son—I mean, while my father was absent." ἐγενόμεσθα, answering οὐκέτ' ἦσθα Δοξίῳν, is short for ἐγενόμεσθα Δοξίῳν. In the note on v. 1396 πολλή in *Hērē*, 1 is said to mean "famous." Surely it has the frequent sense of πολὺς, "in great power"; "famous" is given by κοῦκ ἀνόνημος in the same line. We may regret, but cannot decently complain, that Owen has not cleared up the oft-discussed v. 1424: τόδ' ἔσθ' ὕφασμα, θέσφαθ' ὡς εὐρίσκομεν. One thing seems plain: that the first three words can be right only if the rest of the line describes the ὕφασμα, by something like "corresponding to your statements." This Bayfield clearly saw, but his λεχθέν ὡς εὐρίσκομεν is impossibly crude. Owen adds to our collection an unpublished reading by Prof. A. Y. Campbell: τόδ' ἔσθ' ὕφασμ', ἔφησθά θ' ὡς εὐρίσκομεν, "your assertions tallied every time with our discoveries." This leaves the first words quite futile. Further, I doubt this use of φημί with an implied accusative: "you recounted, mentioned (the details)." Certainly the one alleged parallel which is offered (Plato, *Rep.* 613 E) will not serve; the passage runs in full: . . . μαστιγούμενοι καὶ ἃ ἄγροικα ἔφησθα σὺ εἶναι, ἀληθεῖ λέγων—simply, "punishments which you rightly called brutal."

One element in this edition, if not more, will chasten some of us, who, being uninterested in early Attic history, may have paid scant

attention to Euripides' frequent essays therein. Owen emphasizes it in his Introduction and even provides as a *παροψώνημα* an "Appendix on the Names of the Tribes." Whatever value this may or may not have in itself, the important point is Euripides' patriotism—important, because failure to give it weight may lead us into error about his dramaturgy. That is, possibly the *deus* here and elsewhere, instead of being thrust forward to cut the knot (as some believe) or to provide a *reductio ad absurdum* of traditional theology (as others hold), is introduced precisely and mostly in order to prophesy concerning Athenian tribes, cults, and the like. On v. 1549 Owen writes:

The goddess appears not so much to extricate the tangles of the plot (for Ion's doubts seem to have revived *in order to* warrant her appearance), as to give occasion for a prophecy about the future of the Ionian race who should be Ion's descendants. This kind of purpose, which Aristotle (*Po.* 15) says is the legitimate use of the *deus ex machina*, is a favourite one with Euripides; a good example is *IT.* 1435, where the shipwreck has been brought about so that Athena may utter her prophecies.

That makes a notable contribution to the study of Euripidean dramaturgy. I am not at present disposed to believe it—the parenthesis about Ion, for instance, seems to me a grave mistake—but I recognize that it merits careful attention.

The dramatic criticism itself, though useful so far as it goes, has too little vigour and vivacity. A number of points are excellent: the discussion of *Τύχη* on p. xxv, the notes on vv. 4 (New Comedy), 364 (fencing with pronouns), 806 (a small slip of the poet's), and a number of places (e. g. on vv. 331, 1276, 1307) where Owen points out that a phrase or turn of phrase has been "dragged in" to strengthen the tragic irony. His comment on vv. 239 f., that it is a sententious reflection to come from a boy, could easily be countered by "Yes: an English boy"; Ion recalls much more an American youth than anyone in *Stalky and Co.* In truth, the "dragged in" irony and the comparatively crude psychology of this play are both due to the fact that Euripides here writes not tragedy but melodrama. That is, he dispenses with certain qualities vital to tragedy and concentrates upon an exciting show, his one aim—superbly achieved—being to get the most out of each scene as it arrives; what similarity, for instance, can we detect between the young Samuel with his broom and the competent film-hero who vaults over the dining-table? Still more obviously, the Paedagogus is neither tragic nor comic, but melodramatic; a *frisson* at all costs is his aim, or the aim of his creator. The best stroke of unabashed and magnificent theatricality is that agonizing thrill when we believe for a moment that we are to be cheated out of the *ἀναγνώρισις* after all (vv. 1380 ff.)—a superb trick played by an accomplished "man of the theatre"; there will be nothing so good in this kind again until Scribe.

Finally, what of Verrall, whose essay on this play, in *Euripides the Rationalist*, offers the most trenchant and formidable expression of his famous doctrine? Verrall's learning, beauty of style, and

well-nigh diabolical cleverness have won him few adherents. Almost every scholar rejects his conclusions, but perhaps no one has yet given them adequate discussion, argument being replaced by liberal use of the words "fantastic," "far-fetched," "perverse," and the like. It is precisely *Ion* which affords him the strongest ground, as all honest readers would (I should imagine) confess. On this ground Owen has challenged him and has made the best attack upon the whole structure of his Euripidean theory; meeting, however, with incomplete success, because he has failed to consider fully the theological implications of his own case. He was content to write (p. xxxiv) that the poet's "warm human sympathies will not allow him to condone the crime of Apollo." That is good, but not nearly enough; and, even so, he reveals a tendency to let the god down easily by treating Creusa cavalierly, for example on v. 948: "She is apt to tell untruths, and it looks as though she were adding picturesque touches in order to gain the maximum of pity." But Owen has dealt three telling blows. First, having shown fairly conclusively (pp. xii-xiv) that Euripides invented this story, he says (p. xxxiii): "It would be futile to bring forward such a myth merely to discredit it." Second, he offers a sound rebuttal of Ver-rall's attempts to discredit the birth-tokens (see notes on vv. 1410-1438). Third, on p. xxxv he writes:

If Xuthus is the father of Ion and Creusa no relation of his, the psychology of the play suffers badly, for she and the boy are singularly drawn to one another when they meet, and the tragedy of the plot largely depends on the fact that mother tries to kill son and son to kill mother; all the tragic irony with which the play is full has to disappear if she is not his mother.

Long study of this play has at last persuaded me that it contains no enigma at all but is perfectly simple; our perplexities, though quite natural, are imposed upon it by our modern ideas about dramatic art, about enlightened and pioneering playwrights, about the Divine Nature as conceived by various kinds of Athenian. It seems to me that anyone who reads *Ion* carefully, taking it as it comes, with as few theories in his head as possible, cannot but assent to these following propositions; whether they contradict one another is a further question.

- (i) Apollo, Hermes, and Athena definitely exist as personal deities.
- (ii) Apollo is the father of Ion.
- (iii) Apollo has protected Ion (a) by causing Hermes to bring him to Delphi; (b) by causing Xuthus to accept him as his own son; (c) by sending the doves; (d) by sending out the Priestess.
- (iv) The birth-tokens are genuine.
- (v) Apollo is untruthful.
- (vi) Apollo is a bungler.
- (vii) Euripides intends to prove the descent of the Athenian tribes, through Ion, from Apollo.

Discussion or proof of these assertions would be otiose; only two, those concerning the doves and the Priestess, seem not irresistibly obvious, and even they are hard to disbelieve. Our trouble is that we find all seven hard to accept in a mass. Verrall's perception of Apollo's quality thrust him upon discrediting the tokens and the *cri du coeur*. Others, impressed by the tokens, Apollo's protection, and the "historical" element, gloss over the ignominious collapse of Apollo's schemes. Owen (on v. 1546) misunderstood that tremendous moment when Ion steps forth to challenge the god. "If the oracle were so entirely the fraud that he [Verrall] supposes, it would have been quite capable of giving a fraudulent explanation." But that is not the point. Ion does not mean to ask: "Are you telling the truth?" to which of course anyone could reply: "Yes." He means: "You have said that I am the son of Xuthus. You have said that I am the son of Phoebus. Explain!" And no explanation save one is possible: "I am a clumsy liar, but my intentions are good." That, indeed, is a brief paraphrase of Athena's bland iambs in vv. 1557-1568.

The correct view, though profoundly distasteful to most of us, is simple. Apollo genuinely exists; he is a god, Ion's father, and ancestor of the Athenians; he is also a brute, a liar, and a bungler.

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LIONEL PEARSON. *Early Ionian Historians*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1939. Pp. vi + 240.

A work like this, which deals with a whole section of the history of Greek historiography comprehensively and yet in detail, is very much to be welcomed. For the last few decades have produced almost innumerable books and articles dealing with single authors and single problems; but the few comprehensive studies which we have, like Bury's *Ancient Greek Historians* and Shotwell's *Introduction to the History of History*, confine themselves almost exclusively to those authors whose works have come down to us in their entirety and give only a very casual account of those historians of whose works we possess only fragments.

The present work is divided into five chapters. In the first chapter the author discusses the origin and meaning of the term "logographer" and gives a brief general survey of the origin, development, and character of the pre-Thucydidean historical literature of the Greeks. The following four chapters are devoted to Hecataeus, Xanthus the Lydian, Charon of Lampsacus, and Hellanicus. In each one of these chapters the author first discusses the question whether the works mentioned by later authors are rightly attributed to the historian in question and whether the fragments which have come down to us are genuine, and then attempts a reconstruction of their works, if not in detail, at least in their general outline.

The most thorough discussion is devoted to Hecataeus' Περιήγησις γῆς, and it is also here that the author has his most original con-



tributions to make, while his discussion of Hecataeus' historical or, as one may call it, mythographical work is rather short and does not contribute very much that is new, except perhaps the comparison of the opening sentence of Hecataeus' work with Hesiod, *Theog.*, 24-28. From the similarity of these two passages the author draws the conclusion that "it is quite a mistake to imagine that Hecataeus' words *τάδε γράφω ὥς μοι δοκεῖ ἀληθέα εἶναι*· οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοί τε καὶ γελοῖοι indicate original and impartial research on his part or are evidence for his rationalistic tendencies." But here I can only partly agree with the author. It is quite true that these words do not indicate original and impartial "research," but, as in all similar cases—one must also compare the famous opening sentence of the work of Heraclitus—, those proud words are meant to indicate that the author has a new point of view, and in the case of Hecataeus this point of view is undoubtedly that of rationalism.

The second longest chapter is devoted to Hellanicus. Here too the author has many interesting suggestions to make, but he gives only an outline of the contents and arrangement of the single works and does not attempt a reconstruction in detail, which, at least with some of them, would have been quite possible. But the performance of this task would have required a special work of probably more than the length of the present volume, so that the omission is quite natural. But one may perhaps express the hope that someone may soon tackle this problem. For, though the subject is not particularly attractive in itself, a thorough investigation in this direction would undoubtedly greatly increase our knowledge of the early development of the chronographic methods of the Greeks.

The chapter on Xanthus also contains many interesting suggestions. I think that the author is probably right in his contention that the work of Dionysius Scytobrachion was not meant to be taken seriously.

Throughout his work the author not only shows that he is thoroughly acquainted with his subject but also displays a very sound and cautious judgment. Yet in so controversial a subject there is ample room for disagreement. So I may perhaps take up one problem, or rather set of problems, which seems to me of fundamental importance, and concerning which one may perhaps arrive at different results.

In his discussion of the origin and meaning of the term "logographer" the author gives a very complete and well arranged account of the evidence. This evidence shows very clearly that in antiquity the term *λογογράφος* in a positive sense was used only in reference to writers of speeches. When used in reference to a historian it always has a derogatory meaning and is meant to refer to an objectionable attitude rather than to a definite type of historiography. This latter use of the word obviously originated from the fact that the real *λογογράφοι*, the writers of speeches, had become notorious for distorting the truth and for using all sorts of embellishments in order to represent their cause in the most favorable light. It is for this reason—because he thought that they were more interested in telling a fine story than in telling the truth—that Thucydides (I, 21) called his predecessors *λογογράφοι*, referring principally to Herodotus and Hecataeus. All the later authors who use the word in

reference to a historian are influenced by this passage of Thucydides and, what is more important, they do not confine its use to pre-Thucydidean writers.

If this is so—and so far I agree entirely with the author—the question arises whether we are justified in using the term “logographer” to describe what is usually considered a well-defined group of pre-Thucydidean historians. This is not a purely terminological problem since it involves the further question whether there exists any well-defined group of authors which may reasonably be comprised under this name.

In favor of a positive answer to this second question one may set forth two arguments. (1) Herodotus uses, if not the word “*λογογράφος*,” yet the word “*λογοποιός*” in a positive sense. But this word has a much wider range than the modern term “logographer.” For, just as an *ἐποποιός* is a man who makes and writes *ἐπη*, so a *λογοποιός* is a man who makes and writes *λόγοι* which, in the earlier meaning of the word, may be either fanciful stories, or a description of foreign countries, or an explanation of the universe, or a historical account of the past, etc., if only these are written in prose. (2) Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*De Thuc.*, 5), though not using the terms *λογογράφος* or *λογοποιός*, enumerates a great many pre-Thucydidean “historians” whom he obviously considers a well-defined group, among them all the writers with whom the author deals in the present book. Yet, if one reads Dionysius’ description of their common qualities, one finds that the only positive quality which he ascribes to all of them is their clear, sober, concise style, which yet has its proper charm, and their Ionian dialect. As to their historical methods and subjects, they seem to have only negative qualities in common, while they differ in everything else.

If this should be the case, or even if there is only a mere possibility of its being so, I advocate that we cease to use the modern term “logographer” in reference to these pre-Thucydidean writers, as the author still does. For it might prejudice an investigation into the origin and growth of Greek historiography by creating a bias in favor of the assumption that there was a well-defined group of authors with a common subject or method.

In order to illustrate this I may perhaps take up a problem with which the author deals in his fourth chapter. He rightly rejects most of the titles listed in the Suidas *Lexicon* as those of works of Charon of Lampsacus, since this compendium is very often confused in matters like this and since all the evidence is against the assumption that Charon should have written such a great number of different works. The author practically retains only two of them, expressing some doubt as to three others. But in one of his notes the author mentions without further comment that E. Schwartz considered it “self-evident” that Charon had written only one work, the *ἄροι Λαμψακηῶν*. Now there are no self-evident axioms in history as there are in mathematics, and E. Schwartz, like all of us, is liable sometimes to err. But I have found that, whenever he makes an authoritative statement like this, he has a reason and that it is always worth while to investigate what this reason may be.

In the present case the reason is perhaps not so difficult to find.

It is one of the curious facts of the history of ancient historiography that local history and general history do not mingle until a rather late date. The only seeming exception is Hellanicus,<sup>1</sup> who wrote histories of Attica, of Lesbos, of Cyprus, etc., in addition to his works of general history. But he is only a seeming exception. For his *Ἀττικὴ συγγραφή*, his *Λεσβιακά*, etc., are not only different in character from the local chronicles, but, what is more important, they are, though probably published one after the other, really parts of a much larger systematic undertaking, just as his *Αἰγυπτιακά*, *Περσικά*, *Σκυθικά*, etc., are not independent works like the *Λυδιακά* of Xanthus or the *Περσικά* of Ctesias but parts of an ethnological work of much wider scope. It would, therefore, be very strange if the very earliest local historian of whom we know had, at the same time, written a Persian history; and all the more so since the chronographic methods developed in local and in general history are entirely different and begin to mingle only in and through the work of Hellanicus.

In other words, it would change the whole aspect of the development of the chronographic and historical methods of the Greeks in the earliest period if we could prove that Charon had written a *Περσικά* as well as the *ὄροι Λαμψακηνῶν*. But I cannot find sufficient evidence. The fact, at any rate, that Athenaeus quotes one fragment as "*ἐν τοῖς Περσικοῖς*" cannot be considered as such evidence, though it may have caused the insertion of that title in the Suidas *Lexicon*. For Athenaeus quotes another fragment under the heading "*ἐν τοῖς περὶ Πακτύην*" which certainly does not mean a special work of that title. In analogy to this latter heading the "title" *ἐν τοῖς Περσικοῖς* would mean "in that part of the chronicle of Lampsacus which deals with the period of the Persian wars," and this is exactly the period to which the fragment in question refers.

As to the fragments themselves it seems to me that all of them can easily be assigned to the *ὄροι Λαμψακηνῶν* and that one could also show by a comparison with Herodotus that it is most unlikely that the fragments which the author—like many other scholars—assigns to the *Περσικά* belonged to a special work of that kind. But I cannot discuss the single fragments in a review which is already too long.

I am convinced that the author would have discussed the Charon problem more fully, if he had dealt more in detail with the general problems of the development of Greek historiography. He could not do so, because he would have had to include a full discussion of the work of Herodotus, which was quite outside the scope of his work. So he is certainly not to be blamed for the omission. But, just because his work is otherwise so excellent and will certainly be much in use, I am perhaps justified in pointing out that—whether I am right or wrong in regard to the point discussed—some of the problems appear in a different light when considered from the point of view of the general development rather than from the point of view of the tradition in regard to one single author.

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<sup>1</sup> Ephorus' *ἐπιχώριος λόγος* was, of course, not a local chronicle but, as the words *ἡμεῖς δὲ* clearly indicate, an *ἐπιδεικνύς* in praise of his native city.

W. BEDELL STANFORD. *Ambiguity in Greek Literature*. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1939. Pp. xi + 185. 10 s. 6 d.

This is an interesting and suggestive book which testifies to the never-ending richness and variety of Greek poetry. Mr. Stanford states his purpose as follows (p. 1): "It was, and perhaps still is, a common misapprehension that the more ingenious uses of verbal ambiguity were a pernicious product of fifth-century sophistry. Part of the function of this study will be to make it clear that this is barely a half-truth. Later chapters will show how liberally the poets from Homer to Aeschylus used almost all the types of ambiguity usually ascribed to the rhetorical theorists who came after them, and it will be concluded that what these sophists did was not so much to discover new kinds, as new uses, of ambiguity."<sup>1</sup> The book falls into two well-defined parts, (1) the theories of the rhetoricians and especially a discussion of the various types of ambiguity (*ὁμωνυμία*, *ἀμφιβολία*, *σύνθεσις*, *διαίρεσις*, *προσφῶδια*, etc.), (2) the manner in which the poets (Homer, Pindar, and the tragic dramatists) use ambiguity, and the purposes for which it is employed. Comedy is not treated in detail, although the author states (p. 180) that "in Aristophanes the art of amphiboly, innuendo, allusion and parody reached a degree of expertness rarely equalled in any literature." That he did not consider it worth while to add a chapter on comic ambiguities will be a source of regret to many readers.

The structure of the book and the admission (p. 97) that the Aristotelian categories are hardly adequate to cope with the subtler ambiguities of poetry might lead us to think that the two parts of the book are somewhat unrelated. Actually, this is not at all the case, for the discussion of the rhetorical theories includes illustrations from numerous writers, not only Greek but Latin (e. g. Cicero, Vergil, Seneca, Quintilian) and English (Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, Spencer, etc.); no student of literature can fail to find both profit and enjoyment in what at first sight appears to be a somewhat dry analysis of technical terms used by the rhetoricians.

To ancient seekers after scientific precision, ambiguity seemed dangerous and, when used for the purpose of dialectical dishonesty with the avowed intent to deceive, was almost universally condemned (cf. pp. 12 ff.). In poetry, however, and especially in drama, ambiguity has dramatic and emotional values which must be recognized. The author believes that both Aristotle and his successors failed to appreciate the value of ambiguity in poetry (pp. 22 ff.; cf. p. 69). This is admittedly an *argumentum ex silentio*; the first extant Greek appreciation of the poetic effect of ambiguity is found in an anonymous scholiast on Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*.

The treatment of ambiguity in Homer and Greek tragedy will doubtless be of chief interest to most readers. In the *Iliad* appear only the most elementary types of ambiguity and few even of these, whereas the *Odyssey* "exploits many of the more subtle types with highly dramatic effect" (p. 98). Stanford explains, and rightly, I

<sup>1</sup> That the attempt to combine poetic practice and rhetorical theory leads to a basic confusion in the term "ambiguity" is the opinion of B. Farrington in *Hermathena*, LIV (1939), pp. 170 ff.

believe, that the difference between the two epics results from the difference in plot and from the increased verbal subtlety needed to express the complex scenes of deception in the second part of the *Odyssey*. The famous *Oἷτις οὐ τις* incident is the classic example of deception in names and "is the only place in Homer where ambiguity and paronomasia motivate a whole episode. Technically it is possibly the cleverest use in all Greek" (p. 105). There is quoted as an apt comparison the delightful Nobody-episode in Chapter VII of Lewis Carroll's *Through the Looking-Glass*.

The chapter on Homer seems quite adequate but does not raise the important problems that are suggested by the chapters on tragedy, where the author centers his attention on the three plays which best serve as illustrative material: the *Agamemnon*, where the ambiguity is primarily conscious; the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, which employs unconscious ironic ambiguity; and the *Bacchae*, wherein Euripides "combines deceptive ambiguity on Dionysus' part with unconscious 'Sophoclean' ambiguities foreshadowing his own doom on the part of Pentheus" (pp. 174 f.). It is impossible in a brief review to do justice to the richness of the material on these three plays, and I shall confine myself to a few topics which deserve consideration. (1) Mr. Stanford accepts the traditional view that the audience of a Greek tragedy is "generally omniscient in all the chief events that have been, are, and are about to be when the play is happening" (p. 137; cf. p. 164). The problem of the audience's familiarity with the stories of tragedy is exceedingly complex, but the results of a new study in this field<sup>2</sup> strongly support the view that the supposed familiarity of the Greek audience has been greatly exaggerated. Dr. Pratt shows that in both the *Agamemnon* and the *Oedipus* preknowledge is not required and the clearly foreboding atmosphere stimulates interest and creates expectation of tragic events.<sup>3</sup> Thus the effectiveness of much of the ambiguity does not necessarily depend upon such preknowledge as is usually assumed. (2) Equally important is the relation of ambiguity and tragic or "Sophoclean" irony, which Stanford treats in various parts of his book (cf. pp. 66-68, 74-76, 138, 164 f.). He admits that irony and ambiguity are closely related literary devices; he distinguishes (p. 67) Dramatic Irony, where the character unconsciously says the reverse of the actual truth, from Dramatic Ambiguity, where the character unconsciously suggests double (but not opposite) meanings to the audience; the former is a dramatic device, the latter linguistic. Sophocles in the *Oedipus* is a master of unconscious "ironic" ambiguity (p. 164); that is, the distinction cannot be sharply drawn, for many of the instances of ambiguity contain irony as well. But if we accept the author's belief that in such unconscious ambiguity it is the poet, not the character, who makes the statement (p. 67) and that the poet is a puppet-master who overthrows the illusion of the play (p. 76), we are led to a view of

<sup>2</sup> Norman T. Pratt, *Dramatic Suspense in Seneca and in his Greek Precursors* (Princeton, 1939), pp. 2-13. Since ambiguity is closely related to foreshadowing and suspense, Pratt's discussion of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (pp. 38-46) and Sophocles' *Oedipus* (pp. 100-104) provides a useful supplement to Stanford's treatment of these two plays.

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 39 f., 103.



the *Oedipus* which I am sure Stanford would not wish to defend, in spite of his insistence (p. 164) that in the ambiguities in the *Oedipus* "we are conscious that it is the author's whim, and are never deluded into thinking that it is part of the speaking character's nature, to use them." I see no reason why many of the ambiguous remarks uttered by Oedipus (e. g. 264 f.) may not be as true to his character as the intentionally deceptive ambiguities spoken by Clytaemnestra. It is only natural in times of great stress to speak in personal terms, and most readers, I am sure, feel neither that Oedipus is a puppet in this respect nor that the deservedly famous irony and ambiguity in the play destroy the illusion of the play as a real happening. (3) Mr. Stanford at times finds ambiguity where perhaps none really exists.<sup>4</sup> It seems unlikely that the words of Clytaemnestra in 606, γυναῖκα πιστήν, would be understood as γυναῖκ' ἀπίστην (p. 149); if so, a "very daring ambiguity" indeed. Equally subtle is the suggestion (p. 156) that εἰμάτων βαφάς might suggest the underlying blood motif to the audience, by its similarity in sound to αἱμάτων βαφάς. But in general the analysis of the plays seems sound, and the author throws new light on many passages which illustrate the technique of the dramatists. His treatment of the plays will be useful to all readers of Greek drama, whatever their attitude on the problems of preknowledge and unconscious irony mentioned above.

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R. WALZER. *Eraclito: Raccolta dei Frammenti e Traduzione Italiana*. Firenze, G. C. Sansoni, 1939. Pp. viii + 156. (*Testi della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa*, IV.)

In recent years Italian scholars have displayed great zeal in promoting the study of Greek philosophy, especially by supplying their countrymen with separate editions of sections of Diels' *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. Sometimes the emphasis has been on the Italian translation and commentary. In this instance we receive more: besides translation and a certain amount of commentary, Walzer gives us the Greek text, not only in selections, as Diels did, but quite fully, even adding to the materials printed by Bywater. Moreover, the text does not slavishly follow Diels-Kranz, the editor making good a claim to reasonable independence.

It may be said at once that this text is to be heartily welcomed, especially as the convenience of Diels' text is clearly leading many scholars to neglect Bywater and the background supplied by the ancient writers to whom we owe the preservation of the fragments. There is much also in Walzer's notes that should prove valuable to the student. Gigon's *Untersuchungen zu Heraklit* especially has been largely drawn upon for notes. There are unfortunately many signs of negligence in type-setting and proof-reading of the Greek text, but one may correct the errors easily as one reads. P. 26, n. 6, we have Eraclito (for Eraclide) Pontico.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. p. 181, where he shows a realization of this possibility.



Walzer, as has been stated, displays some independence of Diels-Kranz, but I am not sure that we may content ourselves with either text. Fr. 41: I prefer Diels'  $\delta\acute{\rho}\epsilon\eta$  to Walzer's  $\delta\pi\eta$ . There is involved here a question of style characteristic, I believe, of Heraclitus and generally ignored. He loved pregnant and sudden turns:  $\delta\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$  = *ut qui*. "Wisdom consists in one thing, to have intelligence or judgment: seeing that it rules all things." Cf. frag. 57, 101. The same pregnant turn occurs with  $\delta\tau\iota$  and should be noted. Frag. 104: "They heed the popular bards and take for their teacher the ignorant mob (reading  $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\acute{o}\tau\iota$ ): because the many are worthless, only a few are good." Frag. 108: "Of all I have heard none has attained to this—to have intelligence or judgment: for wisdom is alien to them all." If one takes  $\delta\tau\iota$  to mean *that*, the sentences become flat. I have before given this interpretation of frag. 108. I think it is clearly right. I had forgotten that it is as old as Schuster and Patrick. Diels' understanding of  $\sigma\phi\acute{o}\delta\omicron\nu$  . . .  $\kappa\epsilon\chi\omega\rho\iota\sigma\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\nu$  has always seemed to me forced and unnatural. I may say here that I have recently re-read G. T. W. Patrick's "A Further Study of Heraclitus" (*American Journal of Psychology*, I [1888], pp. 557 ff.) with great satisfaction. I once owned a copy but have lost it; that explains certain lapses of which I am keenly conscious. I am especially pleased to find that Patrick translates frag. 112, "Self-control is the highest virtue, and wisdom is to speak truth and consciously to act according to nature." In a note he adds, "The latter clause may also be translated, 'Wisdom is to speak and act truly, giving ear to Nature.'" That the former rendering is the better seems clear, even if the sentence is not actually Stoic.

There are several fragments the text of which is apparently desperate. Why one should accept Diels' reconstructions I cannot conceive. Frag. 28: I think we have better reason for reading  $\Delta\omicron\kappa\epsilon\acute{o}\nu\tau\omega\nu$  γὰρ  $\langle\delta\rangle$  ὁ δοκιμώτατος γινώσκει φυλάσσειν· καὶ μέντοι καὶ Δίκη καταλήψεται ψευδῶν τέκτονας καὶ μάρτυρας. "Ay, let them (the people) think they are only holding fast to the judgment of their most esteemed teacher (Homer or Hesiod?). Verily, Justice will overtake the fashioners and witnesses of lies." Offense must needs come, but woe unto those through whom it comes! In frag. 45 I can make no sense of  $\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\tau\omega$  βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει. I have before suggested λόχον, "hiding place," which at least makes sense. Cf. Democritus, frag. 117 ἐτεῇ δὲ οὐδὲν ἴδμεν· ἐν βυθῷ γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια. The text of frag. 26 is peculiarly desperate. My interpretation of frag. 120, understanding οὐρος as referring to the south wind, seems to find little favor, though it offers the only rational meaning. I should not call it my interpretation, however, because it was offered long before by others.

Regarding frag. 67 I may add that the reading  $\langle\pi\tilde{\upsilon}\rho\rangle$ , though not so certain as is generally thought, receives some support from Hippolytus. It is always credited to Diels. Thomas Davidson suggested ὅκως  $\pi\tilde{\upsilon}\rho$  in *A. J. P.*, V (1884), p. 503. If Diels anticipated him, I have no proof of it.

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PIERRE ROUSSEL. *Sparte*. Paris, E. de Boccard, 1939. Pp. 216; 16 plates and a map.

Pierre Roussel, whose scholarly work in Hellenistic history is well known, has produced a successful semi-popular treatment of Sparta, from the beginning of her history to modern times. The volume is designed for the layman as well as the scholar, for it contains no quotation in the language of the ancient sources and is bare of references and footnotes.

The introduction justly affirms that the modern attitude to Sparta is based not on the historical facts accessible to us but on the idealistic misconceptions of political theorists and philosophers, past and present. The author's purpose, therefore, is: "... retrouver la vérité sur l'origine et le développement d'institutions singulières dont nous n'avons qu'une très incomplète connaissance."

A concise geographical account of Laconia and Messenia is followed by Roussel's exposition (in twenty chapters) of the external history and the internal phenomena of Sparta from the time of the Dorian invasion; he concludes with a short evaluation of "L'Idéalisation de Sparte." No phase of Spartan history, no important Spartan is omitted.

Roussel emphasizes the natural development of Sparta in archaic Greece and shows clearly that it was only a need for permanent protection against a domestic menace that led, comprehensibly enough, to a state organization that seemed an anachronism as early as the fifth century B. C. In other words, virtues which came to be recognized as peculiarly Spartan were the result not of race or origin, as is at times popularly supposed, but of the system of training which the Spartan had the courage to institute, and to respect, even during the period of decline. Yet Sparta's greatness in the Hellenic world, as Roussel acutely observes, was due chiefly to those men who displayed, along with certain of the well-known Spartan virtues to be sure, a personal (and un-Spartan) independence. These conclusions form the core of the book. As a result, Roussel is at his best in describing internal Sparta, the new ("Lycurgan") order, the lessening of Spartan prestige as the Spartiates dwindled in the fourth century, the attempted revivals of a bygone glory in the third.

Dismissing minor inaccuracies (e. g., the Panhellenic conference called by Pericles at the beginning of the decade 450-440 is certainly misdated), some readers may justifiably complain that Roussel is prone to be dogmatic concerning questions which remain, to say the least, debatable (e. g., Cleomenes' defeat of Argos is placed *ca.* 520 B. C.). To make a general criticism, the chronology is sometimes confused (this applies particularly to the chapter on Lacedaemonian expansion, which is one of the least successful in the book); a few more actual dates would add clarity to the narrative. The account of relations between kings and ephors raises doubts (the work of Guy Dickins, *J. H. S.*, XXXII [1912], pp. 1-42, has evidently not been consulted), and the explanations suggested for Leonidas' circumstances at Thermopylae (pp. 122-123) seem unconvincing beside Munro's brilliant analysis in *The Cambridge Ancient History* (IV, pp. 291-300). There are occasional contradictions, as

when Roussel denies that the Spartan educational system was a machine-like institution, assembled with minute care to check individualistic tendencies, yet on the following pages persuades the reader that the statement is true (pp. 60 ff.; see also pp. 90 and 92, on the prerogatives of the Spartan *apella*).

In a book of this nature there should not exist so many indications of careless proof-reading. The printing is not beyond criticism and apparently no great effort was expended to obtain uniformity of usage (e. g., "État" has the accent about half the time; certain nouns, e. g., "périèque," are capitalized at the author's whim; the spelling of proper names occasionally varies). An irritating eccentricity in the use of the comma sometimes obscures the sense. The illustrations are tastefully selected and well reproduced (see especially the Vaphio Cups on Plate VII); the map is no more than adequate.

There is nothing new or original in the book, but the eminently sane judgments that one would expect from Roussel and his refusal to romanticize at the expense of the evidence, unsatisfactory and scanty though it often is, leave one with the feeling that the book would bring profit and pleasure to all readers and is to be recommended particularly to those whose interest in ancient Greece is not professional.

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SISTER MARGARET MARY FOX. *The Life and Times of St. Basil the Great as Revealed in His Works.* Washington, D. C., The Catholic University of America Press, 1939. Pp. xvi + 172. (*Patristic Studies of the Catholic University of America*, LVII.)

Similar "revelations," concerning Saints Cyprian and Augustine, were made in three earlier studies of the same series (Vols. XXVIII, XXXVII, and XLV), so the merits and limitations of the method are now well known. On the whole, Sister Margaret Mary has applied it with energy and success, turning over a vast amount of material without often forgetting the difference between rhetoric and fact. Most commendably, she has renumbered her footnotes at appropriate intervals so as not to imply too strong a faith in merely quantitative standards: at least she has contrived to avoid four ciphers, if not three. One wishes, however, that she could have somehow persuaded the printer to break up the narrow vertical ribbons of *ibid.*'s which disfigure the bottoms of so many pages. It is pleasing to find that she has often noted the Latin equivalents of titles of office and other technical terms. Besides taking the pains to cite all the articles in Pauly-Wissowa and other reference works which seem to bear upon her subject, she has compiled a good classified bibliography. But Seeck's *Die Briefe des Libanius zeitlich geordnet* (Leipzig, 1906) would have helped with the prosopography of the whole period, not only with the Basil-Libanius correspondence; and on p. xiv the *HSCP* should not masquerade as a "Harvard Journal of Philological Studies." A small item that deserved to be included is the Abbé Fernand Boulenger's *Saint Basile aux Jeunes Gens sur*

*la manière de tirer profit des lettres Helléniques* (Paris, Association Guillaume Budé, 1935)—a separate edition and translation of *Ad Adolescentes*.

According to the author's preface, her manuscript was read carefully by three of her teachers. They ought to have suggested some improvements in the English style. There are many awkward or incorrect expressions such as "... debtors who were *inveighed* ..." (p. 20); "the disease for acquiring" (p. 33); "... the rich man ... anxious and *worrisome* about his wealth" (p. 34); "As a reason for their discontent ... the Saint *ascribes* ..." (p. 47); "He prays him to continue in the same good dispositions towards him" (p. 65); and "... the Saint *acquiesced* to aid a certain Caesarean to be released from the office" (p. 135). Slight lapses in spelling are "Vasilev" (p. xii), "Comagene" (p. 2), and "Nouveaux riche" (p. 33).

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† HERMAN HIRT. *Die Hauptprobleme der indogermanischen Sprachwissenschaft*. Herausgegeben und bearbeitet von HELMUT ARNTZ. Halle-Saale, Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1939. Pp. x + 226.

Although many of the theories expounded in this volume are already familiar to the scholar who has studied the *Indogermanische Grammatik*, we must be grateful to Dr. Helmut Arntz for having completed and published this last work of Herman Hirt. Arntz does not exactly indicate what parts of the volume were written by Hirt himself, but this omission is not important, for in the parts which have not been written by Hirt, Arntz certainly gives us faithfully the point of view of his teacher.

The work is composed of thirty-six chapters among which we may cite: 6. The original home of the Indo-European; 7. The culture of the Indo-European; 13. The flexion and its origin; 14. Singular and plural; 15. The origin of the cases; 16. The grammatical genera; 18. The personal endings of the verb; 19. The development of the *verbum finitum*; 20. Active, middle and passive; 21. Primary and secondary endings; 22. The formation of the verbal stem; 23. The tenses; 24. The modes; 25. The expression of time; 28. The accent; 29. The Indo-European vocalism; 30. The Indo-European ablaut; 31. The Indo-European consonants; 33. The compounds; 35. The syntax; 36. The order of words in Indo-European. At the end of the book there are two concluding chapters in which Hirt sums up and condenses his theories.

Hirt is especially interested in the pre-history of the Indo-European speech. After 1875 most of the scholars who studied Comparative Philology were satisfied with reconstructing the Indo-European forms, and they thought that it was impossible to go further back. According to Hirt, that was a mistake. We can at least partly discover the origin of the cases. There was originally no differentiation between nominative and accusative; the local cases



originated relatively late; the instrumental developed from the locative; and the genitive, which is, in form, like a nominative, is also relatively new. Accordingly, there remain as old cases only the nominative-accusative and the dative. There was originally a *casus indefinitus* functioning as nominative, accusative, vocative, genitive, and locative. To this *casus indefinitus* were appended either meaningless particles or local postpositions to differentiate the cases.

Hirt's theory of the verb is that in Indo-European it developed from the noun. There was a time when in Indo-European the way of expression was purely nominal. Remains of this stage are the participles and infinitives. A sentence like *se in Galliam venisse* is a sentence without a verb. Forms like *sunt, ferent, dat* are originally participles; forms like *ferimini, sequere, agi, egi, ἔπει(σ)αι* are originally infinitives. Some nominal forms came to be used with a verbal meaning. This was the origin of the verbal forms, and then the verbal forms became differentiated by the addition of particles (*age : agi-tō : agitōte*). The difference between the verbal forms in *-ti* and the verbal forms in *-t* is to be explained by the difference between the *-ti* and the *-t* nominal stems. The *-ti* nominal stems are action nouns, and the *-t* nominal stems are agent nouns. Accordingly the *-ti* verbal forms have a durative meaning, and the *-t* verbal forms a perfective meaning.

The theories of Hirt are interesting, but many scholars will not be inclined to admit them. For instance the interpretation of the accusative and infinitive as an old independent sentence seems untenable. It is not unreasonable to suppose that in very remote prehistoric times there was no differentiation of cases or case functions in the pre-Indo-European language, and the explanation proposed by Hirt for the origin of the cases is attractive, but it is not convincing; and on the other hand it seems impossible to prove that the nominal forms are older than the verbal forms.

This last work of Hirt is written in a very vivid way and, in spite of the doubtful nature of some of the author's views, is a stimulating book.

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*Yale Classical Studies.* Vol. VI. Edited by A. M. HARMON, A. R. BELLINGER, and H. T. ROWELL. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1939. Pp. 167; 1 plate. \$2.

Bellinger in "Achilles' Son and Achilles" (pp. 3-13) argues that in the *Iphigenia at Aulis* Euripides "split up" the Neoptolemus of the *Philoctetes* and used part of him for Achilles and part for Iphigenia. In "The Bacchae and Hippolytus" (pp. 17-27) he solves the riddle of the later play in the light of the earlier one, which it resembles in important respects. The real Euripides, according to Bellinger, "was as sincere in his praise of gods as in his doubt of them" and was "alive to the great realities of human worship" (p. 27).

From the form which the re-transposition of "Tacitus, Histories IV, 46-53" takes in Yalensis I (Codex Budensis Rhenani) Walter Allen, Jr. argues (pp. 31-38) that the MS is descended from Laurentianus Mediceus 68.2 (M) "or a MS so similar as to be a twin" (p. 36). The argument is not convincing. C. W. Mendell (pp. 41-70) groups the "Manuscripts of Tacitus XI-XXI" according to their interrelations, proves that they do not all derive from M, and concludes that "the Group I MSS, with readings most widely divergent from the rest, assume a new importance" (p. 67). In an Addendum he describes Budensis 9; Copenhagen, Gl. Kgl. S. 496 (a typical MS of Group I); and Yalensis II.

In "The Honesta Missio from the Numeri of the Roman Imperial Army" (pp. 73-108), Rowell by a skilful combination of inscriptional and historical evidence establishes a strong probability that, except in the case of *dediticii*, an honorable discharge from the national *numeri* was attended by the gift of Roman citizenship to the veteran and his children. The policy instituted by Pius of excluding from this award the children born to the veteran before his discharge "was closely connected with the problem presented by soldiers to be discharged from the earliest *numeri* created by Hadrian" (p. 88).

Finally, J. P. Maguire discusses "The Sources of Pseudo-Aristotle de Mundo" (pp. 111-167). He argues convincingly that Pseudo-Aristotle was a Peripatetic who was "acquainted, directly or through intermediaries, with the Pythagorean commentaries of Speusippus, Heraclides Ponticus, Aristotle . . . , etc.," and who "freely used Stoic scientific works" (p. 166). Pseudo-Aristotle was opposed to the philosophical principles of the Stoics and was only slightly influenced by Posidonius.

Such in outline is the perspicacious group of essays which constitutes Volume VI of the *Yale Classical Studies*. Of the few misprints, one has led to a confused sentence (p. 129, n. 40) and another to a misstatement of the areas of Roman forts (pp. 104-5).

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LUDWIG RADERMACHER. *Mythos und Sage bei den Griechen*. Baden bei Wien and Leipzig, Rudolf M. Rohrer Verlag, 1938. Pp. 360.

Radermacher's book contains a comprehensive survey of the field of Greek myth, legend, and folktale. The first part (*Vorfragen*) is chiefly concerned with methods of investigation in this field. He rapidly sketches the history of mythological study since the eighteenth century, discussing the symbolic and nature-myth theories, the comparative school, and the historical-critical method. In this part are interesting discussions of the principal figures and their contributions: Creuzer, Voss, the brothers Grimm, Mannhardt, K. O. Müller, Welcker, Wilamowitz. But Max Müller barely receives notice, though some attention is paid to sun and moon mythologies. Rader-

macher follows most contemporary scholars in employing the historical-critical method to separate the kernel of a story from its later additions and the comparative method to determine the original character of a story and to separate the mythical, imaginative, and historical elements in it. In this part Radermacher examines the Bellerophon story to illustrate his method.

The second part (*Versuche*) contains detailed treatments of the Jason and Theseus legends. Each is broken up into its component parts and each part is thoroughly studied. In the Jason legend Radermacher finds an original Jason adventure, to which were joined the stories of Medea, the wonder-ship, and the bold seafarers who had marvellous adventures (the true Argonaut story).

The *Versuche* are followed by several short appendices (*Exkurse*), which are followed by numerous notes and an index.

This is a very good book, full of interesting and entertaining matter, though it is possible that some of Radermacher's conclusions will prove unacceptable. At this time I shall only object to his statement (p. 99) that Apollo's golden hair may represent the crown of solar rays.

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(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

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